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Abstract 
For many Member States financial instruments were a new approach to delivering 
Cohesion policy. Their increased use in 2007-13 created significant challenges especially 
for MAs with limited experience. The regulatory framework provided flexibility to 
accommodate domestic arrangements, but demanded considerable administrative 
capacity. FIs can be more sustainable than grants, generate better quality projects, and 
may be considered more cost-effective in some circumstances. However, their main 
rationale in the OPs has been to facilitate access to finance for SMEs, which became more 
important in the crisis. The scale of FI varies between countries, as does the share 
reaching final recipients. In most countries, FI are over 80% invested, but some very 
large FIs have been overcapitalised and the EU average is 61%. Governance 
arrangements tend to be context specific, but build heavily on existing public financial 
institutions. Implementing FI proved complex with demands for greater clarity and 
certainty met through successive changes to the Regulations and guidance, many of 
which have been consolidated into the 2014-20 regulatory framework. Monitoring 
systems for FI are weak, with little hard data on outcomes such as private funding, job 
creation and innovation, but some evidence that FI increase access to finance and can 
help develop private markets.  
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Equity  Equity investment means the provision of capital to a firm, invested directly 
or indirectly in return for total or partial ownership of that firm and where 
the equity investor may assume some management control of the firm and 
share in the firm's profits.  
Exit policy/strategy  A policy/strategy for an investor to liquidate holdings for maximum return, 
including trade sales, write-offs, redemption of preference shares/loans, 
sale to another venture capitalist, sale to a financial institution and sale by 
public offering (including initial public offerings).  
FEI Manager (= FI 
manager) 
An individual or entity responsible for implementing the investment 
strategy and managing the portfolio of investments related to the HF or to 
the Financial (Engineering) Instruments. For 2014-2020 period normally 
referred to as Fund Manager. 
Final Recipient  The enterprises, public-private partnerships, projects or any legal or 
natural person receiving repayable investments from a financial 
engineering instrument.  
First Loss Portfolio 
Guarantees 
FI credit risk protection, guaranteeing the lender reimbursement for the 
first losses in a portfolio of loans. 
First Loss Portfolio 
Guarantees for 
Leasing 
FI guarantees, e.g. covering losses of 80% of the lease amount on 
portfolios of new SME leases. 
Financial 
Engineering 
Instrument  
Financial Engineering Instruments are those set up under Article 44 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/20061. As part of an OP, Structural Funds 
may finance:  
(a) financial engineering instruments for enterprises, primarily small and 
medium-sized, such as venture capital funds, guarantee funds and loan 
funds (examined under WP 3) 
(b) urban development funds, i.e. funds investing in public-private 
partnerships and other projects included in an integrated plan for 
sustainable urban development  
(c) Funds or other incentive schemes providing loans, guarantees for 
repayable investments, or equivalent instruments, for energy efficiency and 
use of renewable energy in buildings, including in existing housing.  
Financial Instrument A term used in preference to Financial Engineering Instrument for the next 
programming period.  
Financial 
Intermediary  
The body that acts as an intermediary between the supply and demand of 
financial products, normally between the MA or Fund of Funds and Final 
Recipients.  
Fund Manager  An individual or entity responsible for implementing the investment 
strategy and managing the portfolio of investments related to Financial 
(Engineering) Instruments, being funds for equity, loans and guarantee 
funds.  
                                          
1  European Commission (2012): Revised guidance note on financial engineering instruments under Article 44 
of Council Regulation (EC) n°1083/2006 
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Funding Agreement  Level I - between the Member State or the MA and the HF.  
Level II - between the Member State or MA (or the HF where applicable) 
and the individual Financial (Engineering) Instrument. Level II funding 
agreements are also referred to as operational agreements.  
Funding agreements must ensure correct implementation of the strategy, 
including goals to be achieved, target sectors and final recipients to be 
supported. Moreover the funding agreements must also contain rules, 
obligations and procedures.  
Gap Analysis  A market assessment under the JEREMIE initiative to identify the potential 
for FEIs to address market failure in SME and enterprise financing.  
Grant  A non-repayable investment.  
Guarantee  A commitment by a third party, called the guarantor, to repay a lender on 
behalf of a borrower when the latter cannot pay it. As stipulated in the 
agreement between the guarantor, the lender and/or the borrower.  
Holding Fund (HF) It is set up to invest in venture capital, guarantee, loan, equity or urban 
development funds, or other incentive schemes. In the 2014-2020 period 
normally called Fund of Funds. 
HF Manager  The individual or entity responsible for implementing the investment 
strategy and managing the portfolio of investments for an HF as set out in 
the funding agreement.  
Loan  An agreement that requires the lender to make available to the borrower a 
sum of money for an agreed amount and time. The borrower must repay 
the loan after a certain period. Usually the borrower must pay interest.  
Leverage Effect  This is the increase in funds available after co-investment. As per Article 
140 of the Financial Regulation No 966/2012 the leverage effect of Union 
funds shall be equal to the amount of finance to eligible final recipients 
divided by the amount of the Union contribution.  
Mezzanine finance This combines the features of debt and equity. The term covers a variety of 
instruments. Mezzanine finance includes convertible shareholder loans, loan 
notes and preference shares. These instruments are unsecured. 
Operational 
Agreement  
An agreement between the Member State or the MA (or the HF where 
applicable) and the individual financial instruments. In the 2014-2020 
period these are normally called funding agreements. 
Risk Assessment  This is part of a risk management procedure and determines the 
quantitative or qualitative value of the FUHGLWULVNµYDOXDWLRQ¶4XDQWLWDWLYH
credit risk assessment requires the estimation and calculation of risk 
LQFOXGLQJµH[SHFWHGORVV¶DQGµXQH[SHFWHGORVV¶ZKLFKLVWKHPDJQLWXGHRI
the potential loss and the probability that the loss will occur.  
Seed Capital  This is financing to study, assess and develop an initial concept. The seed 
phase precedes the start-up phase. The two phases together are called the 
early stage.  
Start-up Capital  This is financing for product development and initial marketing for 
enterprises being set up, or already existing but not yet selling their 
product or service.  
Venture Capital  Investment in unquoted enterprises by venture capital firms that manage 
individual, institutional or in-house money. In Europe, the main financing 
stages included in venture capital are early-stage (covering seed and start-
up) and expansion. It is a subset of private equity. Offsetting the high risk 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
  
is the expectation of a higher than average return on the investment.  
Winding-up  A process that involves selling all the assets of a fund, paying off creditors, 
distributing any remaining assets to the principals, and then dissolving the 
IXQG(VVHQWLDOO\µZLQGLQJXS¶LVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVµOLTXLGDWLRQ¶ 
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 i 
This study examines ERDF co-financed financial instruments (FIs) for enterprises in 
2007-13. It is based on data analysis for  µVWRFNWDNH¶ FRXQWULHV, a literature review, 
nine case study OPs and a seminar with stakeholders to refine the findings. For many 
Member States FI were a novel approach to delivering Cohesion policy. Their increased 
use in 2007-13 therefore created significant challenges, especially for MAs with limited 
experience in FI implementation. The regulatory framework provided the flexibility to 
accommodate domestic arrangements, but was also demanding in terms of the 
administrative capacity needed at national and regional levels. Domestic policymakers 
sought greater clarity and certainty in the regulatory framework, and these were met 
through successive changes to the Regulations and guidance. Many of these and wider 
lessons from 2007-13 have been consolidated into the regulatory framework for 2014-
20.  
What rationales and conceptual models underpin FIs for enterprises? 
FIs can be more sustainable than grants, generate better quality projects, and be more 
cost-effective. In the context of enterprise support, FIs can address capital market 
imperfections; reflecting this, MAs systematically cited limited access to finance for 
SMEs as the rationale for FIs. 
However, in practice we found that pragmatic considerations were often just as 
important. These include avoiding decommitment (ES, IT), or responding to Commission 
enthusiasm for FI (OP Bavaria (DE)). The rationale for using FIs, or not, is context 
specific. FIs may be used in domestic policy, but not in Cohesion policy, perhaps due to 
small allocations which make the administrative burden too high (Flanders (BE)) or 
because the OP focus is on projects that are less likely to generate returns. An important 
motivation in some regions was the development of local financial markets to offset 
agglomeration tendencies (OP North East England (UK)). Mid-term, the financial crisis 
was important in justifying use of FIs, which were readapted (OP COMPETE (PT)) or 
became the principal mechanism to stimulate recovery (OP Economic Growth (LT)). 
There is no evidence that FIs were viewed as an alternative delivery mechanism to 
grants, at least initially. The relationship between grants and FIs is not well articulated in 
the OPs, but the stakeholder seminar suggested increasing importance is being given to 
coordination. Sustainability, cost-effectiveness and quality of investment seem not to 
have been important motivating factors for many MAs. For most, the priority has been 
operationalising FI against the backdrop of a complex regulatory environment. Where 
there was limited experience in running FI, this typically overshadowed the long-term 
rationale of having funds to reinvest and among the nine case study OPs only two of 
them (North East England and Languedoc-Roussillon) had a clear legacy strategy. 
Looking ahead, motivations are evolving: indications are that MAs may approach the 
rationale for FIs with more rigour in future. Experience in some regions suggests that FI 
can sometimes be more attractive to higher quality projects than grants, and as the 
prospect of legacy funds becomes a reality, there is growing interest in the sustainability 
of FI. 0RUHRYHUDOWKRXJKDµWKHRU\RIFKDQJH¶DSSURDFKdid not underpin policy design in 
2007-13, a fine-grained analysis of potential FIs, is a valuable tool (under the now 
mandatory ex ante assessment) to align relevant interests and objectives and develop a 
common understanding of needs.  
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ii 
How much support has been provided through FIs and in what forms?  
The Commission first published an annual summary of data reported by MAs on the 
implementation of FIs in 2012. The 2015 Summary Report records OP commitments of 
RYHU¼ELOOLRQ WR),E\HQGDOPRVW¼ELOOLRQRIZKLFKLVDFFRXQWHGIRUE\(5')
co-financed support for enterprises, compared witKMXVW¼ELOOLRQLQ-6.2 Countries 
vary widely in their use of FI: in absolute terms the largHVWFRPPLWPHQWV¼ELOOLRQRU
over 30% of FIs to enterprises) are reported by Italy, but relative to private investment, 
FIs in Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal are more significant.  
Collectively, WKHVWRFNWDNHFRXQWULHVFRPPLWWHGRYHU¼ELOOLRQWR FIs for enterprises 
under the 2007-13 OPs. While most of this (94%) was paid into holding funds or specific 
funds, less than 60% of the OP contributions committed had actually been 
invested in final recipients by end 2014. There are several reasons for this ostensibly 
unsatisfactory overall performance: a slow start in FI implementation meant it was not 
always possible for investmeQWWR µFDWFKXS¶ZLWKSD\PHQWVthe very poor performance 
of some very large funds which, in aggregate terms, conceals quite high investment rates 
elsewhere; and lack of experience and capacity among some MAs and other 
stakeholders, which needed time to develop the skills needed.  
In the stocktake countries some 784 ERDF co-financed FIs for enterprises had been 
set up by end 2014. This figure comprises 37 holding funds, 410 funds set up within 
holding funds and 337 funds established outside holding funds, in other words, a total of 
747 specific instruments. The number of FI varies widely between countries but is not 
straightforward to quantify meaningfully (from 2 (CZ) to 202 (PL)).  
Fund size is very diverse: In the stocktake countries, individual funds range from just 
RYHU ¼ (HU) WR VRPH ¼ PLOOLRQ (IT), but vary widely in geographical scope, 
financial product and objectives. Some regional equity funds appear too small to have 
the critical mass referred to by the ECA; on the other hand, some large funds appear to 
be among the worst performing: WKHUHDUH ORDQIXQGVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQDQGE\
end 2014, six of these had lent less than 20% of their funds to final recipients. Overall, 
loan funds H[FHHGLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ ZHUH MXVW  invested by end 2014, while smaller 
funds OHVVWKDQ¼PLOOLRQwere almost 82% invested. The impact of a few very large 
funds which have invested very small amounts is significant overall: three funds (two in 
,WDO\RQHLQ6SDLQWRJHWKHUWRWDOOLQJ¼ million (nearly 10% of all payments to loan 
funds in the stocktake countries) have each invested less than two percent in final 
recipients. This overcapitalisation is partly attributable to the avoidance of 
decommitment,3  which in turn makes it difficult to conclude on the relationship between 
fund size, product type and efficiency / effectiveness.  
Loans are the most widely used form of co-financed FI, accounting for almost half 
(361) of all FI in the stocktake countries (747). Guarantees are less widespread (126 
funds) but typically larger in volume. Loans and guarantees account for about two thirds 
of the OP contributions paid to funds in 2007-13. There are 140 equity funds in the 
                                          
2  There are serious deficiencies in the quality of the data reported by the managing authorities. These include 
misunderstandings of the data requirements and incomplete returns. This means that conclusions about the 
scale of spend (and other quantitative indicators) must be treated with caution. 
3  The introduction of phased payments in 2014-20 reduces the scope for this. 
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stocktake countries. These are often regional and are more likely to be closely targeted 
(e.g. on innovative firms) than loan and guarantee funds.  
What are the management and implementation structures? 
The implementation of FIs is characterised by considerable diversity in 
governance and the funding agreements which determine project selection. The FI 
landscape is so varied that implementation mechanisms defy easy comparison. They can 
involve holding funds that feed numerous specific funds each run by one fund manager 
(OP Economic Growth, LT), or the same financial products offered through a national 
network of financial intermediaries (OP Economic Development, HU). The experience of 
major domestic players was often important (e.g. ýMZRB (CZ) and INVEGA (LT)). FI 
support can range from commercial terms offered by co-investment funds (Scottish Co-
investment Fund, UK) to loans at submarket interest rates (OP Convergence Wallonia, 
BE).  
Despite this diversity, key implementation challenges were similar. The lack of 
guidance in the regulations created uncertainties, resulting in significant delays. The 
issues faced are well documented and were a significant obstacle to the smooth 
implementation of FIs in 2007-13 in some cases. In the Enterprise and Innovation OP 
(CZ) the effect of the regulatory dimension was particularly severe ± even though Czech 
funds were among the first to be set up, uncertainties surrounding the precise 
requirements contributed to a suspension of the funds by the auditors. However, 
implementation challenges go beyond Commission guidance and regulations, with limited 
experience among many domestic players and domestic arrangements sometimes ill-
adapted to repayable instruments.  
It is extremely difficult to assess the scale of management fees and costs under co-
financed FIs. For many FIs, fees and costs are not explicitly reported to the Commission, 
and detailed analysis of the relevant data did not even yield plausible results for the nine 
case study OPs, though they do suggest that management fees differ widely by type of 
product and intermediary. Fees may be particularly high for equity funds ± in 18 funds, 
management fees and costs exceeded 20% of the amounts invested in final recipients. 
Also important, while uninvested funds are returned to the EU budget at closure, OP 
contributions to management fees are paid out as eligible expenditure. With one 
exception, case study MAs maintained that FI management fees were below the 
regulatory thresholds established by Article 43(4) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1828/2006. It was rare (perhaps only in the UK) that fees were linked to performance 
indicators. Looking ahead, the 2014-20 regulations provide for stricter limits on OP 
contributions to fees, and require a performance-related component.  
What does the monitoring and evaluation system show? 
Overall the quality of information on FIs is poor. Even though the provisions on 
monitoring are an obligatory element of each funding agreement between MAs and fund 
manager, specific reporting by MAs to the Commission on FIs was not required until 
2011, and the obligatory elements to be reported are few. Financial information 
submitted by MAs is as a result patchy and reporting requirements have sometimes been 
misunderstood. Because many elements of reporting remained optional, basic data is 
often missing and it may be unclear whether information is unavailable on a given FI, or 
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whether no investments have been made. Sometimes the amount invested in final 
recipients exceeds OP commitments, suggesting that either returns to the fund have 
been double-counted - they are no longer strictly OP contributions (HU, LT, PL) - or 
interest has been added to the OP contribution - which is not an error of interpretation 
(PL). However, it is not known to what extent this has happened, making it impossible to 
provide basic aggregate data on the extent to which OP commitments have been 
invested, let alone assessments of how much they cost to run and what impact they have 
had on jobs or investment. 
The case study analysis suggests that there is generally no ongoing quality control of 
data monitoring by MAs beyond that arising from ERDF related audits, State aid 
inspections and ECA visits. Moreover, the monitoring systems set up by MAs usually have 
only a few indicators and these are generally inadequate to provide an impact 
assessment. Existing evaluations provide very limited evidence on the 
effectiveness of ERDF-supported FIs for enterprise support. Evaluations which assessed 
FIs in relation to recipient firms in general indicate that the SMEs created jobs and 
increased their turnover, but only in a few cases were outcomes measured in terms of 
the net effects of FI support. It remains unclear what capacity FIs have to contribute to 
regional development objectives. The relative efficiency of FIs as opposed to grants is 
also unknown and underexplored. 
What are the outcomes and how effective have FI been? 
Appraisal of the operational objectives of OP priorities within which FIs were implemented 
suggests that almost all of them were achieved, 70% to a high degree. For the strategic 
objectives (related to the regional economy or the SME sector), the appraisal was 
positive for fewer than half. For the majority of objectives, assessment of the FI 
contribution was impossible due to lack of data. However, FIs clearly improved access to 
finance for many enterprises (FIs under the Economic Growth OP reached over 7% of all 
SMEs in Lithuania), thus achieving an objective stipulated in almost every case study OP.  
AQDO\VLV RI23 FRQWULEXWLRQV VKRZV WKDW RXW RI ¼ ELOOLRQ SDLG WR KROGLQJ IXQGV DQG
specific funds, RQO\¼PLOOLRQOHVVWKDQFDPHIURPprivate sources. However, it 
is important to note that: not all OPs allow for private contributions; and that private 
funds maybe attracted µGRZQVWrHDP¶ EXW DUH QRW QHFHVVarily captured in the data 
collected by MAs. This partly accounts for the wide variations between countries, with the 
UK attracting relatively significant inputs from the private sector (more than 60% of the 
total across all stocktake countries), and smaller sums in France and Portugal. Some 
countries attract no private funding as part of OP contribution (e.g. BE, HU, LT). Some 
¼PLOOLRQ in private capital was attracted through equity FIs, mainly in the UK. The 
capacity to attract private funds for venture capital improved markedly during the period. 
Leverage4 varies widely in the case study OPs, ranging from 20.4 under the OP Bavaria 
(DE) equity FI, and 18 in the Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) guarantee scheme to around 
1.2-2.2 in most loan FIs. Where the MA involved experienced venture capitalists, as in 
Bavaria (DE), North East England (UK) or Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), private funding was 
high in both absolute and relative terms. However, there may be other sources of 
funding that are not reported which could represent an important share of private 
                                          
4 Public and private funds attracted relative to the ERDF contribution. 
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contributions attracted by FIs, so the focus in the AIR on contributions to the OP 
underplays the likely role of private funds which come on top of OP contribution. 
There is insufficient reliable data for even a tentative global estimate of µUHYROYHG¶
funds. For some case study OPs there is a clear indication that monies have revolved for 
some loans funds (for instance 25% in OP Bavaria (DE), 20%-200%, depending on the 
), LQ 23 0DáRSROVNLH 3/ DQG -126% in OP Economic Growth (LT)). With the 
exceptions of North East England (UK) and ± to a limited extent - Languedoc-Roussillon 
(FR), many of the FI in the case study OPs did not have a clear strategy for establishing 
a legacy. Among the case study OPs, few loan schemes (and no guarantee schemes) 
have reached the stage of revolving, partly due to the late start of the loan schemes and 
the average loan duration. For equity funds, the issue is different; most equity funds 
have been established for a fixed duration, typically 10 years. Although there are 
reported exits (with positive and negative results) from many funds, they involve fewer 
than 10% of the total number of deals. With the exception of OP North East England 
(UK), the future/final financial outcome, and hence the sustainability of the public money 
invested, has not been estimated (North East England expects its holding fund to 
generate close to 100 percent of ERDF plus the public sector match).  
In terms of final outcomes such as productivity, job creation etc., too few MAs provide 
such data related to FIs to make an overall assessment of their impact. For example, job 
outcomes are reported in only five cases: in Bavaria (DE) some 513 jobs were created or 
safeguarded (which was below target); in North East England (UK) the figure was 1,953, 
RIZKLFKPRVWZHUHLQGLVDGYDQWDJHGDUHDVLQ0DáRSROVNie (PL) 162, which seems quite 
modest; while in OP Enterprise and Innovation (CZ) and OP Economic Development (HU) 
5,780 and 61,896 jobs, respectively, were reported, which seem implausibly high. The 
case studies show that the effects of FIs on turnover, job creation, and the innovation 
capacity and competitiveness of supported companies are not systematically measured 
and it seems probable that this pattern is replicated more widely. Only North East 
England (UK) has collected data that shows the effects on innovation capacity.  
Although some final recipients used FI funding to upgrade their technology and business 
processes, a substantial part of funding went into working capital rather than fixed 
investment. The scope for FIs to finance working capital represented important added 
value compared to grants, since it enabled support for business activity during the crisis 
when access to finance became more constrained. It also provides greater flexibility as 
some activities tend to be ineligible for grants since expansion is not based on fixed asset 
investment. Case study evidence suggests that around 60% of loan volumes (as a share 
of all co-financed loan and guarantee products) in Lithuania were for working capital. 
Working capital was also supported in other OPs (including Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) ± 
11%; 0DáRSROVNie (PL) ± 9%; and Hungary c7.5%), but sometimes the scale cannot be 
estimated (OP COMPETE ± PT) or eligibility is unclear (OP Enterprise and Competitiveness 
(CZ). Elsewhere, working capital is explicitly ineligible (OP Bavaria (DE); OP North East 
England (UK) and OP Technological Fund (ES)).  
Last, softer evidence can also provide insights into how FIs have worked: FIs have had 
a tangible positive impact in improving access to finance for SMEs in Lithuania, in 
supporting the development of a sustainable regional revolving fund in North East 
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England (UK), in developing the business angel finance market in Bavaria (DE) and in 
nurturing regionally-EDVHGILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVLQ0DáRSROVNie (PL) and Hungary. 
Conclusions 
The slow start to implementation in 2007-13 partly owed to the complex skill set 
required to establish FI and the lack of capacity in some managing authorities. These 
demands meant that often the most straightforward route was to entrust implementation 
to an existing body, such as a promotional bank. Such structures are not present 
everywhere, however, and the case study research and stakeholder seminar both 
highlighted the importance of past experience in systems which have evolved over more 
than one programme period. This enables policy design to benefit from learning and the 
evaluation of past approaches to contribute to the development of future policies. 
Effective links with the private sector are an important component of capacity and are 
needed to mobilise its resources and expertise. This requires incentives which align public 
policy objectives with private sector motives. In some cases FI can be used to develop 
capacity in the private sector e.g. Economic Development OP (HU) and Bavaria (DE).  
The design and implementation of co-financed FI is context specific. This includes local 
economic conditions, banking / legal systems and previous experience with implementing 
FIs. Context matters because the underlying economic situation and existing institutional 
structures and practices set the parameters within which FI operate, affect how they 
work and influence domestic policy choices. In France, for example, the use of FI is 
comparatively limited, reflecting difficulties in adapting domestic law to the use of FI in 
Cohesion policy. 
In terms of the economic context, this study confirms the need for a quality ex ante 
assessment of the market and of the size and nature of the funding gap. Such 
assessments were not obligatory in 2007-13, but are for 2014-20; these should provide 
a firmer evidence base for the scale and focus of policy than has sometimes been 
evident. In Spain, for example, there has been a significant underinvestment of FI under 
the Technological Fund OP, partly due to a mismatch between the geographical focus of 
the FI and the targeting of innovative projects, which are less prevalent in more 
disadvantaged regions.  
An important lesson from this study is that the context can change and there may be a 
need to adjust the strategy during the course of implementation. Monitoring systems can 
play an important part in determining any adjustments needed, and provide information 
on effectiveness. This study shows that reporting by MAs to the Commission for 2007-13 
has been insufficient for a concrete assessment of policy outcomes. Notwithstanding 
these shortcomings, it is important that monitoring is also adapted to context. Reporting 
mechanisms should be commensurate with the scale of funds in order for costs to be 
proportionate.5  
The 2007-13 experience shows the importance of close coordination of the various actors 
involved from the outset. FI implementation is characterised by multilevel principal-agent 
                                          
5  For example, North West England (which was not one of the case studies) maintains a highly sophisticated 
bespoke real-time system for tracking FI investments by fund managers, but the cost of such a set up 
would be prohibitive in other contexts. 
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relationships, the definition of which requires detailed calibration: funding agreements 
need to be sufficiently attractive to fund managers to secure their involvement, but also 
enforceable so that the policy objectives are met; balancing the need for flexibility (to 
UHVSRQG WR FKDQJLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV DJDLQVW WKH ULVN RI µREMHFWLYH GULIW¶ PD\ EH
challenging.  
The disparate nature and scale of the instruments deployed against the backdrop of 
diverse economic and institutional contexts, coupled with limited data makes it hard to 
draw concrete or comparative conclusions about the conduct and performance of FIs in 
2007-13. Implementation of FIs in 2007-13 has faced challenges ± the crisis, gaps in the 
regulatory framework, the complexity of the administrative structures and the skills 
required. If there is an overarching narrative, it is perhaps to be found in the role of time 
and experience in policy evolution. This may be a truism, but in spite of the challenges, 
FIs under some OPs have performed well in terms of investment in final recipients or 
development of local financial markets, for example, and arguably those that have 
performed best are those that were able to draw on the experience either of existing 
systems and structures or past programmes while committing funding allocations that 
could realistically be absorbed. Even among those FIs that have performed less well, the 
indications are that the experience of FIs in 2007-13 will inform and enrich the design 
and implementation of FIs in 2014-20, contributing to more mature and responsive policy 
instruments in future. 
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2.1 Purpose of the evaluation 
This study looks at the use of financial instruments (FIs) for enterprises in the 2007-13 
Cohesion policy planning period.  
Ex post evaluations are viewed as an important way of informing national and regional 
authorities, the general public, the European Parliament and other stakeholders involved 
about the outcomes of the 2007-13 Cohesion policy programmes. They examine the 
extent to which the resources were used, the effectiveness and the socio-economic 
impact. They also aim to identify factors contributing to the success or failure of 
programmes and highlight good practice. 
We take this opportunity to thank all the stakeholders of the case study OPs who gave 
their time and provided valuable insights into and information on their programmes and 
instruments. 
2.2 Scope of the evaluation 
The methodology for the study was as follows: 
x A stocktake of FIs in the 12 Member States (Task 1) which account for the 
majority (c.92%) of ERDF-funded FIs for enterprise support and most expenditure 
on FIs (c.86% of total planned equity/venture capital FI expenditure; 92% of 
loan/guarantee expenditure). The stocktake covers 108 European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) Operational Programmes (OPs) in 12 Member States.6 
x A survey of the literature (Task 2) IRFXVHGRQD µWKHRU\RIFKDQJH¶DSSURDFKWR
understand how and where FIs might work, in what conditions and for whom. 
x Nine case studies (Task 3), based on nine selected OPs in different Member 
States, which explore the key issues for all FIs within that OP. The key features of 
FIs in the case study OPs are outlined in the table below.  
x A stakeholder seminar (Task 4) ³)LQDQFLDO ,QVWUXPHQWV IRU HQWHUSULVH VXSSRUW
Lessons from 2007-´held on 11 September 2015, which was an important 
milestone towards the final report.7  
                                          
6 The countries covered by the stocktake are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  
7  The seminar discussed and deepened the emerging findings of Tasks 1 (Taking stock of support), 2 
(Literature review), and 3 (Case studies). A total of 47 participants attended the seminar which was 
LQWHUDFWLYHO\VWUXFWXUHGDQGFRQVLVWHGRISOHQDU\VHVVLRQVDQGEUHDNRXWµZRUOGFDIp¶JURXSVThe seminar 
provided an opportunity to hear the views of stakeholders such as representatives of Managing Authorities 
(MAs) and Intermediate Bodies (IBs), chambers of commerce / enterprise associations, the European 
Commission, European Investment Fund (EIF), the academics / advisors associated with the study as 
external experts, the country experts involved in case study drafting and representatives of parallel ex-post 
evaluations commissioned by DG Regio. 
 
2 Introduction 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 2 
Table 1: FIs in the case study Operational Programmes 
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CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
0 1 0 1 0 0   2 3,774 234.5 4.3 5.7 
DE: OP Bavaria  0 1 3 0 0 0   4 582 101.0 9.7 21.1 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
1 1 0 1 0 0   3 860 527.0 28.3 28.3 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon  
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1,308 30.0 6.0 14.7 
HU: OP 
Economic 
Development 
17 77 25 43 162 1   0 14,767* 710.9 19.3 20.9 
LT: OP 
Economic 
Growth 
4 15 5 0 23 2 1 1 5,540 265.8 8.7 25.1 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVND 3 11 0 0 0 0   14 1,544 38.6 2.9 13.3 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
0 0 25 2 26 1   1 6,831 271.4 9.3 10.3 
UK: OP North 
East England  0 1 6 1 7 1 
  1 771 167.9 17.4 30.7 
Total 25 107 64 49 219 6   26   2347.2     
Source: Own calculations from 2015 Summary Report, situation at 31 December 2014. *Data as of 31 
December 2013 as the situation at 31 December 2014 was not reported by the MA.  
The full stocktake was included in the First Intermediate Report presented to the 
European Commission in March 2015; this report includes only a summary.  
The nine complete case study reports have also been published separately. This report 
provides a comparative overview of case study findings. In addition, the executive 
summaries of the case studies are included in the country annexes appended to this 
report. The findings in this report are structured around the five main evaluation 
questions outlined in the following section. 
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2.3 Evaluation questions 
The aim of this ex post evaluation is to assess the rationale, implementation and early 
evidence of effectiveness of FIs implemented under Cohesion policy programmes in 
2007-13. 
The detailed evaluation questions outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the 
evaluation can be clustered into five groups. 
x What are the rationales and conceptual models that underpin financial 
instruments? 
x How much support has been provided through financial instruments and in what 
forms? 
x What are the management and operational structures for financial instruments, 
and how well are they working? 
x What does the monitoring and evaluation system show? 
x What are the outcomes and how effective have financial instruments been? 
The detailed list of task-specific evaluation questions (EQs) is presented in the Annex 
(6.4, 6.5) 
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3.1 Process/Methodology 
The evaluation included three core elements - stocktaking, literature survey and case 
studies ± designed to provide quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as the 
capacity to test empirically the principles suggested by the existing literature on FIs and 
the scope to enrich that literature. Figure 1 summarises the overall methodology of the 
study.  
More specifically, the stocktake (Task 1): 
x examined all ERDF programmes in the 12 Member States specified in the Terms of 
Reference, to identify and collect data for each FI scheme for enterprise support. 
Information was gathered on: (a) the private markets for FIs; (b) the main 
forms/packages of support offered; (c) the rationale for support and the types of 
business targeted; (d) the management and operational structure; (e) the 
amount of support provided; (f) effectiveness (where available) of the schemes; 
x cross-checked the above as far as possible with the data reported by Member 
States to the European Commission in their annual summaries of data on FIs, 
published beneficiary data, as well as with the results of the parallel ex post 
evaluation Work Package 0 (data collection and quality assessment); 
x used the outcome to select nine OPs for in-depth analysis under Task 3. These 
were chosen to be broadly representative of the different FI schemes in the 12 
countries in terms of forms/packages of support and rationale. The selection of 
OPs also took into account of the availability of reliable data, as well as the 
presence of significant or interesting FIs. 
The stocktake was carried out in parallel with an examination of the existing 
literature (Task 2) at EU and national level. The literature review sought examples of 
where and why publicly-funded FIs for enterprise support worked (or did not work), and 
studies comparing the performance of private sector with publicly-backed venture capital 
funds. The aim was to identify the main theories of change and contribution stories 
underpinning how FIs might work, taking account of the context, type of support, target 
recipients, as well as the performance and final results.  
Desk research on FI schemes and the literature review fed into Task 3, the nine case 
studies. These were the core of the evaluation. The case studies enabled a more in-
depth analysis of the specific FIs set up in the programme areas. The case studies were 
also intended to µWHVW¶ the theory of change approach, with a fine-grained analysis of the 
µPLFURVWHSVWKDWOHDGIURPLQSXWVWRRXWFRPHV¶. This approach posed challenges for the 
evaluators, notably those conducting the case studies, since it involved evaluating 
interventions according to logics that may not have been explicit at the programme or 
policy design stage. 
The structure of the case studies included: 
x mapping a conceptual model, identifying the desired change to be achieved 
through the FI scheme and providing information on the context for 
implementation and the steps to reach the outcome; 
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x checking how the FI worked in practice, assessing implementation activities e.g. 
set up, management, performance of the FI e.g. leverage, revolving of funds, and 
outcomes e.g. age, size and sector of supported enterprises; 
x comparing the expected impact of the policy according to the theory of change 
with the actual results, and drawing evidence-based conclusions about when, 
where and how FIs work or do not work. 
Case studies involved both desk review of the relevant documents and field research. 
Two pilot case studies were undertaken to enable feedback to be incorporated in the 
remaining case studies at an early stage of the process. 
Figure 1: Overall methodology (Tasks 1 to 4) 
 
Source: Consortium 
The final task of the evaluation ± the seminar (Task 4),± brought together the study 
team with representatives of the MAs, Commission officials and experts in the fields of 
theory-based evaluation and FIs (on whose expertise the study has drawn from the 
outset). The seminar involved the discussion of the rationales and conceptual models 
underpinning implementation of FIs, management and operational structures, monitoring 
and evaluation systems, and the outcomes and effectiveness of FIs. Key findings and 
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some outstanding questions were explored with the stakeholders and yielded significant 
information which has in turn fed into this Final Report.  
Goals and Theory of Change (ToC) of FIs  
On the basis of the available literature, the Terms of Reference for the study proposed a 
theory-based evaluation - specifically theory of change - to address the evaluation 
questions. Theory of change approaches have been widely used in the field of 
development policies but are new to Cohesion policy. Applying a theory of change 
approach at different scales and in a multidimensional context was a significant challenge 
for the study team. 
Box 1: What is a Theory of Change? What is a theory-based evaluation 
approach? 
Theory of change (ToC) is defined as a way to describe the set of assumptions that 
explain both the mini-steps that lead to a desired long term goal and the connections 
between policy or programme activities and results that occur at each step of the way.8  
A theory based evaluation approach follows several methodological steps. First, a 
reconstruction of the theory underpinning the intervention (including the preconditions 
for the achievement of the goals), the development of evaluation questions (EQs) and 
success indicators that cover the richness of the theory. Second, attention is focused on 
the theory, the verification of theory-specific EQs and the success indicators against 
available evidence. This either confirms the postulated ToC or indicates implementation 
gaps. The better the preconditions have been understood, the more likely it is that the 
expected outcomes will be achieved.  
Task 2 developed generalized ToCs for different types of firms (start-ups, mainstream 
SMEs, social enterprises, high growth firms) and for different types of FIs (loans, 
guarantees, equity finance). The detailed results are presented in the annex (6.6). 
However, these remained at a generalised level and cannot reflect the complexity of real 
world instruments.  
The research found that ToC differ not just by instrument, but also by specific instance. 
In other words, the ToC underpinning FIs are sui generis and the role and design of FIs 
depends critically on the objectives being pursued, the context in which FIs are applied, 
and the underlying assumptions concerning their design and implementation. Also 
crucial, FIs must be viewed as part of a wider economic and social policy landscape, 
including non-financial support and the development of appropriate linkages between 
different sources of finance, including different FIs, the role of the private sector and 
availability of non-repayable funding. 
                                          
8  EVALSED - The resource for the evaluation of Socio-Economic Development : Sourcebook - Method and 
techniques (09/2013), p54 f http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/evaluations-
guidance-documents/2013/evalsed-the-resource-for-the-evaluation-of-socio-economic-development-
sourcebook-method-and-techniques 
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Because the context and pre-conditions differ, so must core elements of the 
implementation structure and the design of policy instruments. In consequence, it was 
not possible to develop conceptual models for all types of FIs supported across 12 
Member States (108 OPs) in sufficient detail to show how financial instruments are 
expected to work and achieve their stated goals, and to be able to verify this in the Task 
3 case studies in a meaningful way.  
An alternative approach was therefore taken and simple retrospective ToCs were 
constructed for each OP which could later be verified. The broad lines of the plausible 
ToCs developed under Task 2 then helped to assess the context specific ToCs developed 
for the Task 3 case studies.   
The following figure presents an overall ToC model of FIs. The model provides all the core 
elements, from the planning phase to the expected outcomes. The key elements are 
linked together in a causal pathway. It demonstrates clearly that many pre-conditions 
need to work in practice for FIs to be appropriately targeted and successfully 
implemented.  
Figure 2: Overall ToC model of FIs 
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Task 3 aimed at the reconstruction of specific ToCs for all types of FIs supported in the 
nine case study programmes (nine OPs). This task was partially successful and could be 
regarded as a theory driven (but not theory-based) approach.9 The case studies 
demonstrate compellingly that there are serious limitations to organising the evaluation 
of FIs around a ToC when a policy intervention has not been designed on the basis of a 
theory of change. This may reflect the fact that FIs have been viewed less as an 
alternative delivery mechanism for achieving OP goals by MAs than as a means of 
addressing a gap in the availability of finance for SMEs.  
In the case studies, national experts refer to OP intervention logics,10 which are different 
from theories of change. In the 2007-13 period, ERDF programmes defined highly 
simplified intervention logics of policy objectives at different levels (OP, priority axes, and 
measures) and a limited set of corresponding (core) indicators to measure achievements. 
The OP intervention logic lacks the intermediate steps and the specific assumptions 
characteristic of a ToC. The OP intervention logic does not determine the pathway of 
preconditions, or change in conditions, needed for an OP to reach its long-term 
objectives. No details are given on the conditions (assumptions) that connect the 
DFWLYLWLHVWRWKHµVKRUW-WHUPUHVXOWV¶DQGWRWKHYHU\EURDGPDFUR-level outcomes.  
Although a ToC approach was not used in developing the FIs under the OPs, the case 
VWXGLHVDWWHPSWHGWRUHWURVSHFWLYHO\GHYHORSDQµHQULFKHGOP LQWHUYHQWLRQORJLF¶IRUVHWV
of FIs under each OP. National experts examined to what extent FIs had a rationale or 
set of hypotheses driving interventions, and to what extent there was an implicit ToC at 
work and tried to map this. The lack of documentary evidence was in part overcome by 
the interviews with OP stakeholders. These interviews helped to trace the preconditions 
necessary for FIs to work effectively within the framework of Cohesion policy. 
Accordingly, simple ToCs could be posited, even in the absence of an explicit ToC. 
The standard model to map out a simple ToC is given in the figure below. The simple 
ToCs for FIs served to constitute the evaluation framework for verification; experts could 
only make case studies `theory-driven´ by establishing the extent to which there were 
hypotheses and assumptions for interventions. 
                                          
9  Thanks to Heléne Clark, ActKnowledge, for clarification of this issue 
10  µ,QWHUYHQWLRQORJLF¶LVWKHWHUPFRPPRQO\XVHGLQ(8Cohesion policy for the programme logic showing the 
interaction between the hierarchy of OP objectives and measures. The evaluation framework (evaluation 
questions, indicators) is connected to the intervention logic. 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 9 
Figure 3: Standard model for simple ToCs (´enriched OP intervention logic`) for 
FIs under the case study ERDF OPs  
 
Source: Consortium 
Figure 4: Risk capital FIs in the OP Bavaria, Germany (example) 
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The following overview demonstrates that the development of a retrospective ToC at the 
level of individual instruments was only possible in very few cases (e.g. Bavaria - Loan 
Fund; UK - pilot Creative Content Fund). The most relevant unit of analysis varied with 
each case. In most cases only summary ToC could be created for a number of 
instruments (e. g. in Lithuania, one ToC for 24 FIs, Hungary - one ToC for one loan 
product, three guarantee products and three equity products). The conceptual model of 
FIs in the programme documents is in most cases rather generic. Measured against the 
standards of a fully developed ToC, in many cases it was not possible to reconstruct a 
substantive justification and consistent intervention logic at the level of the financial 
instrument (the key elements of a ToC to help develop a clear rationale for FIs are 
presented in the annex 6.9). 
Figure 5: Level of detail of ToCs 
OP name11 
Total 
no of 
FIs 
Level of detail of ToC 
Guarantees Loans Equity 
DE: OP Bavaria 4 - 1 ToC for 1 loan scheme 
1 ToC for all 3 risk 
capital funds 
FR:OP Languedoc-
Roussillon 3 
1 ToC for 3 FI products: a co-financing fund, a seed loan fund 
and a guarantee fund 
UK: OP North East of 
England 
8 
- 1 ToC for the JEREMIE fund of funds (7 
products) and 1 ToC for the pilot Creative 
Content Fund 
CZ:OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 
1 ToC for Credit 
Fund (with 2 sub-
programmes) 
1 ToC for Guarantee 
Fund (with 2 sub-
programmes) 
- 
PL: OP 0DáRSROVNLH 14 
1 Toc for loans (7 funds) and guarantees (3 
funds) and loans to SMEs affected by natural 
disasters (4 funds) 
- 
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 24 
1 ToC for 24 FIs 
PT: OP COMPETE 27 
- 1 ToC for VC funds, finance line for Business 
Angels and Loan funds (27 products in 
total) 
ES: OP Technological 
Fund 3 
1 ToC for 
guarantee fund 
2 ToCs for loan funds - 
HU: OP Economic 
Development  11 
1 ToC for EDOP including five loan products, three guarantee 
products and three VC products 
Source: Case study research 
The following section illustrates theory-driven examples and gaps in the Theory of 
Change framework. 
The OP Bavaria (DE) case study identified relevant pre-conditions for risk capital funds 
to function well, for example: 
                                          
11  Order of case study countries by 2007-13 SMAF Index, see First Interim Report (March 2015) p 35 
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x Business angels are mobilized through effective awareness and publicity measures 
x Business angels and investors form a funding consortium that can follow the 
various rounds of financing  
x Start-ups and companies receive intensive non-financial support to build up their 
business competence 
x Funds are long-term stable partners for the companies. 
These pre-conditions, which are not included in the programme documents - but critical 
for success - were checked in the case studies to understand if they worked out in 
practice. 
In the OP North East of England (UK), the conceptual model of FIs was well-
developed. The design of the FIs built strongly on the experience of the previous 
financing periods. The seven product funds under a JEREMIE holding fund (FBNE), as well 
as the pilot fund for the commercial creative sector, the Creative Content Fund (CCF), 
show a very clear and distinctive profile and the OP offered few grants to businesses 
(only small consultancy grants). A number of studies were undertaken to assess 
specific market issues and needs related to the creative sector. Research undertaken in 
2007 identified the main weaknesses. The evaluation of a previous pilot - the Design and 
Creative Fund ± had identified barriers and challenges at both the investor and the 
investee levels. In addition a set of progress indicators was introduced relating to longer 
term goals and shorter term preconditions. 
In Hungary, the OP Economic Development focused on longer-term targets including 
promoting growth and job creation, but without specifying the mechanism to achieve 
these goals. A number of assumptions influenced the decision not to favour specific 
regions or economic sectors and the preference for very small businesses. The rationales 
and underlying assumptions for these decisions are not explained. For example it is not 
made clear why microcredit was considered essential to growing the Hungarian economy. 
Other assumptions were: that many financial intermediaries in competition would lead to 
better financial products; that attracting private money would increase growth; that local 
business development centres provide better outreach of FIs because they understand 
local conditions. Many such assumptions underlie the theory, some of which may be 
better represented as precondition outcomes to be examined and tested through 
evaluation.12 
The theory-driven approach has the benefit of identifying the strategic and operational 
objectives for the FIs and some implicit assumptions for performance monitoring. These 
assumptions were checked to see if they were implemented (or whether this is likely). 
7KH RSHUDWLRQDO DQG VWUDWHJLF JRDOV DQG DVVXPSWLRQV LQ WKH µHQULFKHG OP intervention 
ORJLF¶ZHUHFKHFNHGLQGHWDLOLQµDVVHVVPHQWJULGV¶EDVHGRQWKHHYLGHQFHFROOHFWHGLQWKH
case studies (see outcomes chapter). In addition, indicators were proposed that can 
capture the effects of the FIs such as the change in firm growth or innovation capacity, 
or, if there are no data available, proxies, such as employment or investment. In most 
cases, however, no data for this proposed set of indicators are available and therefore 
the indicators cannot be quantified. 
                                          
12  based on a comment by Dana Taplin, ActKnowledge, July 2015 
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7KH ³HQULFKPHQW³ of the simple OP intervention logics with a ToC perspective for the 
evaluation purpose was, however, not grounded in a thorough consultation with the 
policy makers. Developing a comprehensive and meaningful ToC retrospectively would 
require the joint involvement of many stakeholders. Underestimating the time and effort 
necessary to develop an effective theory has been a key barrier to the effective use of 
ToC in planning and evaluation.13  
A theory based approach (had it been adopted at the outset of the OP) would enhance 
subsequent evaluation by drawing out the hypothesised intermediate outcomes or 
preconditions between Cohesion policy goals and the immediate outputs or outcomes of 
the OP. This could provide a meaningful research design for measuring correlation and 
causation. 
3.2 Limitations ± robustness of findings 
Considerable care was taken in the stocktaking exercise, but it is important to be aware 
of the limitations of the data collected. The study team cross-checked the information 
gathered by national experts as part of the stocktaking exercise with the data reported 
by Member States to the European Commission in their annual reporting of data on FIs. 
Most data collected under Task 1 was additional to the coverage of data available to the 
Commission, so it could not be checked against this source. At the same time, a check of 
the FI summary data reported by the managing authorities and a crosscheck with other 
sources, including published beneficiary data and the results of the parallel ex post 
evaluation Work Package 0 (data collection and quality assessment),14 showed: 
x There were many blank values in the FI summary data because much of the 
information provided by MAs was optional rather than compulsory (there were few 
gaps in the compulsory data). Also, FIs may not have reached the relevant stage 
of implementation when reporting. This meant that empty values were a 
µVWUXFWXUDOIHDWXUH¶RIWKHGDWDVHW+RZHYHUWhere were also some ambiguities in 
the use of blank and zero values, i.e. blanks used to represent zero values and 
vice versa. This made data interpretation difficult. 
x Some data points only partially covered the relevant issue. For example, 
management costs and fees included a high number of zeros. Other remuneration 
of the fund managers, such as from their own contribution or fees charged to final 
recipients, was not covered by the data. Similarly, private contributions made 
outside the OPs were only partially covered by the data. 
x It is impossible to clarify the nature of specific data. For example, contributions 
disbursed by the FIs that were higher than those paid to the FIs could reflect MAs 
reporting revolving amounts, although these are no longer part of the OP, 
contributions from the fund manager's own resources, additional amounts 
generated through treasury operations (e.g. interest), or fund managers being 
reimbursed by HF or managing authorities only after disbursing money to final 
recipients. This also applies to FIs with contributions to final recipients that were 
lower than contributions paid to the FI. 
                                          
13  Heléne Clark, ActKnowledge, external expert to the study.  
14  While 2013 and 2014 FI summary data has been checked, crosscheck was carried out for 2013 FI summary 
data only. 
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x Unrealistic values were identified as well as data that looked implausible when 
considered in combination with other FI information, such as unrealistically high 
or low amounts invested per contract. 
x Some reporting mistakes were found, including misinterpretation of the definition 
of SMEs, set-up dates that were outside the programming period, and 
misclassification of FIs by type of implementation. 
x Comparison of data for jobs created, reported by Work Package (WP) 0 and the 
summary data, suggested some reporting errors. These appear to include MAs not 
counting FI jobs in the total for core indicator 1 in the Annual Implementation 
Reports (AIRs). 
While such shortcomings are understandable considering the complexities of the 
information and the fact that 2012 was the first year that MAs were formally required to 
report on FI data, the data limitations make detailed comparisons across FIs difficult. 
Case studies were used to verify the inaccuracies and inconsistencies wherever possible. 
However, analysis of the case studies which are based on a sample of nine OPs (out of a 
total of 108 in 12 Member States) may lead to specific and non-representative findings. 
Preparation of the case studies was also challenging. First, there are definitional issues 
around some of the required information and data, e.g. leverage effect, multiplier effect, 
and amounts committed, paid and actually invested. Second, in most cases, access to 
important documents such as funding agreements, agreements between holding funds 
and financial intermediaries or audit reports was not possible. This problem was partly 
solved by using interviews and other data sources. There was also a major gap in reliable 
data on the economic performance of companies participating in enterprise support 
schemes. 
Box 2: Division of roles in data reporting ± specifities of FI reporting 
When referring to reporting/monitoring of FI data, the distinction between the different 
roles of the European Commission and the Member States in terms of the specific 
reporting requirements for FIs should be taken into account: 
x the reporting from FI to the Managing Authority (MA), who has the ultimate 
responsibility for the implementation of the programme (in line with the shared 
management principle), and; 
x the reporting from MAs to the European Commission on operations comprising 
support through FIs. Such reporting is a priori limited to OP resources. It should 
be noted that reporting requirements introduced for FIs in the Annual 
Implementation Reports (AIRs) are quite extensive and specific compared to 
those for grants.  
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This part of the report is structured around the five main evaluation questions which the 
study sought to address, specifically: 
x What are the rationales and conceptual models that underpin financial 
instruments? 
x How much support has been provided through financial instruments and in what 
forms? 
x What are the management and operational structures for financial instruments, 
and how well are they working? 
x What does the monitoring and evaluation system show? 
x What are the outcomes and how effective have financial instruments been? 
4.1 EQ1: What are the rationales and conceptual models that underpin 
financial instruments?  
The overarching rationale for the use of FIs in public policy is that facilitating access to 
finance through the use of repayable instruments contributes to sustainable economic 
growth. An important dimension to the rationale for FIs concerns the extent to which 
they are a substitute for, and can be articulated with, grants or non-repayable support. 
In other words, FIs are (potentially) an alternative, more sustainable policy delivery 
mode. 
Key findings 
x The role and operation of FIs is often driven more by pragmatic considerations - 
such as interest in diversifying the range of policy instruments, pressure to 
ensure that the available EU resources are spent or to maintain funding for 
existing support schemes - than by an in-depth consideration of the design of 
FIs, the change they would bring about and the contribution they would make to 
OP objectives. 
x The design and implementation of FIs is highly context specific, limiting the 
extent to which lessons may be transferable. 
x The gap analyses should play a crucial role in the rationale for FI use, but often 
the design of FIs was not based on specific studies, and the quality and 
usefulness of some gap assessments is questionable. 
x OP commitments to FIs are not always justified by demand ± the low absorption 
rates of some FIs casts doubt on the accuracy of the financing gap assessment 
and are sometimes indicative of the avoidance of automatic decommitment. 
x There is no optimum fund size as such. Even if the literature suggests that very 
small equity funds can be relatively costly and lack the critical mass to be 
effective and spread risk, very large funds PD\EHSURQH WR µREMHFWLYHGULIW¶ RU
may struggle to absorb the funds allocated.  
x Neither cost-effectiveness nor quality of investments appears to have been 
important in deciding to use FIs; sustainability and the provision of a legacy were 
not high on the agenda. 
x Although the relationship between the use of grants and repayable instruments 
was not well articulated in the OPs, in practice consideration has been given to 
 
4 Answers to evaluation questions 
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the different roles of different measures within a priority axis and to using them 
in a complementary way. 
Publicly funded FIs for enterprises are typically justified on the basis of two main types of 
market imperfection. One is information asymmetry, the result of which is that certain 
types of project ± such as start-ups and new firms in high technology sectors - lack 
sufficient track record or other information for potential investors to be able to assess 
risks. Another is that commercial assessments of returns in investment do not 
necessarily capture all positive externalities or wider social benefits. For example, lack of 
access to finance may constrain investment in R&D and innovation, leading to suboptimal 
investment in new technologies that would benefit society more widely; similarly, urban 
development or energy efficiency projects offer longer-term societal gains that justify 
public intervention, but would not attract commercial funding. More prosaically, the 
assessment of very small projects requiring microfinance may incur disproportionate 
transaction costs for investors, leading to a dearth of funds for initiatives that could have 
a positive impact on society by reintegrating individuals into the labour market or 
supporting disadvantaged groups.  
Against this background, this section addresses the first evaluation question by briefly 
reviewing the wider financial context in which ERDF co-financed FIs for enterprises 
operate. It goes on to consider the role of FIs in economic development policy, 
before considering the need for finance and the rationales for using financial 
instruments under Cohesion policy programmes.  
4.1.1 The financial context for FIs 
Markets for finance vary between different types of enterprise. In general, SMEs face 
greater obstacles in accessing finance than do large firms, which are more likely to be 
able to secure capital from equity markets or by issuing corporate bonds. The economic 
context for such firms has been particularly difficult in the period under study, with many 
countries seeing a sharp decline in lending to SMEs and venture capitalists withdrawing 
from the early-stage market. 
Access to finance is the second most pressing problem for SMEs across Europe, after 
finding customers.15 Conventional analysis suggests that access to finance is likely to be 
especially difficult for certain categories of SME, notably start-ups, small and/or young 
firms, high tech enterprises, and for entrepreneurs from disadvantaged or 
underrepresented groups.16 These categories of firm are important for different 
dimensions of economic and social cohesion policy. For example, despite the fact that 
most SME employment is among older SMEs, young SMEs are responsible for most new 
job creation,17 and a very small proportion of new firm starts accounts for the majority of 
                                          
15  (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ60(¶V$FFHVVWR)LQDQFH6XUYH\ 
16  Siedschlag, I et al (2014) Access to External Financing and Firm Growth, background study for the European 
Competitiveness Report 2014, ESRI.  
17  Criscuolo, C., P. N. Gal and C. Menon (2014), "The Dynamics of Employment Growth: New Evidence from 18 
Countries", OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 14, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz417hj6hg6-en; NESTA (2008) The vital six percent: how high growth 
innovative businesses generate prosperity and jobs.  
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net benefits in terms of investment, employment and exports.18 Increasing policymaker 
attention has focused on high growth firms (and a subset thereof, so-FDOOHGµJD]HOOHV¶19 ± 
young high growth firms) defined as those with at least 10 employees and an average 
growth rate (turnover or employees) of over 20% per year over three years. 
Comprehensive data on high growth firms are rather poor; however, OECD research 
suggests that such firms typically account for 2.5% to 6% of the total firm population 
when measured by employment growth, but higher levels when measured on the basis of 
turnover. 20  
Support for this segment of the business population has become a focus of policymaker 
interest partly owing to the sharp contrasts in entrepreneurship between Europe and the 
86VL[RIWKHWRSWHQµPRVWDGPLUHG¶FRUSRUDWLRQVZRUOGZLGH± Apple, Amazon, Google, 
FedEx, Starbucks, Southwest ± are US firms started after 1970;21 no European 
companies feature in the top ten, and those in the top 50 are all of longstanding (BMW, 
Nestlé, Volkswagen, Unilever).22 Apple, Microsoft and Google ± all established since 1970 
± feature in the top ten of the FT Global 500 by market capitalisation; the only European 
firm to do so is the Swiss pharmaceutical firm Roche.23 
The relevance and availability of different sources of finance varies by type of enterprise 
DQG E\ FRXQWU\ $OWKRXJK WKLV VWXG\ DLPV WR HYDOXDWH µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV¶ LW LV
important to acknowledge that this term includes forms of intervention that are 
extremely diverse and have little in common with one another beyond the fact that they 
are intended to be repaid. Also important, the boundaries between public and private are 
often blurred and in many countries there is a longstanding tradition of public sector 
involvement in the provision of finance for example through business development banks 
(Landesbank in Germany; BGK in Poland), other funds and structures (BPI and its 
predecessors in France) or the operation of guarantees which may involve mutual and/or 
public backing (Invega in Lithuania).  
Discussions of financial instruments conventionally distinguish three main types of 
measure: loans, guarantees and equity. These categories are, however quite broad, and 
each encompasses instruments that differ in their target market, the terms on which 
they are operated and the mechanisms by which they are governed.  
Traditional loan finance is one of the least expensive forms of external funding, suitable 
for comparatively low risk operations and businesses with sufficient cashflow to service 
capital and interest repayments; debt finance also enables entrepreneurs to retain 
control of their business. Guarantees are typically coupled with loans, in principle in order 
to facilitate access to capital by firms which would not be able to obtain it otherwise, and 
are offered by various types of guarantor. Equity is more suited to the small number of 
                                          
18  Henrekson, M and Johansson, D (2010) Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation of the 
evidence, Small Business Economics, 35 (2), 227-244; Rigby et al (2007) Are gazelles leaping ahead? 
Innovation and rapidly growing small firms, study for DG Enterprise and Industry: http://grips-
public.mediactive.fr/knowledge_base/view/128/grips-mini-study-on-gazelles/  
19  Mitusch, K. and Schimke, A (2011) Gazelles ± High Growth Companies, final report, INNOVA. 
20  http://www.oecd.org/industry/business-stats/39974588.pdf  
21  *LPHQR-:KHUHDUH(XURSH¶V*D]HOOHV"http://knowledge.insead.edu/blog/insead-blog/where-are-
europes-gazelles-2751 ;  
22  )RUWXQH:RUOG¶VPRVWDGPLUHGFRUSRUDWLRQVhttp://fortune.com/worlds-most-admired-
companies/2014/  
23  FT Global 500: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/988051be-fdee-11e3-bd0e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3T2izlnjd  
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potentially high growth firms which lack the cash flow to cover debt and interest 
repayments, but may offer high returns to investors in the long term. 
Loans are the main source of private financing for SMEs ± over 60 % of SMEs have used 
them.24 This reflects their relatively low cost and the absence of implications for firm 
ownership and control. Loan volumes vary widely between countries ± (from 15-20% of 
GDP in the Czech Republic and Poland, to highs of over 60% of GDP in Denmark, Spain 
and Portugal).25 In most countries (particularly Portugal, the United Kingdom, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Spain), levels of lending to firms fell in the wake of the economic crisis, 
with the volume of small loans falling even more sharply; only in Germany were levels of 
firms applying for finance and receiving it stable in 2007-13. In part this is a reflection of 
a more difficult borrowing climate ± with firms reporting increasing difficulties in 
obtaining all or part of the finance sought. Rejected applicants tend to be very small, 
young and in the service sector. Also important, the proportion of firms refusing bank 
loan offers on grounds of cost is low, partly reflecting the fall in interest rates, and 
supporting the view that finance constraints are volume not cost based. Case study 
research showed that in some cases the supply side was so affected by the crisis that 
public FIs had to take a much greater and less targeted role than originally intended 
(Lithuania and Compete (PT)). 
Importantly, however, the fall in lending has also been a product of demand, with fewer 
firms confident about investing in a difficult economic climate. The case studies showed 
that patterns of demand for loans have been quite different between countries and 
regions. In some cases, e.g. Languedoc-Roussillon, Czech Enterprise and Innovation OP, 
North East England and Bavaria, the demand for ERDF co-financed loans (and sometimes 
other instruments) was hardly influenced by the crisis, while in others demand actually 
weakened so much that the instrument had to be redesigned. This was in particularly the 
case in Lithuania, Hungary and Portugal and to a lesser extent in 0DáRSROVNLHand Spain.  
The strength of the underlying domestic finance provision determined how FIs were used 
in the crisis, so where this is strong (as in DE), the use of FI was not affected by the 
downturn, but where this was weaker (as in PT and LT), the use of FIs had to be 
adjusted to deal with wider problems of access to finance 
The fall in demand is not solely a result of hesitation about investing, but also reflects 
µIHDU RI UHMHFWLRQ¶ - thought to be a new phenomenon in the wake of the crisis.26 This 
factor is important because it implies a need for support in developing investible 
propositions, but not necessarily a finance gap. This is an important policy issue and 
points to the need for intervention in the form of training, advice, mentoring, and so on 
to improve the skills and confidence of entrepreneurs in dealing with lenders. 
Equity and venture capital finance are considered of limited relevance by most 
(80%+) SMEs.27 The equity market is small and specialised in most countries and is 
arguably only well-developed in the United Kingdom. There are signs that angel investors 
and syndicates thereof are becoming more important as venture capitalists withdraw 
                                          
24  European Commission (2013) ibid. 
25  Calculated from ECB and Eurostat data 
26  Hutton, W and Nightingale, P (2012) The Discouraged Economy. London: The Work Foundation. 
27  (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ60(¶V$FFHVVWR)Lnance Survey 
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from the early stage market, but in most countries apart from the United Kingdom, and 
to a lesser extent France and Portugal, the market can be viewed as embryonic. Crowd 
funding is currently marginal but is expected to grow. Even in countries where venture 
capital is more important, it remains niche ± VC investors are highly selective and deals 
number in the hundreds and low thousands annually. 
The guarantee market is difficult to assess. Many guarantees involve public backing and 
guarantees have been an important policy tool in the recession, with terms often relaxed 
to enable firms to borrow working capital. In terms of volume, guarantees are only 
important in a few countries ± notably Italy, Hungary and Portugal; however, in terms of 
reach they are far more significant than equity, with many thousands of guarantees 
issued annually in some countries. 
4.1.2 The role of FI in economic development policy 
Against the backdrop of the financial context, a key issue is the role of publicly-funded 
FIs in economic development policy and how well FIs work in addressing identified 
market imperfections. A number of studies have made detailed assessments of FIs in 
relation to recipient firms or the outcomes of specific schemes, though many such studies 
assess outcomes that were not necessarily part of the initial policy rationale. There is 
also a growing body of policy evaluation work, case studies and analyses of 
implementation, which are less focused on specific outputs or policy outcomes, and 
markedly less rigorous in seeking to establish the net effects of policy, but often give a 
more rounded perspective on the implementation of policy measures, yielding insights 
into processes and the practical operation of schemes, which condition how measures 
operate in reality. In the main, the academic literature on FIs is focused on different 
GLPHQVLRQVRIWKHµDFFHVVWRILQDQFH¶TXHVWLRQ0XFKRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHIRFXVHVRQSXEOLFO\-
backed venture capital rather than the more frequently used loan funds. Few studies 
consider the rationale for the form of intervention ±repayable mechanisms as opposed to 
grants ± or the relative efficiency of public funds disbursed in repayable form and their 
capacity to draw in private funding. 
Several academic studies consider firm level impacts of FIs, such as the effects on 
profits, survival or sales. Findings include:  
x a government-backed credit guarantee scheme in Italy improved the financial 
circumstances of beneficiary SMEs because it shifted the structure of their debts 
towards longer-term lending.28 
x government-backed venture capital did not affect sales or employment growth 
among a sample of EU high-tech entrepreneurial investee enterprises observed 
from 1993-2010.29  
x a French guarantee scheme led to an increase in investment and employment, but 
not in the number of new start-ups; also that the scheme significantly increased 
the risk of defaults, raising concerns about risk-shifting.30 
                                          
28  '¶,JQD]LR$ DQG0HQRQ&  7KH FDXVDO HIIHFW RI FUHGLW JXDUDQWHHV IRU60(V HYLGHQFH IURP ,WDO\
7HPL GL'LVFXVVLRQH %DQFD G¶,WDOLD http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td900_13/ 
en_td900/en_tema_900.pdf  
29  Grilli, L and Murtinu, S (2014) Government, venture capital and the growth of European high-tech 
entrepreneurial firms, Research Policy, 43(9), 1523-1543.  
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x a wide-ranging meta-evaluation of English-language evaluation literature reported 
limited evidence that access to finance policy interventions improved firm 
performance and a need for more evidence on how different types of access to 
finance measures contribute to better or worse firm and economy-wide 
outcomes.31  
x a study of microfinance in Belgium found qualitative benefits among recipients ± 
in terms acquiring experience and skills, personal life satisfaction, self-esteem and 
better social and economic integration, even among owners of aided businesses 
which had ultimately failed. 32  
A number of studies compare public and private sector financial instruments: 
x a dual picture emerges on the efficiency and effects of government venture capital 
programmes for young innovative firms in a wide-ranging review of academic and 
policy-oriented literature on the financing of innovative ventures:33 pure public 
sector venture capital operations tend not to be very effective, but funds that co-
invest with the private sector show more positive effects. This suggests that much 
depends on the specific design of the instrument.  
x analysis of a sample of 865 young biotech and pharmaceutical companies across 
seven European countries found that syndicates between private and 
governmental venture capital investors, in which the private investor takes the 
lead, are the most efficient form in terms of innovation production and that this 
outperforms all other forms.34 In other words, syndicates perform better than 
standalone investors at promoting innovation, and mixed syndicates better than 
homogenous private ones, but private partners should lead mixed syndicates for 
optimal outcomes.  
x firms funded by both public VC and private venture capitalists obtain more 
investment than enterprises funded purely by private VCs, and much more than 
those funded purely by public VCs. Also, markets with more public VC funding 
have more VC funding per firm and more VC-funded firms, suggesting that public 
VC finance largely augments rather than displaces private VC finance. There is 
also a positive association between mixed public/private VC funding and 
successful exits, as measured by initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions, 
attributable largely to the additional investment.35 
                                                                                                                                   
30  Lelarge, C, Sraer, D and Thesmar, D (2010) Entrepreneurship and Credit constraints: Evidence from a 
French Loan Guarantee Program, in Lerner, J and Schoar, A (eds.) International Differences in 
Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8218.pdf  
31 What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2014) Access to Finance, Evidence Review 4, 
http://whatworksgrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/14-10-31-Access-to-Finance.pdf  
32  3UR[LPLW\ )LQDQFH )RXQGDWLRQ DQG &H)L3.H)L.  /¶LPSDFW GH OD PLFURILQDQFH HQ %HOJLTXH
http://www.fonds.org/02Documents/Impactstudie%20microfinanciering%20FR.pdf  
33  Manigart, S et al (2014) Revue de la littérature relative au financement des jeunes entreprises innovantes, 
,QVWLWXW :DOORQ GH O¶pYDOXation de la prospective et de la statistique: 
http://www.iweps.be/sites/default/files/evaluation_thematique_financement_spinoff.pdf  
34  Bertoni, F and Tyková, T (2012) Which form of Venture Capital is Most Supportive of Innovation? Discussion 
paper no 12-018: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12018.pdf  
35  Brander, J Du, Q and Hellmann, T (2014) The Effects of Government Sponsored Venture Capital: 
International Evidence, Review of Finance Advance Access, 1-48. 
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x public VC-backed firms underperform private VC-backed ones, and do not grow 
more than non-VC-backed companies.36 The impact of public venture capital is still 
not statistically significant (even though positive) when public funds target young 
firms, except when public funds co-finance with private funds and both target 
young firms.  
The geographical dimension of FI is of particular relevance in the context of Cohesion 
policy. Academic research shows that the financial environment for firms differs not only 
between countries, but also within them, i.e. there are significant differences between 
regions in the availability and type of investment capital, with the tendency for 
entrepreneurial finance to focus on the metropolitan regions.37 Indeed, financial systems 
are inherently spatial, characterised by complex institutional geographies that both 
reflect and influence their functioning.38 This, in turn, produces geographical effects on 
the ability of entrepreneurs to access finance, which typically work to the disadvantage of 
peripheral regional economies.  
The typical approach of governments to stimulate venture capital in the regions has been 
to establish hybrid funds with private sector fund managers which comprise a mixture of 
public and private money, with private investors given certain incentives that either 
increase their up-side or reduce their down-side, or both.39 However, it is debatable 
whether constraining equity funds by restricting their investments regionally is good 
practice40 - although there may well be regional-level resistance to the idea of funds 
being pooled, notably, but not only, in the context of Structural Funds co-financed 
measures. More generally, the literature suggests that small VC funds have a number of 
disadvantages, i.e. limited ability to diversify funds and to make follow on investments 
(thus fully sharing in successful investments).41 In addition, Nightingale et al suggest that 
the key problem with regional VC IXQGV LV RQH RI µWKLQ¶ PDUNHWV LQ GLVDGYDQWDJHG
regions42 - these regions lack an appropriate eco-system to support venture capital 
investing. Another important consideration is that of crowding-out private sector finance, 
an issue which became a concern in the context of publicly-backed loans in Finland. 43  
There is also evidence of positive effects of FIs on disadvantaged areas. A study of Small 
Business Administration guaranteed lending in the US showed a correlation between the 
level of guaranteed lending and the level of employment in a local market.44 However, 
crucially, this correlation was only significant in low income areas, perhaps suggesting a 
                                          
36  Grilli, L and Murtinu, S (2013) New technology-based firms in Europe: market penetration, public venture 
capital and timing of investment, paper to 4th European Conference of Corporate R&D and Innovation 
CONCORDi-2013, Seville, September 2013: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/concord/2013/papers.html  
37  Mason, C and Harrison R (2002) The geography of venture capital investments in the UK, Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, 27, 427-451. 
38  Martin, R (1999) Money and the Space Economy, Chichester: Wiley. 
39  Murray, G C (2007) Venture capital and government policy, in H Landström (ed) Handbook of Research on 
Venture Capital, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 113-151. 
40  9HXJHOHUV50LQG(XURSH¶VHDUO\HTXLW\JDS%UXHJHOSROLF\FRQWULEXWLRQ,VVXH'HFHPEHU
2011.  
41  Murray, G C (2007) Op. cit. 
42  Nightingale, P et al (2009) From Funding Gaps to Thin Markets: Designing Hybrid VC Schemes for the 21st 
century, SPRU, University of Sussex for BVCA and NESTA. 
43  Ministry of Employment and Economy (2012) Evaluation of Finnvera Plc, Final Report, Innovation 28/2012. 
44  Craig, B, Jackson, W and Thomson, B (2008) Credit market failure intervention: Do government sponsored 
small business credit programs enrich poorer areas? Small Business Economics, 30, pp345-360. 
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crowding-out effect in more prosperous areas, but also providing support for arguments 
in favour of regionally-discriminating guarantee schemes. 
The case studies reveal two distinct approaches to the regional development dimension: 
regional development goals and general territorial development issues play a significant 
role in the design and/or implementation of FIs in some OPs, but not others. 
Interestingly, this does not depend on whether the OP is national or regional in scope. In 
%DYDULD '( 23 (FRQRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW +8 0DáRSROVNLH 3/ 23 &203(7( 37
North East England (UK), regional development issues are important. The FIs in these 
OPs pursue explicit regional development goals, mainly closing development 
gaps/disparities between the region(s) or within the region, thus in most cases 
addressing the sub-regional or even local level. This is most pronounced in the Bavaria 
OP. Nevertheless, FI tend to be aimed at regional development generally and it is rare 
that individual instruments are restricted to disadvantaged regions.  
An important dimension of operating FIs is the extent to which they can foster the 
development of private markets. For example, an important aim of the North East 
England (UK) FI strategy was to offset the impact of the London-centric financial services 
sector; interestingly, in the new period, stakeholders expressed an interest in developing 
markets beyond the main urban areas in the region. In Hungary, the involvement of 
LQWHUPHGLDULHVWKURXJKRXWWKHFRXQWU\ZDVDQ LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIWKH µWHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶
of access to finance.  
4.1.3 Assessing the need for finance 
At least part of the justification for publicly-funded financial instruments hinges on the 
presence of a µIXQGLQJJDS¶, but the presence or scale of such a gap is not tangible in a 
general sense, and can only be meaningfully assessed in relation to specific sectors, 
target groups and / or localities. Although it was not compulsory at the time, most case 
study Operational Programmes designed their co-financed FIs on the basis of market gap 
analyses. In five cases, fairly comprehensive dedicated studies on the financial markets 
were undertaken, three of them by the EIF. In two cases, the MA chose not to undertake 
such a study, but to rely on prior experience with FIs both within the MA and the 
intended fund mDQDJHU%DYDULD'(DQG230DáRSROVNLH3/These gap analyses by 
and large made a reasonable attempt to identify the relevant issues, especially given the 
relative novelty of the process and experimental character of the FIs, and were sufficient 
to enable the identification of a plausible financial product mix within the FI, 
accompanied by targeting of enterprise groups. In general, however, they contained little 
or no quantification of the respective market gaps identified.  
In two cases (OP Economic Growth OP (LT), COMPETE (PT)), the study was considered 
very useful but could not be applied in their entirety, as they did not take into account 
the changes caused by the financial crisis because it had been completed in 2007. By 
contrast, in a third case (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR)), the gap analysis and subsequent FI 
design and implementation were not affected by the crisis. 
Only in the cases of the OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ) and OP Technological Fund 
(ES), does there seem to have been no adequate analysis of the market situation 
available to the MA prior to introducing EU co-financed FIs. 
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It is generally accepted that a financing gap exists where viable projects cannot be 
financed - in other words, firms that have the ability to use funds productively do not 
have access to those funds. Assessing the nature and scale of the gap is however, 
acknowledged to be very difficult, although pragmatic methodologies exist which help 
quantify the market failures or suboptimal investment situations, and investment 
needs.45 Many managing authorities are, of course, currently engaged in commissioning 
such studies for the new funding period, an ex ante assessment of the funding gap 
having become an obligation for those using co-financed financial instruments in 2014-
20.46 
Figure 6 : Overview of Market Gap Analysis 
OP Name Total 
No of 
FI 
Guaran-
tees 
Loans Equity Quality of market gap 
assessment 
DE: OP Bavaria  4  X X No dedicated analysis, based 
on MA & FM experience 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon  
3 X X X Useful and robust study by 
European Investment Fund 
UK: OP North 
East England  
8  X X Good, detailed market 
assessment 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 X X  No specific analysis 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
14 X X  No dedicated study 
MA & FM experience 
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 
24 X X X Analysis by EIF was good but 
designed for normal economic 
conditions not for the crisis 
PT: OP COMPETE 27  X X Useful study by European 
Investment Fund 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
3 X X  No specific analysis; FIs were 
not part of the OP at the 
beginning 
HU: OP Economic 
Development 
11 X X X Sufficient, lacks quantification 
Source: Case study research 
4.1.4 Rationales for implementation of FI 
The stocktake of FI in 12 countries reviewed the stated rationales for FI alongside the 
market situation, the types of FI deployed and the sectors and size of firm targeted. The 
most striking feature to emerge from the analysis is the lack of clear patterns and 
                                          
45  Kraemer-Eis, H and Lang, F. (2014) Guidelines for SME Access to Finance Market Assessments (GAFMA), 
EIF Working Paper 2014/22. 
46  Regulation 1303/2013, Article 37. 
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trends relating the rationales for FI use and either the market situation or the 
characteristics of the FIs chosen. 
Restricted access to finance for enterprises to start-up and grow, either in terms 
of availability or quantity of credit, is identified as a problem in all the countries studied. 
This is overwhelmingly the main rationale given for FI use. Related objectives are in 
evidence in almost all the countries considered: lack of appropriate finance available on 
the market and unwillingness of commercial banks to lend (DE, DK, HU, PL and UK); 
credit rationing (ES, IT, FR, LT and PT); and strict banking rules affecting bank finance 
(BE - VSHFLILFDOO\WKH%DVHO,,,SURYLVLRQVZKLFKUHJXODWHWKHEDQNV¶ULVNSURILOHVIRUORDQV
and equity investments).  
Restricted access to finance may arise from information asymmetries which make banks 
unwilling to lend except under onerous terms and conditions. The cost of credit was 
highlighted as a rationale for FI use in some countries (CZ, DE, FR and PL). Information 
asymmetries and perceptions about the risk of investing may make it difficult for firms to 
access funding for innovative projects, especially in the R&D sector. Risk sharing to 
encourage private sector funders to participate in investment activity is a frequent 
motivation (BE, DE, ES, LT, PL, PT and UK); this is often the rationale provided for (but 
not restricted to) equity FIs. Stakeholder participants at the seminar mentioned a 
number of additional specific rationales for FI use - WKHQHHGIRUWKHµWHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶RI
the financial services sector, which is too concentrated on large urban agglomerations, 
mainly capital cities, and responding to specific situations, notably flood damage, where 
grants (or insurance) might have been expected to be used. 
Increasing the cost-effectiveness of public funds is stated as an additional rationale 
in most countries (CZ, DE, DK, ES, FR, IT, LT, PT), while improving the quality of 
investments is not cited at all.  
Very few FIs explicitly target specific disadvantaged groups or sub-regional territories. 
Among the case studies, only Bavaria (DE) and to a limited extent North East England 
(UK) have this type of focus (although North East England (UK), the OP Economic 
'HYHORSPHQW +8 DQG 23 0DáRSROVNLH 3/ all monitor the geographic distribution of 
investments).  
Few stated rationales for FIs mention the wider context of the pursuit of Cohesion policy 
goals, although several do specify the potential of FIs to create jobs. Contribution to 
wider Cohesion policy goals should be an explicit goal within the relevant OP priority 
under which the FI is being funded, but at the level of the individual FI and certainly once 
DQ), LV µPDUNHWHG¶ UHIHUHQFHWRWKHZLGHUJRDOVLVQRWDEO\DEVHQWThere was a strong 
focus on the delivery of regional development goals in only three of the case studies 
(Bavaria (DE), 0DáRSROVNLH3/ and North East England (UK)). 
Interestingly, sustainability, and the prospect of a legacy is rarely mentioned. As was 
evident at the stakeholder seminar, the emphasis during the period has been on 
spending and absorbing funds rather than on seeking returns. Nevertheless, although 
practical implementation issues have dominated policy agendas, the seminar revealed 
growing interest in the capacity of FIs to generate returns for future use and it may be 
that the legacy rationale plays a greater role in the next planning period.  
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There are also no clear patterns with regard to the link between stated rationale for FIs 
and the type of FIs, the size of firm or the sectors targeted. Most of the FIs target 
general SMEs, with less support available for individuals, micro-sized firms and large 
firms. Similarly, most of the schemes are rather generic in terms of sectoral targeting. 
The exceptions are equity FIs, which are more frequently used to target specific sectors, 
for example in DE, where sectors with R&D/innovation potential such as nanotechnology, 
ICT, bio-technology and medical engineering are targeted, and the United Kingdom, 
where individual regional-level equity FIs target strategic, regionally-significant sectors. 
However, there is not always a clear link between the choice of a sector-specific 
approach and the market situation, or the stated rationale for incorporating FIs under the 
OP.  
The lack of clear patterns and trends makes it difficult to assess the logic of the 
approaches taken at this level. There is no clear divide in approach between those 
countries with lengthier experience with FIs and those with none, in terms of size of 
Member State or Structural Funds budget; approaches vary widely also within countries, 
and between regions in a Member State. This suggests that the choice of FI and the 
approach taken are determined only in part by the market situation, and that the choice 
and approach are likely to be determined by a very specific set of circumstances at 
programme level. To look for such patterns would imply that the use of FIs within 
Structural Funds programmes has been based on an intervention-logic type approach; 
and that individual FIs were designed following OP analysis and a gap assessment.47 
However, gap assessments did not always take place, those that were carried out had 
weaknesses, and in any case, market conditions changed dramatically during the period 
in many countries from what was envisaged when the OPs were drafted.48 This led 
directly to the introduction of new FIs and substantial expansion of some existing FIs 
during the period. In addition, many other factors are likely to have influenced the choice 
of instruments and targets, including previous experience with particular instruments, the 
influence of expert advisors and stakeholders, and the domestic support environment.  
Across the case studies, the rationale for the introduction or non-introduction of EU-co-
financed guarantee schemes is not readily visible. There are several large guarantee 
programmes (e.g. ES, CZ) and also extremely small guarantee schemes (fund size ~ ¼1 
million) alongside them, and several regional guarantee schemes operating in parallel (as 
in PL). The opportunity to benefit from lost-cost capital may be more influential in 
offsetting up guarantee schemes than the needs of the regional economy. Sometimes the 
UDWLRQDOHIRUWKHµnon-use¶RIDQLQVWUXPHQWPD\EHFOHDU- in the UK, guarantees are not 
co-financed by the ERDF since a long-standing domestic scheme is already in place. The 
equity schemes in the case studies seem to have been designed carefully to serve 
particular aims. In most cases, equity instruments are set up after a thorough market 
analysis. Equity FIs are typically operated through a holding fund structure, increasing 
the flexibility to switch commitments between funds and instruments. The number of 
equity FIs is high in several cases (25 in OP COMPETE (PT) and seven in North East 
England (UK), a regional OP). 
                                          
47  This intervention logic-type approach has been mandated in the 2014-20 Structural Funds regulations, by 
introducing the requirement for an ex ante assessment to be carried out before any funds are committed to 
FIs.  
48  For example, the concise market gap analysis undertaken in Lithuania was deemed to no longer reflect the 
ILQDQFLQJQHHGVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V60(Vafter the onset of the crisis. 
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There is also the question of whether stated rationales provide the complete picture, as 
there were arguably µSDUDOOHO¶PRWLYDWLRQs for the use of financial instruments in 
2007-13. The enthusiasm of the Commission for financial instruments, and 
encouragement at programme negotiation stage to include FIs49 was confirmed by the 
case studies as a positive influence (as well as the encouragement by the EIF, which was 
noted in at least three cases- Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP Economic Growth (LT) and 
23 0DáRSROVNLH 3/. The strong Commission support for FI use encouraged MAs to 
consider the introduction of ³H[SHULPHQWDO´ EU co-financed FIs. This is reflected in the 
relatively small amounts committed into FIs in most OPs (compared to total OP 
resources, or even total enterprise support). 
The potential for FIs rapidly to absorb funds to at least delay the prospect of de-
commitment50 was not mentioned directly by stakeholders in the case study research. 
However, in a small number of cases, this does seem a likely motivation since the 
disbursement to the beneficiary appears out of proportion to probable demand from final 
recipients. The stakeholder seminar confirmed that financial instruments had sometimes 
been used to postpone possible de-commitment. While this was not widespread, it was 
FDXVHRIVRPHµRYHUVL]HG¶IXQGV 
At the stakeholder seminar, one participant noted that a motivating factor for FI use was 
that audit was easier than for grants, since checks did not generally need to be made 
below the level of the final beneficiary.51 
The focus of this study is on FI for enterprises, so it not surprising that it should place 
considerable emphasis on the issue of access to finance. However, it is important to note 
that FI are essentially an alternative delivery mechanism (see Figure 7) for OP 
objectives. In principle, FI are more sustainable (because support is repaid), more 
efficient (because they may be able to attract private finance) and more able to enhance 
the quality of investments because of the due diligence in investment decision-making 
and the psychological impact of the support being lent rather than given.  
                                          
49  Prof Danuta Hübner (November 2010) (8 3HUVSHFWLYH RQ WRGD\¶V UHJLRQDO SROLF\ DQG WKH UHOHYDQFH RI
financial engineering instruments, Speech at Conference on JEREMIE and JESSICA: Towards successful 
implementation, 29-30 November 2010, Brussels.  
50  A practice which was in evidence from early on in the current period ± see Michie R and Wishlade F (2011) 
µ%HWZHHQ6F\OODDQG&KDU\EGLV1DYLJDWLQJ),VWKURXJK6WUXFWXUDO)XQGDQG6WDWH$LGUHTXLUHPHQWV¶,4-Net 
Thematic Paper No. 29(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
51  Later workshop sessions revealed some participants to be of the opposite opinion, having found that 
auditors were more accustomed to auditing grants, causing difficulties in the audit of FIs.  
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Figure 7: A model of grant vs FI support  
 
Source: Forster, B, Grajewski, R (October 2014)52, p12, own adaption 
In terms of the balance between grants and FIs in Structural Funds programmes, the 
rationale for MAs introducing FIs in place of non-repayable measures (aside from the 
SRVVLEOH µSDUDOOHO¶ PRWLYDWLRQV GLVFXVVHG DERYH LV ODUJHO\ UHODWHG WR WKHLU UHYROYLQJ
nature, which has the scope to increase the efficiency of these investments and reduce 
deadweight. The capacity to attract private investors and boost the overall level of 
investment in the economy was another purported benefit of FIs use. This included the 
potential multiplier effect of FIs, whereby private resources leveraged could increase the 
overall amount spent on regional development (in practice, this effect has been limited).  
There is a trend away from offering grant support to businesses in some Member States 
GXHWRFRQFHUQVDERXWGHDGZHLJKWDQGIRVWHULQJDµJUDQWFXOWXUH¶Indeed, addressing the 
µJUDQWFXOWXUH¶ZDVone the main rationales for using FIs to emerge from the stakeholder 
seminar. It has been argued that publicly-backed finance for SMEs should be provided on 
a repayable basis, unless there is a clear and strong rationale for providing grants (or 
soft loans), and that such a rationale would exist only in certain circumstances.53 In this 
                                          
52  Forster, B, Grajewski, R (October 2014) Beurteilung von alternative Finanzierungsarten und ±instrumenten 
zur Umsetzung von investiv ausgerichteten Fördergrundsätzen der GAP; Thünen Working Paper 29 
53  Regeneris and Old Bell (2014) A Thinkpiece, Grants for SMEs in Wales. Report to Welsh European Funding 
Office.  
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context it is perhaps worth observing that the 2014-20 Common Provisions Regulation 
effectively takes an opposing view, requiring ex ante quantification and justification of 
the need for FI, but not of the need for grants.  
In general, there was little, if any, explicit articulation of the relationship between grants 
and FI. Moreover, the existing literature offers little ± no studies were identified that 
focus on the rationale for the form of public intervention ± grants as opposed to 
repayable mechanisms ± or the relative efficiency of public funds disbursed in repayable 
form and their capacity to draw in private funds; these issues are mentioned in some 
studies, but have not been the primary focus of any. This issue was, however, explored 
in the stakeholder seminar, which suggested a growing recognition of the need explicitly 
to consider how different instruments dovetail with one another. Some seminar 
participants considered that grants were more suitable for certain types of project than 
FIs ± such as greenfield investments involving infrastructure and early R&D activities. 
However, it was also noted that the eligibility criteria for FIs are more flexible, with more 
opportunities for working capital to be supported than with grants. Stakeholders 
considered that this support is often what SMEs actually need, rather than funding to 
contribute to fixed asset investment. Sectoral coverage of FI is also more flexible with 
scope to support trade and retail activities which are not really suited or often eligible for 
grants. Some stakeholders noted that the application process for loans is typically easier 
than for grants and this is considered important by viable firms (who are motivated by 
the need to obtaLQDFFHVVWRILQDQFHZLWKRXWH[FHVVLYHEXUHDXFUDF\UDWKHUWKDQE\µIUHH¶
money). Several seminar participants shared the view posited by one stakeholder 
(Bavaria ± DE) that a viable firm would prefer a loan covering 80% of its needs than a 
grant covering 20%.  
An important issue in 2007-13 is that grants were implemented sooner than loans ± so 
often firms applied for a grant first, then sought out other sources. So, if FIs were open 
to applications earlier in the planning period, uptake might be higher. 
Sometimes loans and guarantees are offered in combination with grants. The rationale 
for this has been to make the FIs more attractive, especially for small and micro 
HQWHUSULVHVRU WRDOORZD µVPRRWK WUDQVLWLRQ¶ IURP FRQYHQWLRQDO JUDQW-based funding to 
repayable instruments. When FIs are offered along with non-financial measures e.g. 
advisory support, the motivation is to offer all-round support to enterprises to enhance 
their competitiveness, besides adapting the intervention to the needs of the market / 
SMEs.  
In the case studies, MAs seemed to be more concerned with how and whether to 
combine grants with FIs and less with combining non-financial support with FIs. Non-
financial support is usually provided alongside equity, but it is frequently informal and 
rarely from the same OP. Combining loans with non-financial support is less common; 
combining guarantees with non-financial support is rare, but it is possible that final 
recipients receive such support through lenders rather than associated with the FIs as 
such. Both public and private intermediaries operating FIs tend to consider it within their 
remit to provide non-financial support alongside funding (e.g. OP Languedoc-Roussillon 
)5 23 (FRQRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW +8 23 (FRQRPLF *URZWK 23 /7 23 0DáRSROVkie 
(PL), OP North East England (UK)). This is an important aspect of support provision and 
potentially a major advantage of FIs over grants insofar as FIs create an opportunity to 
develop an ongoing relationship between the beneficiary (i.e. the financial intermediary) 
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and the final recipient which in turn KDVWKHVFRSHWRLQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHURIµLQYHVWLEOH
SURSRVLWLRQV¶LQWKHORFDOLW\ 
4.2 EQ2: How much support has been provided through financial 
instruments and in what forms?  
The use of FIs in Cohesion policy has increased significantly over successive programme 
periods, and ERDF co-financed FIs for enterprise support make up the vast majority of 
Cohesion policy FIs. Although financial instruments have gained a higher profile in the 
2007-13 period, the overall levels of commitment remain relatively modest as a share to 
total Cohesion policy expenditure.  
Key findings 
x The number of financial instruments offered is surprisingly difficult to quantify, 
partly owing to the lack of a concrete definition of what constitutes an FI and 
partly owing to the variety of arrangements for their implementation. 
x There are few obvious patterns to policy and the domestic context is important in 
shaping Cohesion policy use of FIs. 
x Loans are the most widespread type of financial instrument; they are often 
preferred by policymakers because of their simplicity and ease of setting-up, and 
by firms because they do not imply loss of control. 
x There are fewer guarantee instruments, but some are large national schemes. 
x There is a broadly similar number of equity schemes, but these are more likely to 
be regional in scope. 
x Funds vary considerably in size ± from around ¼ WR ¼ PLOOLRQ EXW
definitional issues confuse the overall picture. 
x Loans predominate (more than 50% of payments to funds). Equity is significant 
in DE, PT and the UK; guarantees in IT.  
x Support and advice is sometimes offered alongside FIs, provided under other OP 
priorities.  
x 7KUHH W\SHV RI µVSHQG¶ FDQ EH LGHQWLILHG 23 FRQWULEXWLRQV FRPPLWWHG SROLF\
intent); OP contributions paid to holding funds or specific instruments; OP 
contributions invested in final recipients (firms). 
x There are serious flaws in the data available, so caution is required in reaching 
firm conclusions. 
x OP contributions committed vary widely ± in absolute terms IT accounts for 30% 
of the total; relative to private investment, FIs are more significant in importance 
in HU, LT and PL. 
x Some 65% of OP payments (but less than 60% of OP commitments) to funds 
had been invested in final recipients by end 2104. 
x 6RPHODUJHORDQIXQGV!¼PKDYHLQYHVWHGYHU\OLPLWHGVXPVDQGDFFRXQWIRU
a significant SURSRUWLRQRIWKHµXQGHULQYHVWPHQWµ 
 
The section provides a stocktake of the main packages and forms of support being 
offered under ERDF co-financed FIs for enterprise support in 2007-13 in the case study 
countries. The section starts with a brief overview of the implementation of FIs for 
enterprise support in the 25 EU Member States which implemented FIs for this purpose 
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during the period. There then follows an overview of the main features of each type of FI 
as they are being implemented in the countries concerned. 
The use of FIs in Cohesion policy has increased significantly over successive programme 
periods, and ERDF co-financed FIs for enterprise support make up the vast majority of 
Cohesion policy FIs. Accurately assessing the scale of FIs for enterprise support in the 
2007-13 period however was hampered by the lack of systematic reporting until 2011, 
before which time reporting on FIs by managing authorities was not obligatory.54 The 
first summary report on FIs was published by the Commission in 2012; successive 
reports have improved the quality and comprehensiveness of data, but many gaps and 
inconsistencies remain. The most recent report was published in 2015 and ostensibly 
covers the situation as at end 2014.55 
4.2.1 Forms of support 
In the countries covered by this study some 784 ERDF financial instruments for 
enterprises had been set up by the end of 2014. This figure comprises 37 holding funds, 
410 funds set up within holding funds and 337 funds established outside holding fund 
structures, in other words, a total of 747 specific instruments.  
Table 2: Overview of FI in the stocktake countries 
 HF FEI NHF 
BE   9 
CZ   2 
DE   36 
DK   3 
ES 2 2 7 
FR 2 17 101 
HU 1 168 1 
IT 12 14 68 
LT 2 23 1 
PL 9 128 74 
PT 2 36 9 
UK 7 22 26 
Total 37 410 337 
Note: HF=holding funds; FEI=specific funds set up within holding funds; NHF= specific funds set up outside a 
holding fund. 
Source: 2015 Summary Report. 
                                          
54  An amendment to Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 obliged Member States to report on FIs in the 
Annual Implementation Report: (Regulation (EU) No 1310/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006). 
55  European Commission (2015) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing 
financial engineering instruments reported by the managing authorities in accordance with Article 67(2)(j) 
RI&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQ(&1RKHUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV³6XPPDU\5HSRUW´ 
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The number of FI varies widely between countries and, as explained in Box 3 is not 
straightforward to quantify. For the purposes of the 2015 Summary Report (and its 
predecessors) every funding agreement signed between a managing authority and a 
holding fund or directly with a specific fund, as well as each contract between a holding 
fund and a specific fund, is reported as a separate financial instrument.  
Box 3: What is a financial instrument? 
Quantifying the use of financial instruments is not straightforward.  
FIs were not defined precisely in the 2007-13 Structural Funds regulations. The General 
Regulation stated that to qualify as a financial engineering instrument, an OP 
contribution must target the specific final recipients/type of investments referred to in 
Article 44 (i.e. enterprises) and take the form of repayable investments (i.e. equity, 
loans and/or guarantees). Article 43(2) of the Implementing Regulation specified that 
co-financed financial engineering instruments must be set up either as independent legal 
entities governed by agreements between the co-financing partners or shareholders, or 
as a separate block of finance within a financial institution.  
The template monitoring report provided with the February 2012 revised COCOF note56 
supplied a form for managing authorities to complete and submit with their AIRs. This 
invited information on Holding Funds (Form I) and on Financial Engineering Instruments 
)LQDQFLDO ,QWHUPHGLDULHV DQG SURYLGHG D ER[ IRU WKH µWRWDO QXPEHU RI ILQDQFLDO
HQJLQHHULQJLQVWUXPHQWVVXSSRUWHGQRRIDJUHHPHQWVVLJQHG¶ 
Member States have reported different circumstances in different ways: 
x funding from two different OPs into one instrument has been reported variously 
as one FI (e.g. Hungary) or two FIs (e.g. UK). 
x some entries seem to represent new tranches of funding to the same FI, but have 
been reported separately, perhaps because they involved a new agreement being 
signed, e.g. Poland. 
x a fund procured for delivery at local level with the same terms and conditions 
with many financial intermediaries is reported as many FIs, though it may 
HVVHQWLDOO\EHRQO\RQHµILQDQFLDOSURGXFW¶ ± e.g. Poland and Hungary. 
 
Importantly, the number of FIs is distinct from the number of financial products (i.e. 
loans, guarantees, equity) since a given FI may comprise several different financial 
µproducts¶ ± LHWKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWQXPEHURIµPL[HG¶ILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV 
  
                                          
56  Guidance Note on Financial Engineering Instruments under Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1083/2006 COCOF_10-0014-05-EN (12/02/2012). 
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Table 3: Specific financial instruments by product in the stocktake countries  
  Loans Guarantees Equity Mixed Other Not classified Total 
BE 8     1     9 
CZ 1     1     2 
DE 16   17 3     36 
DK 2     1     3 
ES 5 1   3     9 
FR 62 15 16 3   22 118 
HU 80 17 27 45     169 
IT 24 32 7 8 2 9 82 
LT 15 4 5       24 
PL 129 57 11 5     202 
PT     33 6 6   45 
UK 19   24 5     48 
Total 361 126 140 81 8 31 747 
Note: µ1RWFODVVLILHG¶UHIHUVWRPHDVXUHVZKHUHWKHW\SHLVXQFOHDUW\SLFDOO\EHFDXVHQRH[SHQGLWXUHKDVEHHQ
reported as reaching final recipients by type of instrument. 
Source: Own calculations from 2015 Summary Report. 
Loans are the most widely used and well-established form of co-financed FI. Loan funds 
are widely viewed as relatively simple and quick to launch compared to other types of 
support, and the market uptake also tends to be more rapid.57 
Loan FIs mainly aim to provide access to credit for micro enterprises and SMEs to finance 
expansion and investment, working capital and innovation/R&D-type activities. A very 
wide range of loan sizes is offered in the stocktake countries, and terms also vary 
FRQVLGHUDEO\7KHUHDUHQR µW\SLFDO¶ loan FI within countries since support is tailored to 
the market being addressed, which generally varies by region and firm size. For example 
microfinance FIs may be included within portfolios where other loan measures operate on 
different terms.  
  
                                          
57  Michie R and Wishlade F, with Gloazzo C (2014) Guidelines for the Implementation of Financial Instruments: 
Building on FIN-EN ± sharing methodologies on FINancial ENgineering for enterprises, Report to 
Finlombarda SpA. 
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Table 4: Overview of loan FIs in the stocktake countries  
MS Market situation Loan size 
range 
Loan 
duration 
Interest rate 
below 
market level 
Non-financial 
support 
BE Credit rationing and 
need for collateral 
N/A 5-20 years Yes Yes, advice and 
management 
CZ Low levels of 
lending generally; 
limited finance for 
micro-businesses 
and start-ups 
0.5 ±15 
million CZK 
F¼- 
¼ 
µORQJ-WHUP¶ Yes No 
DE Lack of commercial 
loan finance for 
SMEs 
¼-
100,000 
(micro) to 
¼-10 million 
3-20 years Yes in about 
half the 
schemes 
No, except NRW/EU 
Mikrodarlehen 
Business counselling 
DK Regional challenges 
e.g. in sparsely 
populated regions 
e.g. up to 
DKR 5 million 
¼ 
e.g. 2-7 
years 
No Capital 
management, 
project plan, loan 
application 
ES Credit rationing and 
need for sharing 
risk re R&D 
¼-¼P 1-10 years Yes in about 
half the 
schemes 
No 
FR Credit rationing N/A N/A Mostly yes Business and 
management advice, 
training 
HU Lack of access to 
finance for SMEs 
HUF 1-20 
million 
F¼-
¼00) 
1-10 years No No 
IT Lack of access to 
finance for SMEs 
N/A N/A Mostly yes Advisory, 
management and 
technical support 
LT Need for risk 
sharing/ improved 
borrowing 
conditions for SMEs 
N/A 1-10 years Mostly yes, 
1RIRU³6PDOO
loans to 
60(V´IXQGV 
No 
PL Lack of capital for 
SMEs 
N/A 3-10 years Yes Partial: financing, 
training 
UK Lack of sufficient 
finance/ gaps in 
commercial finance 
£1,000 - £5 
million 
¼-¼
million) 
3-7 years N/A Partial 
 
Note: The stocktake exercise gathered information on whether or not loans were offered at below market rates 
DVDÃ\HVµRUÃQRµDQVZHUit is not possible to generalise about what rates were offered. These often vary within 
countries and may in any case be set on a case-by-case basis. 
Source: Consortium research. 
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Around half the loan funds in the stocktake countries lend at below market interest rates. 
This suggests that offering finance on terms that are more attractive than are available 
commercially is as relevant an objective as simply improving access to finance. Interest 
rates are generally calculated in relation to reference rates on a case-by-case basis 
taking account of the creditworthiness of final recipients, and subject to the State aid 
ceilings. In addition to interest rate subsidies, repayment holidays or much longer term 
loans (in some cases up to 20 years) than would be available commercially make publicly 
backed loans more attractive. Even where terms were not relaxed and the measure did 
not comprise an interest rate subsidy (in the sense of the Commission reference rate), 
the simple fact of being able to access capital is important to SMEs, which often lack 
collateral or track record in support of loan applications, and was especially so in the 
crisis when credit was highly constrained.  
Non-financial support is often available alongside loan FIs (slightly less than half of 
cases). :KHUHLWLVQRWGHVFULEHGDVµSDUW¶RIWKH),LWPD\still be available under other 
OP priorities. For example, in Germany, several ERDF programmes offer business advice, 
incubator facilities, R&D/technology transfer etc. as separate measures for SME support. 
Only the NRW/EU Mikrodarlehen offers non-financial support alongside financial support, 
so that in general there is no perceived need for soft-support measures as part of FIs. In 
a very few cases, grants are available alongside loans. For example, the Combined Micro 
Credit (Hungary) is aimed at making loans more attractive for micro enterprises by 
combining them with non-refundable grants.  
Guarantees provide support to firms unable to obtain finance (typically loan finance) 
due to a lack of collateral. Guarantees encourage banks or financial institutions to 
DGYDQFHFUHGLWWR60(VE\PDNLQJDFRPPLWPHQWWRSD\WKH60(V¶GHEWLIWKH\GHIDXOW
There are also examples of counter-guarantee FIs,58 which secure guarantees rather than 
loans, as in Italy and Belgium. Guarantees can be operated at national or regional level. 
Guarantee FIs are used in ten of the stocktake countries (not in Denmark or the UK) - 
see Table 5 - which also indicates the justification given for the use of guarantees, where 
this is made explicit.  
  
                                          
58  A counter-guarantee is a guarantee given by a guarantee agency/bank to another bank issuing a guarantee. 
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Table 5: Overview of guarantee FIs in the stocktake countries 
MS Market situation Guarantee fee subsidy 
BE Credit rationing and lack of collateral among 
SMES 
Yes 
CZ Low ratio of SME loans as % of GDP and low 
provision of microfinance for start-ups 
Yes 
DE Insufficient collateral of SMEs (Berlin) Yes 
ES Credit rationing Mostly no, yes for JEREMIE, Canarias (ES) 
FR Credit rationing Mostly no 
HU SMEs face difficulties in finding financing on 
the market 
No 
IT Credit rationing N/A 
LT Need for improved borrowing conditions for 
SMEs 
Mostly no, yes for Guarantee Fund (LT) 
PL Lack of capital for SMEs Yes 
PT Difficulties in accessing bank financing and 
capital markets 
Yes 
 
Source: Consortium research. 
Equity FIs are less widely used than other forms of FIs under Structural Funds 
programmes; within the stocktake countries they are not used in Belgium or the Czech 
Republic. Equity FIs tend to be used to support innovative firms and business start-ups 
with high growth potential (and therefore high returns), but also high risk (and 
potentially high losses). Non-financial support is frequently available for equity FIs, which 
is to be expected given that equity investments are larger and that investors take 
ownership of part of the undertaking and have a stake in the success or failure of the 
venture. 
Most of the equity FIs are regional in scope (and comparatively small in size). Such 
approaches have been used in a number of countries under domestic policy. This has 
typically involved hybrid funds comprising public and private money, manged by private 
sector fund managers, and with private investors given incentives that either increase 
their up-side or reduce their down-side, or both.59 However, the literature suggests that 
small regional funds have a number of disadvantages:60 
x the costs of due diligence and management support are largely fixed and small 
funds account for a much higher proportion of operating costs. According to the 
European Court of Auditors, providing access to finance with fund sizes below 
critical mass is very likely to be unsustainable, as the overhead costs and the risks 
                                          
59  Murray, G C (2007) Venture capital and government policy, in H Landström (ed) Handbook of Research on 
Venture Capital, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 113-151. 
60  Murray, G C (2007) Op. cit. 
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associated with investments or loans cannot be spread over a sufficient number of 
SMEs.61 
x Returns to venture capital investing are skewed, with fund performance 
GHSHQGLQJRQDVPDOOQXPEHURIµZLQQHUV¶+HQFHGLYHUVLILFDWLRQLVHVVHQWLDOEXW
small funds are less able to fully diversify their fund.  
x Small funds can only make small initial investments and have limited ability to 
make follow-on investments. This means that they are unable to fully share in 
successful investments and they are exposed to dilution if their investee 
businesses raise further finance from elsewhere. 
As noted earlier, it has been argued that the problem facing regional public sector 
venture capital funds is not simply their size, investment model or ability to support 
LQYHVWHHILUPVEXWWKDWWKHNH\LVVXHLVWKDWRIµWKLQ¶PDUNHWV62 ± disadvantaged regions 
in particular lack an appropriate eco-system to support venture capital investing. This 
implies, among other things, the need for more emphasis on developing investible 
propositions.  
Table 6: Overview of equity FIs in the stocktake countries  
MS Market situation Focus Non-financial support 
DE Need to strengthen equity 
provision for innovative 
SMEs  
Many equity FIs support both 
start-ups and expansion projects, 
some specifically target young 
entrepreneurs 
No 
DK Identified funding gap in 
the private capital market 
Specific enterprises considered 
unattractive for traditional VC 
funding 
No information available 
ES Lack of adequate capital 
for businesses 
Seed and expansion No, except JEREMIE 
Barcelona - networking 
suppoUWµEXVLQHVVDQJHOV¶
action line only) 
FR Lack of capital for business 
in general, and start-ups in 
particular 
Sectors supported by venture 
capital are related to the 
competitive clusters identified in 
WKH³3{OHGHFRPSpWLWLYLWp´RU
VHFWRUVZLWKD³VWUXFWXULQJUROH´
in the regional economy 
Often provided with 
advisory support, delivered 
by the scheme (e.g. 
SORIDEC in Languedoc 
Roussillon) or some 
intermediate bodies 
HU Share of VC directed at the 
early period of enterprises 
and start-ups is low 
Seed and expansion phases, in 
innovative, technology-oriented 
sectors (Exception: the 
Széchenyi Capital Investment 
scheme is open not only to 
innovative sectors but also more 
traditional ones). 
No 
IT Gaps in terms of lack of Flexible - cover support for seed, Partial 
                                          
61  European Court of Auditors (2012) Financial Instruments for SMEs Co-financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund, Special Report No. 2, 2012. 
62  Nightingale, P et al (2009) From Funding Gaps to Thin Markets: Designing Hybrid VC Schemes for the 21st 
century, SPRU, University of Sussex for BVCA and NESTA. 
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MS Market situation Focus Non-financial support 
capital for business start-
ups or support investments 
considered too risky for the 
private sector 
start-up and expansion stages 
LT Lack of capital for SMEs All sectors eligible, priority is 
generally given to IT, high-tech 
(incl. cleantech) and innovative 
sectors 
Partial - Only for equity FIs: 
business / management 
advice, B-plan, networking, 
training 
PL Capital gap in SME 
financing, especially at set-
up, early and expansion 
stage and for innovative 
start-ups 
VC funds provide equity 
investments up to ¼PLOOLRQWR
ventures at seed, early or 
expansion stage 
More extensive support for 
equity FIs: strategy, 
research, etc. 
PT Lack of capital for business 
start-ups / capital 
VC funds support SMEs in early 
stage and expansion phases in 
different themes: innovation, 
internationalisation, audiovisuals 
Partial - Only for equity FIs: 
advice, management 
support, networking 
UK To fill gaps in early stage 
capital available 
Broad coverage ± often a  
µSRUWIROLR¶DSSURDFKXVHGWRFRYHU
different sectors/stages 
advice, etc. plus innovative 
measures 
Source: Consortium research.  
In contrast with loans and guarantees, equity FIs vary widely in terms of focus, and have 
differentiated target sectors and markets. The majority of equity FIs focus on a single 
phase, such as early stage capital or the expansion of existing companies. Among the 
case study OPs there are examples of co-investment schemes in which the public sector 
invests alongside the private sector on a pari passu basis, (OP Languedoc-Roussillon 
(FR), OP EconRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW +8 23 (FRQRPLF *URZWK 23 /7 23 0DáRSROVNLH
(PL), OP North East England (UK)), although they operate in slightly different ways.  
Case study OPs and the role of FIs in the development cycle 
Loans also predominate among the nine case sWXG\ 23V ¼ ELOOLRQ 23 FRQWULEXWLRQV
ZHUH FRPPLWWHG WR ORDQ IXQGV ¼ PLOOLRQ WR HTXLW\ IXQGV DQG ¼ PLOOLRQ WR
guarantees funds.  
FIs can have different roles in the firms´development cycle (e.g. support in the growth 
stage) in developing particular sectors (e.g. tourism) or specific territories (e.g. to 
support economically weaker regions). However, FI are typically rather general in scope - 
aimed at filling a finance gap, but not necessarily with a focus on a gap affecting 
particular market segments, sectors or territories. For instance in the OP Economic 
Growth (LT) all the FIs are national, address all sectors and were introduced to tackle the 
servere lack of external finance for SMEs. Only five FIs under the JEREMIE HF were 
aimed at different types of enterprises. Also in the 230DáRSROVNLH3/, the FIs basically 
address all sectors with a few schemes concentrating on particular sectors or territories, 
e.g. tourism, rural areas and small towns. 
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With respect to the lifecycle of firms, a broad coverage is achieved in different ways (e.g. 
through one fund or several specific, targeted ones). Some funds support SMEs at all 
stages of their development (e.g. loan and guarantee products in 230DáRSROVNLH 3/, 
OP Economic Growth (LT)). In other cases the different phases of the enterprise life 
cycle, from seed to growth and expansion stages, are covered by a cascade of different 
specific funds (e.g. Bavaria (DE), North East England (UK), and the OP Technological 
Fund (ES), which has three thematic FIs restricted to the later stage/growth phase (see 
table 7 below)). Only a few funds, however, specifically target the early business start-up 
phase (e.g. the ERDF cluster fund in Bavaria); and in some of the case study OPs such 
support is missing altogether ± i.e. it is not part of more generic funding (e.g. in the OP 
Enterprise & Innovation (CZ), where there is no seed or start-up capital funding).  
Among the more generic FIs, there is an overlap between loan and guarantee schemes 
since they provide very similar products to final recipients. Usually, the financial 
intermediary (generally a bank) chooses which FI to use in a particular case. In other 
cases the FI-products are clearly differentiated according to firm size and capital needs. 
Here there is minimal overlap between the products. 
In some cases FI design was modified during implementation. For instance start up 
support in CZ under a credit and guarantee fund only operated for six months (due to 
internal reasons), and in other cases the design of FIs was affected by the economic 
crisis. Although some targeting was part of the ToC (start±ups, innovation±oriented 
enterprises and SMEs operating in less-developed regions), the economic crisis resulted 
in some FIs providing more mainstream funding than had originally been envisaged (e.g. 
in Lithuania). 
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Table 7: &DVHVWXG\),VDFFRUGLQJWRUROHLQILUPV¶GHYHORSPHQWF\FOH 
OP name Total no 
of FIs 
(exc. 
HF) 
1RRI),VDFFRUGLQJWKHLUUROHLQFRPSDQLHV¶
development cycle 
Seed Start-up Later 
Stages 
Growth Expansion 
DE: OP Bavaria 4 1 VC   1 L   
  1 VC     
    1 VC   
FR: OP Languedoc-
Roussillon  
3 1 L       
    1 VC   
      1 G 
UK: OP North East of 
England  
 
8 1 VC 1 VC 1 VC   
1 VC 1 VC   
1 VC     
  1 L     
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4   1 L + 1 
G 
1 L + 1 G   
3/230DáRSROVNLH 14 14 L, G (territorialized) 
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 
24 24 FIs, specific role only for 5 FIs under JEREMIE HF  
PT: OP COMPETE 
 
27 2 VC 2 VC     2 VC 
      1 VC 
  1 VC     
  1 VC 
      1 L 
ES: OP Technological 
Fund 
 
3     1  G (Exploration, 
prototyping) 
  
    1 L (Product 
development) 
  
    1 L (Commercialisation)   
HU: OP Economic 
Development 
 
11   3 L  + 1 G 1 G   
1 VC   2 L   
  2 VC     
Total 98           
Source: Case study research. Guarantees, Loans, Venture Capital. 
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4.2.2 Quantification of support provided 
Financial instruments have increased in prominence in the 2007-13 period, from an 
HVWLPDWHGLQYHVWPHQWLQ),RI¼ELOOLRQLQ-WRVRPH¼ELOOLRQLQ-6,63 the 
6XPPDU\5HSRUWUHFRUGV23FRPPLWPHQWVWR),WRWDOOLQJRYHU¼ELOOLRQE\HQG
2014. AOPRVW ¼ ELOOLRQ RI WKLV LV DFFRXQWHG IRU (5') Fo-financed support for 
enterprises.64 7KHµVWRFNWDNH¶FRXQWULHVLQWKLVVWXG\DFFRXQWIRUMXVWRYHUSHUFHQW
of OP ERDF commitments to FI for enterprises among the EU28 (FI were not used in 
Croatia, Ireland or Luxembourg in 2007-13).  
There are three GLVWLQFWSKDVHVLQWKHµVSHQGLQJ¶SURFHVVIRU),V 
x OP contributions committed in funding agreements (OP commitments) 
x OP contributions paid either to holding funds or specific funds; OP contributions 
paid by holding funds (where they exist) to specific funds (OP payments) 
x OP contributions reaching final recipients (e.g. SMEs) through financial products ± 
i.e. loans, guarantees and equity (OP investments in final recipients).  
Taking the stocktake countries as a group, by end 2014 some 58.6% of OP commitments 
had been invested in final recipients. 
                                          
63  CSES (2007) Comparative Study of Venture Capital and Loan Funds Supported by the Structural Funds, 
report to European Commission. 
64  Article 44 of Regulation 1083/2006 also provides for financial instruments to be used for urban development 
and energy efficiency projects; and around 6 per cent of OP commitments to enterprise FIs are co-financed 
by the European Social Fund.  
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Figure 8: 3KDVHVDQGSURJUHVVLQ),µVSHQG¶LQWKHVWRFNWDNHFRXQWULHV 
 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary Report data. 
OP commitments to financial instruments 
OP commitments could, in principle, be seen as a broad indicator of policymaker intent 
regarding the scale of FI spend. Countries vary widely in their use of FIs. In absolute 
terms the largest volume of OP commitments to FIs DUH LQ ,WDO\ RYHU ¼ ELOOLRQ IRU
2017-14), which accounts for over a third of OP commitments to FIs by the stocktake 
countries. Relative to gross fixed capital investment (a proxy for private investment), 
however, Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal have committed higher sums. Significantly, 
widespread use of FIs in domestic policy is not necessarily reflected in the scale of OP 
commitments to FIs. This may be because, given the complexities of Structural Fund 
administration, the programme is too small to justify the setting up of specific 
instruments, and this is left to domestic policy (as in Flanders ± all FI commitments in 
Belgium are accounted for by Brussels and Wallonia) or because policymakers opt to 
focus Structural Funds spending on particular types of project that are perceived to be 
less amenable to the use of FIs, even though repayable support is an established part of 
domestic economic development policy. 
OP contributions
invested in final 
recipients:
¼6.595 billion
OP contributions
committed to the fund (HF 
or specific fund):
¼11.252 billion
OP contributions paid to
the fund (HF or specific
fund):
¼10.545 billion
OP
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Figure 9: OP Contributions committed to FI vary widely in stocktake countries 
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Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report and Eurostat data. 
OP Payments to financial instruments 
Importantly, as both Figure 9 and Table 8 show, not all OP commitments made in 
funding agreements had actually resulted in OP payments to holding funds or specific 
funds by end 2014, but the extent of this varies by country. 
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Table 8: OP commitments to FI paid to holding funds or specific funds 
OP payments to funds as % of OP commitments 
BE 100.0 
CZ 100.0 
DE 95.7 
DK 81.0 
ES 100.5 
FR 91.0 
HU 97.9 
IT 98.3 
LT 100.0 
PL 99.4 
PT 47.7 
UK 88.3 
Total 93.7 
EU28 Total 93.5 
Note: Figures exceeding 100 per cent may not involve errors, but could be due to the inclusion of interest on 
treasury operations or phasing of reimbursements to financial intermediaries. 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report data. 
Table 8 shows that in some countries (notably Portugal, and to a lesser extent Denmark, 
the United Kingdom and France) significant sums committed to FIs have not actually 
been paid to holding funds or specific funds.  
The volumes of OP contributions committed to holding funds and specific funds vary 
widely between OPs. Of the 107 OPs in the stocktake countries, 45 have committed more 
WKDQ¼PLOOLRQ WRKROGLQJ IXQGVRU VSHFLILF IXQGV2QO\'HQPDUN DQG)UDQFHGRQRW
have any OPs that KDYHFRPPLWWHGPRUHWKDQ¼PLOOLRQWR),s. As would be expected, 
the OPs committing large sums include national or multi-region programmes (Czech 
Republic, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal). In other OPs, while the absolute 
amounts may not be not be large, FIs may be significant within the programme, 
accounting for 40% or more of ERDF commitments to support for enterprises. 
The amounts allocated to specific financial products varies between stocktake countries. 
In terms of the funds paid to specific instruments, loans predominate overall, as 
illustrated in Table 9. However, equity is particularly significant in Germany (about a 
third of the total) and in the United Kingdom equity is more important than loans in 
terms of payments to funds. Guarantees are significant in Italy and to a lesser extent 
Poland and Spain, but elsewhere payments to guarantee funds are low. 
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Table 9: OP contributions paid to specific financial product funds ¼P 
 G L E Mixed N/A Other Total 
BE   367   29     396 
CZ   75  159   234 
DE   751 483 62   1296 
DK   10  4   14 
ES 70 739  213   1021 
FR 58 82 163 19 50  371 
HU 7 530 231 77   845 
IT 1324 1376 125 260 213 35 3332 
LT 49 159 35    243 
PL 329 611 20 28   989 
PT    218 121  17 356 
UK   215 474 314   1003 
Total 1836 4914 1749 1286 263 52 10101 
Note: µ1$¶FRYHUVPHDVXUHVZKHUHWKHW\SHLVXQFOHDUW\SLFDOO\EHFDXVHQRH[SHQGLWXUHKDVEHHQUHSRUWHGDV
UHDFKLQJ ILQDO UHFLSLHQWV E\ W\SH RI LQVWUXPHQW µ2WKHU¶ LQFOXGHV IRU H[DPSOH LQWHUHVW Uate subsidies or 
guarantee fee subsidies when combined with loans and guarantees in a single financing package. 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report data. 
At the level of specific instruments, whether within holding funds or not, fund size 
varies extremely widely. 65 Among guarantee funds, they UDQJH IURP ¼
(Hungary)66 WR ¼PLOOLRQ ,WDO\ $PRQJ ORDQ IXQGV WKH\ UDQJH IURP¼ DOVR
Hungary)67 WR¼PLOOLRQ6SDLQ/DVWDPRQJHTXLW\IXQGVWKH\UDQJHIURP¼
3RODQGWR¼PLOOLRQ*HUPDQ\ 
  
                                          
65  Among funds set up that have had monies paid to them ± it is not always the case that funds have been 
paid. 
66  In this context, it should be recalled each funding agreement constitutes a financial instrument and that in 
Hungary, FIs are implemented through a large number of financial intermediaries who essentially operate 
the same measure(s) in different localities. 
67  See previous footnote ± the same applies. 
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Table 10: Fund size in stocktake countries (amounts paid to holding funds or 
specific funds) 
  Guarantees Loans Equity 
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BE           5.6 42.4 92.2 0 0           
CZ           75.4 75.4 75.4 0 0           
DE           0.00 22.5 237.9 1 2 1.4 25.0 85.1 0 0 
DK           0.4 4.8 9.2 1 0           
ES 70.0 70.0 70.0 0 0 0.8 24.6 379.0 1 2           
FR 0.3 3.0 18.7 3 0 0.00 0.5 26.0 34 0 2.0 6.1 68.4 0 0 
HU 0.00 0.02 4.5 16 0 0.00 3.0 52.8 29 0 1.1 6.3 47.5 0 0 
IT 3.6 12.3 550.0 0 2 5.0 47.4 202.0 0 3 7.0 20.0 24.8 0 0 
LT 1.8 4.8 37.4 0 0 0.00 7.5 36.1 2 0 4.2 6.3 10.4 0 0 
PL 0.00 2.4 43.7 10 0 0.2 2.4 45.2 18 0 0.4 1.3 4.5 4 0 
PT                     0.00 3.8 32.0 5 0 
UK           0.5 4.0 61.3 3 0 2.9 18.3 45.5 0 0 
Note: These data refer to sums actually paid to specific funds whether in holding funds or not; sums committed 
are higher but data are considered unreliable at instrument level. In some cases, no sums appear to have 
reached a given fund, in which case the minimum is recorded as zero.  
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report data. 
Fund sizes are also extremely varied in the case study OPs, as reflected in Table 11.68 
  
                                          
68  Data on the fund size in the case study OPs cannot be directly compared to the fund size in the stocktake 
countries. Case study data refers to commitments and not to sums actually paid to specific funds. This may 
in principle explain higher figures in the case study data. Also not all case study data is from 2014 and this 
may also explain some differences. In addition some FI are classified as 'mixed' and do not appear in the 
stocktake country data. Some discrepancies (e.g. maxima exceed those in the stocktake table) exist in OP 
Enterprises & Innovation (CZ), OP Economic Growth (LT), OP COMPETE (PT), and OP Economic 
Development (HU). 
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Table 11: Fund sizes are extremely varied in the case study OPs (amounts paid 
to funds) 
OP name No of FIs 
(exc. HF) 
Range of Fund size (min-PD[ ¼P 23
contribution paid to funds 
Guarantees Loans Equity  
DE: OP Bavaria 4   56 9-16 
FR: OP Languedoc-Roussillon 3 14 2 11 
UK: OP North East England 8   8 3-33 
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 2-156 2-74   
3/230DáRSROVNLH 14 1-14 1-5   
LT: OP Economic Growth 24 1-37 1-34 1-8 
PT: OP COMPETE 27   38-143 1-81 
ES: OP Technological Fund 3 70 142-314   
HU: OP Economic Development 11 4-13 5-167 19-185 
Total 98 1-156 1-314 1-185 
Notes:  The figures concern the position by 2013/14. 
Source: Case study research 
OP investments in final recipients  
Arguably the key question in quantifying support is to what extent FIs have reached final 
recipients ± i.e. individual enterprises. A detailed analysis is hampered by the quality of 
the data available. An important issue here is that, in some cases, it is evident that 
revolved sums have been included in the sums invested in final recipients; in principle 
these are no longer OP funds and should not be recorded as such. In other cases, 
interest accruing to funds under management has also been invested in final recipients.69 
The inclusion of these sums makes it impossible to determine precisely to what extent OP 
payments to FIs have been invested in final recipients. There are also gaps in the data 
and evidence of misunderstandings in the data requirements by managing authorities. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are wide variations in the extent to which funds 
committed to FIs have been invested in final recipients ± as reflected in Table 12. 
  
                                          
69 Technically these are OP resources. 
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Table 12: Proportion of OP payments to FI invested in final recipients (% by end 
2014) 
Guarantees Loans Equity Mixed Total 
BE 72 83 73 
CZ 96 89 91 
DE 100 74 74 89 
DK 91 123 100 
ES 100 20 34 28 
FR 220 106 39 172 83 
HU 105 95 69 105 89 
IT 47 40 37 7 38 
LT 100 100 81 97 
PL 87 93 67 92 90 
PT 82 118 92 
UK 72 91 85 85 
Total 63 66 73 67 65 
EU28 Total 74 73 75 70 71 
Note: These data should be treated with caution. Investment rates exceeding 100 percent suggest inclusion of 
returns in amounts invested. 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report data. 
Setting aside issues associated with data gaps and the inclusion of revolved funds, it 
appears that in most of the stocktake countries, FIs are 85% percent invested in final 
recipients or more. However, in Italy and especially Spain it is significantly less and these 
two countries accouQW IRU PRVW WKH µXQGHULQYHVWPHQW¶ DFURVV WKH (8 DV D ZKROH
Indeed, the aggregate performance of FI in terms of investments in final recipients is 
skewed by the performance of some large funds. Taking loan funds as an example (since 
these account for the bulk of OP contributions paid to funds), the larger funds have 
invested a smaller proportion of OP contributions than loan funds as a whole 
(see Table 13). 6SHFLILFDOO\ZKLOHORDQIXQGVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQDUHRQDYHUDJH% 
invested, smaller loan funds in the stocktake countries are about 81% invested on 
average. In reality, though, there is no evidence that large funds per se are likely to have 
a lower investment rate (there are many small funds that have invested little), but the 
poor performance of a few very large funds has a significant impact on overall rates of 
investment both in the countries concerned and at the level of the EU28. 
  
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 47 
Table 133URSRUWLRQRI23SD\PHQWVLQYHVWHGE\ORDQIXQGV!¼P in the 
stocktake countries 
MS Specific fund (FEI or NHF) Set-up 
date 
OP contribu-
tions paid to 
fund 
OP contri-
butions 
invested 
in final 
recipients 
% in-
vest-
ed  
ES JEREMIE-IDEA 2009 379.0 129.3 34.1 
ES ICO INNOVACIÓN-FONDO 
TECNOLÓGICO 
2013 314.3 4.3 1.4 
DE KMU-Darlehensfonds Sachsen-Anhalt 2008 237.9 277.1 116.5 
IT DM 23/07/2009- Fondo rotativo 
(inclusi Contratti di Sviluppo) 
2011 202.0 57.8 28.6 
IT POR CReO FESR Regione Toscana 
2007-2013. Fondo Unico Rotativo  
2011 131.8 105.1 79.7 
DE Darlehensfonds Thüringen Dynamik 2010 120.0 120.3 100.3 
IT Fondo rotativo finanziamento 
agevolato DM 6 agosto 2010  
2010 105.0 1.3 1.2 
IT Fondo Rotativo PON Contratti di 
Sviluppo 
2012 95.0 17.2 18.1 
BE Loan Fund of INNODEM2 SA 2009 92.2 57.6 62.5 
DE KMU-Fonds, Berlin 2008 91.6 71.3 77.9 
IT Fondo FIT PIA Innovazione - Rome 2009 90.5 17.3 19.1 
IT Jeremie 007/01 2011,2012 89.0 66.4 74.6 
IT Fondo FIT P21³/HJJH- 
JHQHUDOLVWD´ 
2009 85.0 27.6 32.4 
CZ Credit Fund E 2007, Praha 2007 75.4 72.5 96.1 
BE Loan Fund of IMBC - CONVERGENCE 2009 72.3 49.7 68.7 
BE Loan Fund of FONDS DE CAPITAL A 
RISQUE - CONVERGENCE 
2009 68.5 57.2 83.5 
IT Fondo di rotazione per il 
finanziamento agevolato degli 
investimenti innovativi delle PMI 
2009 67.4 144.1 213.7 
IT Fondo rotativo finanziamento 
agevolato DM 6 agosto 2010  
2010 67.0 1.0 1.5 
DE NRW/EU.Investitionskapital 2007 65.0 59.4 91.3 
IT FRIM Fesr - Milano 2008 64.1 22.6 35.2 
UK Scottish Investment Bank Loan Fund 2010 61.3 9.1 14.9 
DE LfA Förderbank Bayern, München 2010 60.0 66.4 110.6 
HU Mikrofinanszírozó Pénzügyi 
6]ROJiOWDWy=iUN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 
2007 52.8 50.9 96.4 
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MS Specific fund (FEI or NHF) Set-up 
date 
OP contribu-
tions paid to 
fund 
OP contri-
butions 
invested 
in final 
recipients 
% in-
vest-
ed  
BE Loan Fund of NOVALLIA SA 2009 50.0 29.2 58.4 
IT Fondo regionale per la 
reindustrializzazione nelle aree 
industriali (FRAI) 
2012 50.0 5.6 11.1 
 All loan IXQGV!¼PLOOLRQ   2787.1 1519.9 54.5 
 $OOORDQIXQGV¼PLOOLRQ  2129.4 1726.3 81.1 
Note: 'DWDVKRXOGEHWUHDWHGZLWKFDXWLRQQRWOHDVWVLQFHVRPHIXQGVDUHµRYHU¶LQYHVWHG7KHRYHUDOOILJXUHV
do not adjust for this and treat blank returns as zero (RQO\DPRQJORDQIXQGV¼PLOOLRQ 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report. 
The data shortcomings and the mixed pattern of fund performance are replicated at case 
study level: in a significant number of OPs less than two-thirds of funds had been 
invested; elsewhere, absorption rates exceeding 100% point to the inclusion of revolved 
funds, undermining an accurate understanding of fund performance. 
Table 14: Absorption rates at end 2013/2014 are variable and there are data 
problems in the case study OPs, as in the stocktake countries generally 
OP name (cut off date) Total no 
of FIs 
% OP contributions invested in final recipients 
Guarantees Loans Equity  Total 
DE: OP Bavaria (end 
2013) 
4  84% 78% 82% 
FR: OP Languedoc-
Roussillon (end 2013) 
3 44% 50% 35% 41% 
UK: OP North East 
England (end 2014) 
8  65% 92% 90% 
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation (end 2014) 
4 87% 96%  90% 
3/230DáRSROVNLHHQG
2014) 
14 50% 80%-100%  84% 
LT: OP Economic Growth 
(end 2013) 
24 166% 108% 78% 117% 
PT: OP COMPETE (end 
2014) 
27  59% 37% 45% 
ES: OP Technological 
Fund (end 2014) 
3 307% 12%  51% 
HU: OP Economic 
Development (end 2014) 
11 64% 97% 90% 94% 
Source: Case study research 
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The following key explanatory factors for weak absorption emerged from the case study 
research: 
x Late start up of funds (case study OPs in ES, LT, FR, HU, PT, UK-pilot Creative 
Content Fund)  
x High concentration of resources in Convergence regions with low innovation 
capacity (ES). Focus on weaker regions with low number of technology-oriented 
enterprises (DE) 
x Uncertainty of legal framework (ES, HU, DE, PT, CZ) 
x Economic slowdown and budgetary problems in the public administration (ES) 
x Combination of OP-funded loans and guarantees but no clear legal framework for 
combined support (PL) 
x Problems with audits related to the management and control system (CZ, PT) 
x Lack of accompanying measures to communicate the FI-package to enterprises 
(FR) 
The specific reasons for weak absorption vary widely depending on the local context, as 
illustrated in the following examples. 
In the French OP Languedoc-Roussillon, the JEREMIE contribution invested in final 
recipients by the three funds was 41% of the total. Payments to final recipients by 
December 2013 were: 50% of the financial resources allocated to the seed loan; 35% to 
the co-investment fund; and 44% to the guarantee fund. The lack of non-financial 
support, including awareness-raising, the small size of the instrument and the 
experimental character of the JEREMIE mechanism, made it difficult to communicate the 
JEREMIE FIs to enterprises. 
,Q WKH 3ROLVK 23 0DáRSROVNLH WKH JXDUDQWHH IXQGV KDYH D JHQHUDOO\ ORZHU OHYHO RI
performance - the average investment rate at end 2014 was slightly below 50%. During 
OP implementation, there was competition between the guarantees offered by the fund 
managers and other guarantees offered by banks. Introduction of the latter caused a 
sudden loss of market demand for OP products and thus significant underperformance of 
the guarantee FIs. In addition, the MA faced implementation challenges connected to 
combining OP-funded loans with guarantees, where the legal framework appeared to be 
ambiguous. 
Under the Portuguese OP COMPETE, only half of the ERDF money allocated to FIs was 
effectively disbursed (end 2014). The credit line funds and the finance line for Business 
Angels performed well. However, some venture capital FIs disbursed less than one-third 
of planned funds. Problems associated with capturing private investment or in 
establishing a single fund instead of three led to termination of the respective projects at 
the beginning of 2012 and consequent adjustment in the previously approved venture 
capital funds. A further implementation problem was experienced with the Portugal VC 
initiative (PVCi), a project application approved in 2009 and managed in partnership with 
the EIF. It was annulled in 2012 because it was not possible to guarantee that the 
specific OP regulations as well as EU regulations related to VC supported by ERDF funds 
would be complied with. 
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Under the Spanish OP Technological Fund by the end of 2014, the small-volume ICO 
Guarantee Fund had a disbursement rate of more than 312%. The medium-volume CDTI 
Loan Fund disbursed almost 35% of allocated funds. The large-volume ICO Loan Fund 
was established at the end of 2013 but only 1% had been disbursed by the end of 2014. 
Two out of three FIs were established too late to be spent during the programming 
period. In addition, the Technological Fund OP struggled with absorption rates due to 
difficulties in finding final recipients for R&D business investment in Convergence regions. 
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4.3 EQ3: What are the management and operational structures for 
financial instruments, and how well are they working?  
The implementation of FI is highly demanding in terms of administrative capacity and the 
varied skill sets required. This chapter addresses aspects of FI management and 
implementation at the level of the stocktaking countries (12 MS) and case studies (9 
OPs) such as governance and management structures, set up times, management fees 
and costs, performance and success indicators, project selection criteria, capacity 
building, and the approaches taken to exit strategies and risk management. This section 
also presents good practice examples for FI management. 
Key findings 
x Management and operational structures vary widely across Member States and 
regions. There is no obvious link between the types of FI and the type of 
management structure chosen. This implies that choices have been driven by a 
complex range of factors, conditions and assumptions. Involving diverse fund 
managers creates wider access for SMEs, because of their different specialisms. 
x Set up of FIs within existing structures minimises operational costs and helped to 
speed up implementation. Set-up times were fastest when no selection process 
was followed. Where national institutions did not have the necessary expertise or 
capacity, the use of external expertise (such as the EIF) was very helpful. 
x The early stages of the programme period were characterised by considerable 
uncertainty. The regulatory provisions were thin and still geared towards grants. 
),VZHUHEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGLQDUHDVGRPLQDWHGE\DµJUDQWFXOWXUH¶ZKHUH),V
as such and the related specificities of Structural Funds were not well 
understood. All in all, only a few FI where operational before 2010 and quite a 
considerable number of funds began operating only in the year 2013. 
x Experience and relationship building among key stakeholders are important for 
successful implementation. The level of human resources responsible for FIs 
within the MAs varies hugely between Member States and regions. In some cases 
the political will to introduce FIs preceded the administrative capacity and 
experience of MA/IB, which now needs to catch up. As good practice example 
capacity building with EIF support helped to manage the holding fund for 
JEREMIE Languedoc-Roussillon (FR). North East England (UK) represents an 
example of a region maturing in experience of the use of FI. 
x Management fees and costs are difficult to assess owing to their structure. Fund 
managers are predominantly selected through competitive selection processes, 
but the case studies suggest that management fees (and costs) differ widely 
depending on the nature of the FI and the bodies involved in implementation.  
x The financial crisis had a significant impact on the focus of some FI, involving a 
shift towards financing working capital (in case study OPs in LT, PL and HU). 
Overall, only a small share of investments is made in innovative enterprises. 
Setting up VC markets to finance high growth enterprises is only a minor focus of 
FIs. 
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4.3.1 Management and operational structure 
Managing authorities had a range of operational structures open to them in 
establishing financial instruments: whether or not to use holding funds; whether to 
procure fund managers or entrust; whether to establish funds as a separate legal entity 
or as a block of finance within an existing institution. In terms of outcomes, no obvious 
patterns emerge in organisational arrangements ± four of the stakeholder countries do 
not use holding funds; the remaining eight use a mix of holding funds and specific funds 
outside holding funds; some holding funds comprise large numbers of specific funds; 
some, surprisingly, only one; some countries operate both national and regional level 
holding funds; and there is EIF involvement in several holding funds, but not in most, in 
spite of the large number of gap analyses undertaken by the EIF. 
Table 15: Number of holding funds and specific funds in the stocktake countries 
MS Holding Funds Specific Funds under 
Holding Funds  
Specific Funds  
(non-Holding Fund) 
BE   9 
CZ   2 
DE   36 
DK   3 
ES 2 2 7 
FR 2 17 101 
HU 1 168 1 
IT 12 14 68 
LT 2 23 1 
PL 9 128 74 
PT 2 36 9 
UK 7 22 26 
Source: Own calculations from 2015 Summary Report. 
There are a number of potential advantages to using holding funds to manage FIs. 
These include increased flexibility, the scope for a more strategic view and a portfolio 
approach to diversifying risk, securing match funding at the level of the holding fund at a 
sufficient scale to attract EIB funds and the pooling or delegation of some administrative 
tasks at holding fund level. Use of holding funds also has disadvantages. It can involve 
an additional layer of management fees and a higher level of overheads due to the need 
IRUH[WUDPRQLWRULQJDQGVFUXWLQ\WRPLWLJDWHµREMHFWLYHGULIW¶7KLVUDLVHVTXHVWLRQVDERXW
the efficiency of models where there are holding funds containing only a single specific 
instrument. Among participants at the stakeholder seminar, opinion on the usefulness of 
holding funds was divided. Many MAs were strongly in favour, due to their flexibility and 
the option of moving funds between instruments, scale factors, and the expertise and 
knowledge a holding fund manager can bring. At the same time, other MAs remained 
sceptical of the potential benefits, citing the additional layer of costs and reporting, and 
the potential loss of control ± especially as it is the MAs which ultimately remain 
answerable to the Commission. 
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There is no obvious link between the types of FI and the type of management 
structure chosen, and as there are many combinations across Member States and 
regions, this implies that choices have been driven by a complex range of factors, 
conditions and assumptions. 
The case studies illustrate how widely the simple governance model for implementation 
of co-financed FIs has been translated µRQ WKH JURXQG¶, with complex arrangements 
reflecting national (or regional) support structures. Where these are weak or new (OP 
Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ)), structures tend to be less 
complicated, whereas with well established, strong national support structures (already 
using FI) this regularly leads to more complex structures for implementation of EU co-
financed FIs (Bavaria (DE), North East England (UK), 0DáRSROVNLH (PL), OP COMPETE 
(PT)). 
The complexity of the approach chosen also reflects the degree of centralisation of 
Structural Funds management and implementation. Although it might be expected that 
smaller countries and regions would apply simpler governance structures, this is not 
generally the case: sub-regional structures are integrated in the delivery mechanisms of 
some regional OPs (Bavaria (DE), North East England (UK)0DáRSROVNLH (PL)); however, 
in most national programmes, the regional delivery mechanism (i.e. how final recipients 
are reached) does not much affect the governance structure (OP Enterprises & 
Innovation (CZ), OP Technological Fund (ES), OP Economic Development (HU), OP 
Economic Growth (LT), OP COMPETE (PT)). Delivery of FI to final recipients is done either 
through regional entities with a strong (direct) link to the MA or holding fund (OP 
Economic Development (HU), OP COMPETE (PT)) or directly from the (specific) fund. 
Most fund managers (below holding fund level) were selected through a competitive 
process (public procurement or call for applications). In only two cases (OP Enterprises & 
Innovation (CZ), OP Technological Fund (ES)), public bodies were directly appointed to 
manage the FIs. In three case studies, the fund managers are all public (OP Enterprises 
& Innovation (CZ), OP Technological Fund (ES), 0DáRSROVNLH (PL)), in three they are all 
private (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), North East England (UK), OP Economic Growth (LT)) 
and in the remaining three they are mixed private/public. Beneficiaries (fund managers) 
tend to be (a) banks or other financial institutions, private and publicly owned; (b) 
venture-capital companies (including business angel entities), all private; and (c) 
regional or sectoral support institutions, predominantly public. 
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Table 16: Case study management structures 
OP Name Total No 
of FIs 
(excl HF) 
No of 
FM 
No 
of 
HF 
Funding 
DJUHH¶WV
(inc HF) 
FM 
select
ion * 
Legal Status of 
FM 
      Public Private 
DE: OP Bavaria 4 4 0 4 DA X X 
FR: OP Languedoc-
Roussillon 
3 3 1 4 PP  X 
UK: OP North East  
England 
8 5 2 10 PP  X 
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 1 0 4 DA X  
PL: OP 0DáRSROVNLH 14 9 0 14 CA X  
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 
24 16 2 26 PP  X 
PT: OP COMPETE 27 ~9 1 28 PP X X 
ES: OP Technological 
Fund  
3 3 0 3 DA X  
HU: OP Economic 
Development 
11 137 1 138 CA X X 
Note: DA= direct appointment; PP = public procurement; CA = call/applications 
Ownership /type and background of fund manager also varied widely. The seven 
holding funds covered in the case studies were predominantly managed by public (or 
semi-public) institutions. In the case of North East England (UK), two private limited 
companies were entrusted with managing the holding funds and the EIF has managed 
holding funds in another two cases (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP Economic Growth 
(LT)). Most of the public holding fund managers were comparatively new institutions or 
even only set up for the purpose of implementing the 2007-13 FIs. 
Fund manager ownership and type for specific funds is much more mixed among the 
case study OPs. Only for guarantee instruments is there a clear dominance of public 
institutions, mostly specialised organisations with majority public ownership. Loan 
instruments are managed equally by private and public fund managers and in most cases 
they co-exist within the same OP. For equity FIs, managers from the private sector 
predominate (VC companies, business angel associations), although a considerable 
number of public entities are also involved. Taking all three types of FIs together, there 
are only three OPs where there is no (truly) private fund manager involved in FI 
implementation (CZ, PL, ES). 
Regional development goals played a significant role in selection of fund managers in the 
230DáRSROVNLH3/$OOQLQHIXQGPDQDJHUVZHUHVHOHFWHGIURPUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQD
competitive, transparent procedure of calls for applications. All fund managers are public 
(or equivalent to public) bodies and had previous experience with EU co-financed FIs. 
Delivery of the FIs is based on the distribution of resources between the fund managers 
located in all the sub-UHJLRQV RI 0DáRSROVND ,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH UHVRXUFHV are made 
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available to the final recipients locally and reach businesses in the sub-regions, through 
financial intermediaries that are closely linked to local communities and SMEs.  
The regional development orientation is also evident in the OP Bavaria (DE). The FIs are 
managed by two public and two semi-private bodies with long-standing experience. The 
institutions are decentralised with a strong presence in the weaker regions such as 
(Bayern Kapital in Landshut or S-Refit in Regensburg). Further, the LfA funding bank is 
represented by the local banks in the regions. The fund managers have sufficient 
knowledge of the regional and local product and financial markets. The links with regional 
cluster initiatives help to identify suitable investments. In the case of the Risk Capital 
Fund I, start-ups are mobilised through a regional cluster initiative focused on 
biotechnology. 
4.3.2 Set-up times 
Set-up time differed between countries and OPs. There were significant delays in 
setting up FIs in many countries; this was partly attributable to the lack of clarity in the 
regulations, but also the length of time needed to negotiate terms with the various 
actors. These delays are reflected in the phasing of OP commitments to FIs. Overall, 
almost half of OP commitments were paid to FIs established in or before 2009. However, 
there were considerable variations between countries, with the Czech Republic 
committing all contributions to FIs established in 2007 and Belgium the same by 2009. 
By contrast, Spain, in particular, but also Denmark and Portugal committed a significant 
proportion of funds as late as 2013; and further, albeit small, amounts were committed 
in 2014.  
Figure 10: OP contributions to FIs per year 
Source: Own calculations from 2015 Summary Report. 
FI set-up time varied both between the case study OPs and between different FIs within 
a particular OP. In two cases, the set-up of the full operational system for FIs was only 
achieved in 2013. Even individual FIs mostly took longer than six months to set up; there 
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was mixed opinion among MAs as to whether this was an acceptable timeframe. The 
fastest set-up was achieved when no (multi-stakeholder) selection process had to be 
followed (OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ), OP Technological Fund (ES)).  
The stakeholder seminar highlighted that the early stages of the programme period were 
characterised by a great deal of uncertainty. The use of FIs was new in many OPs and 
the regulatory provisions were thin and still geared towards grants. In addition, FIs were 
being implemented in areas which were dominated by a µgrant culture¶, where neither 
FIs, nor the specificities of Structural Funds, were well understood. MAs considered that 
the process would have been easier if more guidance had been available from the start of 
the period and if it had been clearer, more extensive and less subject to change.  
Beside the selection process, individual negotiations (between Member States and the 
Commission or EIB/EIF) slowed down the process considerably (Bavaria (DE), 
Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP Economic Growth (LT), North East England (UK)). MAs 
had to seek clarification on many elements of the implementation process, and have 
found aspects such as public procurement, preparation for closure and State aid, 
challenging. Supplementing the regulations with COCOF notes also had repercussions for 
audit, with the retrospective application by auditors of guidance notes on FIs that had 
been set up prior to the availability of the guidance. The lack of expertise of auditors with 
respect to FIs (as opposed to grants) was also problematic.  
Several µgood practice¶ examples emerged from the study. These addressed the fact that 
FIs were being implemented in fields more accustomed to grants, and involved setting up 
and improving communication channels, especially with potential private sector fund 
managers. These aimed to make participation in FIs more attractive, and included µroad 
shows¶ to reach remoter/rural parts of regions and marketing the funding logic to 
financial intermediaries. Maintaining good communication channels with all levels of the 
implementation structure has a positive impact on implementation, the capacity to adapt 
FI to changing needs and on uptake.  
An option which has worked well for some MAs has been to use existing (national) 
institutions, which has helped speed up implementation. However, where national 
institutions did not have the necessary expertise or capacity, the use of external 
expertise (such as the EIF) was view positively. Further, continuity of implementation in 
terms of stakeholder institutions played a critical role in the set-up and stability of policy 
(OP Economic Development (HU), OP Economic Growth (LT), North East England (UK)).  
4.3.3 Management fees and costs 
It is extremely difficult to provide an assessment of the scale of management fees and 
costs under co-financed FIs with any confidence. For many FIs, fees and costs are not 
complete in the summary data (e.g. HU, LT, see annex 6.11), and detailed analysis of 
the relevant data did not even render a reliable and plausible result for the nine case 
study OPs. 
A consideration of management fees and costs must also take into account that these 
may sometimes be paid with resources other than those from the OP, and that 
remuneration of fund managers may come from sources other than fees. Further, with 
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risk sharing FIs, earnings on private contributions may provide an incentive for the fund 
manager to perform even if no performance fees are envisaged. From a Cohesion policy 
perspective, the primary concern is with costs and fees paid from OP contributions, but 
before the closure declaration is made it is not easy and sometime not possible to know 
how (or whether) such costs have been paid. In short, the real cost of running FIs is 
strikingly opaque.  
The case studies suggest that management fees and costs differ widely depending on the 
nature of the FI and the bodies involved in implementation. For example, fees for the 
loan FI in OP North-East (UK) appear comparatively high, but this reflects the fact that 
microfinance is being offered which necessarily carries relatively high transaction costs 
(this being one of the reasons for the limited commercial availability of microfinance). It 
also appears that public intermediaries do not identify costs in the same way as do 
private intermediaries. For most of the case study FIs, the annual management fee 
charged to the MA or HF respectively, is given in Table 17, below. However, the detailed 
basis of the calculation is usually unclear; rules for fee calculation specified in funding 
agreements are often complex and often confidential. For this reason a second measure 
or in some cases alternative measure ± the cumulated contribution for management fees 
or costs from the OP to the FI product ± is also given in Table 15, where available from 
the 2015 Summary report.   
Most stakeholders interviewed claim that the annual fees paid are (sometimes 
considerably) below the fixed threshold (generally 3%). Clearly, guarantee products and 
loan schemes demand smaller annual management fees than equity funds. Over the 
duration of the funds, management fees for equity FIs in two case study OPs (LT and UK) 
exceeded 14% of OP contributions paid to FI by the end of 2014; depending on the 
extent to which the fund had been invested, this would be even higher as a proportion of 
the amount reaching final recipients. However, the data reported by MAs is far from 
complete, so detailed comparisons of costs are not feasible. For example, in the OP 
Economic Development (HU), all selected fund managers are granted an annual 
management fee of 5% of OP funds under management, which would appear higher than 
the market rates prevailing under comparable conditions or in other countries, but in the 
AIR and the 2015 Summary report, no OP contribution to management fees has been 
reported by the MA.  
The role of management fees in the selection of fund managers was called into question 
by some interviewees who argued that capable financial intermediaries were being 
excluded on cost grounds ± in other words, competent fund managers opted not to bid to 
run funds because the levels of remuneration were inadequate. Their argument seems to 
be that the additional administrative burden for running an ERDF-funded (equity) scheme 
are not covered by the minimal difference in fees compared to fully commercial funds. 
However, there is no evidence that the fund managers who claim that the fees are 
inadequate would actually be more effective in managing funds or supporting final 
recipients.  
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Table 17: Actual management fees charged to the OP by FIs (NHF) 
OP  
No 
of 
FIs  
Annual management fees of funds 
under management (case study 
data) 
Management fees paid to FI 
until end 2014, in % of OP 
contribution (case study data) 
Guar-
antees 
Loans Equity  
Guar-
antees 
Loans Equity  
DE: OP 
Bavaria 
4   0.5% to 1.0 
%  
3%, plus 
performanc
e bonus 
 n.a. n.a. 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
3 0.0%* 3.0% 3.0% 
0 n.a. n.a. 
UK: OP North 
East England 
8   4.95%  
1.0% to 
4.5% 
  
 n.a 14.8%** 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 
Estimated 2% 
management fee 
(Deloitte, 2014) covered 
partly by non-ERDF 
sources 
  
n.a n.a  
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 14 
0.5% to 
1.0%  
0.9% to 
2.6% 
  2.2 % 8.6%  
LT: OP 
Economic 
Growth 
24 1%  
0.6% to 
0.9%   
5% to 13% 
 
5.6% 3.2% 15.9% 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 27   n.a. n.a. 
 3.7% 1.8% 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
3 0 0   
1% no fee 
charged 
(so far) 
 
HU: OP 
Economic 
Development 
11 
5% p.a. for all financial 
intermediaries; no realised data 
available 
total cost of HF until end 2013: 
EUR 10.2 million, i.e. 1.5% of OP 
contribution 
Source: Case study research, own calculation  
Note: (*) covered by HF management fee (identical FM); no fee has been paid to the financial intermediary, 
who set up a loan portfolio with risk of default partly covered through JEREMIE guarantees, and was in charge 
for, inter alia, monitoring and reporting, State aid supervision, recovery procedures. (**) all FBNE funds except 
micro-loans 
None of the fund managers interviewed was willing to reveal the ³UHDO´FRVWRIUXQQLQJDQ
individual FI as this would disclose commercially sensitive information. In OP Economic 
Growth (LT), the holding fund publishes business data regularly, including profit and loss 
accounts, but these cannot be aligned with the financial performance data of the OP, and 
even less so with the individual FI. Costs cannot therefore be compared between 
different bodies (public or private). Comparison between different instruments is also 
very limited, beyond the clear trend that guarantee instruments generally have the 
lowest costs, while equity instruments are at the upper end of the cost scale. This can 
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largely be explained by the fact that selection of projects for equity investment takes 
longer and is more expensive, due to the in-depth due diligence required. By contrast, in 
the case of guarantees, due diligence is often undertaken by the lender, minimising the 
involvement of the guarantee fund in individual investments. 
From the case studies it seems that fees and costs for managing FIs do not differ 
between public and private fund managers, as the procurement process rules out most of 
these differences. What marks the difference between fund managers is rather the 
combination of financial and non-financial services applied. For instance some fund 
manager (not necessarily public ones) offer better value for money because their fees 
include business support advice, e.g. in HU, Languedoc-Roussillon. 
Management fees may not be the only remuneration for fund managers, who may also 
earn from investments in enterprises on their own account. Funds may charge fees to 
final recipients e.g. arrangement fees, although this was not mentioned in the case study 
OPs. What does occur is that public fund managers, in particular, finance management 
services to national bodies (ministries) themselves, regarding this as part of their general 
remit, and do not seek fees from the ERDF; e.g. in Czech Republic70 and in Spain71 and 
partly in Lithuania72. Integrating FIs into existing public management structures helped in 
some cases to limit management costs attributable to ERDF. However, it is difficult to get 
clear evidence on this. 
Regarding performance and success indicators for fund management, the case study 
analysis found that the remuneration of fund managers was rarely linked to any 
performance indicators (mainly UK). In general, the main incentive is increasing the 
volume of resources available for the fund which is mostly linked to the level of 
disbursement to final recipients. The maximum consumption of available resources is 
seen as an incentive because it increases thHVFRSHRIWKHIXQGPDQDJHUV¶DFWLYLWLHVLQ
most cases) and the efficiency of its operations.  
In Hungary (OP Economic development) the so-FDOOHGµSDUWQHUOLPLWV¶V\VWHPSURYLGHGDQ
adequate incentive for the fund managers and simultaneously a risk management tool for 
the HF. Monitoring of the project portfolio of the fund managers is provided by an annual 
VFRULQJ V\VWHP 7KH 0$ DQG WKH KROGLQJ IXQG PDQDJHU XVHG D VRUW RI ³VWHS-by-VWHS´
performance-based incentive in allocating the EU contributions to the financial 
intermediaries. The HF transferred the (ERDF plus national) contributions to the 
individual intermediaries in sequential steps in dependence of their past financial 
performance. This system could be supplemented by outcome indicators. 
                                          
70  Fees from the Credit fund are paid from funds that are not considered ERDF. This doesn´t refer to the 
Guarantee Fund. The actual amount of management costs and fees is not yet public. 
71  The public fund manager CDTI set-up the FI action line (CDTI Loan Fund) within its existing structure; 
sometimes co-financed by ERDF. Therefore no operational costs were charged to the FI since they were 
already assigned to other ERDF action lines and specific costs related to this FI were not differentiated. 
Management and control costs for all ERDF funded action lines, including the FI, were classified as technical 
assistance. Only 100% specific and new costs were considered as FI costs, such as adapting ICT software. 
72  Costs and fees are for instance low in the case of the publicly managed INVEGA HF and publicly managed 
Guarantee Fund. But also the Funded Risk Sharing Product operated by private banks has low management 
costs. 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 60 
4.3.4 Project selection criteria 
Project selection criteria and the terms under which FIs are offered vary widely 
not just among countries, but between the various FIs implemented. These range from 
those which seem near-identical to strictly commercial criteria and terms that involve 
subsidy elements in the interest rate charged or provide support on terms that would not 
be acceptable commercially (such as the length of the credit term).  
Project selection criteria typically are similar to those used by commercial banks. This 
commercial orientation of project selection criteria poses interesting questions given the 
ultimate wider Cohesion policy objectives of co-financed FIs. It also raises the question of 
how and at which level the contribution of these investments to Cohesion policy goals is 
assessed. Co-financed FIs do, however, differ from their wholly commercial counterparts 
in several important ways. The geographical location of the recipient, requiring 
operations in the region where the FI operates, is an important criterion common to all 
OPs. Similarly, compliance with the definition of SMEs or micro enterprises, in terms of 
the number of employees and upper limits on revenue, is also regularly used in the 
VHOHFWLRQ SURFHVV 7KH µOHQGHU RI ODVW UHVRUW¶ SULQFLSOH LV XVHd in cases where 
loan/guarantee-type FIs provide opportunities for beneficiaries that are unable to obtain 
loans elsewhere.  
From the case studies it is clear that implementation of a particular FI µon the ground¶ 
does not differ according to whether the fund manager is a private or a public body. They 
are both bound by the same provisions of the funding agreement and operate within 
these as due diligence allows. Profitability criteria play a minor role in the selection of 
projects with private fund managers as well as with public ones. This is reflected in the 
reluctance of many private sector institutions to participate in co-financed support 
schemes, because this is considered (rightly or not) to endanger their profitability.  
4.3.5 Capacity building 
As most fund managers were either new to FI management (as they had only recently 
been set up) or new to Structural Funds implementation (or both), capacity building 
was a prominent theme. Stakeholder seminar participants noted that that the level of 
human resources responsible for FIs within the MAs varies hugely between Member 
States and regions ± and the number of staff can be very few. This has important 
implications for administrative capacity, and can strengthen the argument for involving 
external or private sector expertise where this is the case. At the same time, the 
complexity of Cohesion policy administration can prove a disincentive to potential private 
sector stakeholders who often consider their own audit and control procedures to be 
more than adequate and are sometimes surprised at levels of further monitoring required 
as a consequence of Cohesion policy funding. 
Within the nine case study OPs, at least five MAs had the capacity to manage public FI 
readily available at the start of the period. All had a proven track record of running such 
schemes, mostly including ERDF co-financing. For these OPs this was also the case with 
respect to (most of) the planned fund managers.  
For the remaining MAs (Technological Fund (ES) OP Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP 
Economic Growth OP (LT), OP COMPETE (PT)) managing FIs was relatively new and 
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capacity had to be developed. According to the interviews this took place quickly in all 
these cases and without major problems. In two cases, the capacity building support 
from the EIF was perceived to be crucial.  
Box 4: Good practice in OP Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) - capacity building with 
EIF support 
The EIF managed the holding fund for JEREMIE Languedoc-Roussillon (FR); it was also 
closely involved in management activities and delivering technical assistance to fund 
managers. This helped capacity building, and a number of elements of good practice 
emerged from the management structure, the fund selection procedures and 
implementation rules. The mechanism was considered to have worked well by the 
different stakeholders interviewed. Positive feedback was also reported in the mid-term 
evaluation and the ex ante evaluation for the 2014-20 period. Good practice aspects 
include: 
x Seed-loan and co-investment funds: Strong orientation of the FIs towards 
regional development goals is demonstrated by strict targeting of actors and 
sectors. 
x All funds: Management costs considered by the three fund managers as 
moderate (low) and concentrated in the first phase of development. 
x Guarantee fund: No fee has been paid to the financial intermediary, who set up a 
loan portfolio with risk of default partly covered through JEREMIE guarantees, 
and was also in charge for, inter alia, monitoring and reporting, State aid 
supervision, recovery procedures. Gains from treasury management have been 
used within the same financial instrument. The guarantee fund manager is 
identical with the HF manager and thus an additional layer of financial 
intermediary is economised. 
x All funds: the EIF, as holding fund manager, collected a number of indicators 
measuring financial performance and the characteristics (age, employees, 
turnover) of the enterprises supported. 
 
Source: Case study research 
Interestingly, the challenges encountered by the MAs (and partly the holding fund 
managers) during implementation were similar for both those the experienced with FIs 
and those with less experience. The major challenges in all cases related to the EU 
regulations, their interpretation and legally secure application, and their compatibility 
with domestic (legal and technical) requirements. The main areas concerned the 
eligibility rules, the options for combining grants and FIs (with very different solutions 
found in the nine cases studies) and hence the design of the individual FI products, and 
an extensive list of State aid issues. In some case these had serious practical 
repercussions - for example, in Portugal, parts of the management and control system 
had to be redrafted to release a payment suspension, just as the programme had 
seemed ready to start. Several MAs (with holding funds) found the administrative burden 
linked to the selection of fund managers a particular challenge. The highly technical 
language associated with finance/fund management was also a major challenge.  
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Once the delivery system was set up, new challenges emerged related to monitoring and 
absorption, and the need to deal with poor performance of individual funds. Capacity 
building to cope with these challenges predominantly took place ³RQ WKH MRb,´DOWKRXJK
some MAs and holding funds also offered formal training for their own staff and those of 
fund managers. 
4.3.6 FI portfolio management and risk management 
The repayment structure for loan instruments varies from programme to programme. For 
example, the repayment period of the seed loan scheme in Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), 
ranges from 6 to 48 months, whereas most other loan schemes in the case study sample 
start at a minimum of 3-4 years and rise to 6-7 years, with the notable exception of the 
Bavarian loan scheme, which can grant credit of up to 20 years duration. 
Exit strategies for equity funds seem to be more similar across the different OPs, 
although in principle are less regulated. In general, equity funds calculate a five year 
development period before exiting. Most of the funds also orient themselves towards a 
fixed fund closing date of 2020, when all deals must be closed and exited from (at the 
latest). 
Targeting the right balance in terms of risk has been difficult to address given the 
diversity of implementation options and situations addressed. However, two interesting 
points emerged from the stakeholder seminar. On the one hand, it was argued that, in 
the context of economic development policy, there should be a focus on riskier projects 
and investing in projects which the private sector would not. In any case, with grants the 
SXEOLFIXQGLQJLVµORVW¶ZKHUHDVZLWK),LWPD\EHUHSDLGVRLWLVZRUWKILQDQFLQJULVNLHU
projects on these grounds alone. On the other hand, the level of risk that can be taken 
depends on how the fund is capitalised. For example, if the fund is financed by a loan 
from the EIB, then there has to be an emphasis on ensuring that the SMEs which are 
funded can repay their loans on time, so that the EIB can, in turn, be reimbursed, and 
this affects the risk strategy. 
4.3.7 Key success factors in management and implementation 
$OO FDVH VWXGLHV RIIHUHG YHU\ VLPLODU VXJJHVWLRQV DV WR WKH µVXFFHVV IDFWRUV¶ IRU
management and implementation:   
x The selection of appropriate fund managers. More specifically, in the case of 
equity funds, the track record of deals closed, is ranked very highly for all OPs. 
The requirement for knowledge of the finance sector as well as of Cohesion policy 
(Structural Funds) at the fund manager level is considered crucial, but also 
difficult to find (according to case studies in UK, HU, ES, PT, DE, LT; FR, CZ; see 
case study section on success factors for sound administration and management 
of FIs). 
x The need for regional and local knowledge was stressed by the regional case 
study OPs along with networks involving both the business and financial sectors 
(UK, PL, DE, LT, FR). 
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x Clear organisational set-up, with unambiguous competences and 
responsibilities and smooth information flows between the parts of the system 
was unanimously regarded as key (UK, PL, HU, ES, LT, FR). 
x Shared objectives. A common view of the relevant issues among the different 
institutions involved and an information exchange which goes beyond obligatory 
reporting was also mentioned as a success factor by some OPs (UK, FR). 
x Flexibility of implementation arrangements was also mentioned repeatedly. 
This allows a timely reaction to changes in the context of the programme and the 
DELOLW\WR³ULJKWVL]H´LQGLYLGXDOLQVWUXPHQWVRUSURGXFWV(UK, HU, ES, LT). 
North East England (UK) represents an example of a region maturing in experience of 
the use of FI. It has successfully incorporated learning from previous funds into the 
management structures and processes of the Finance for Business North East scheme 
(FBNE), and this is leading to positive outcomes for SMEs in the region, and the 
achievement of strategic objectives to increase the stock of businesses, sustainability and 
growth in higher value sectors of the economy. Good practice aspects include the 
following:  
x Active management of fund managers through dedicated and experienced HF 
team 
x High calibre, experienced Board members scrutinising performance 
x Incorporation of learning from previous funds. Detailed operational guidelines set 
parameters for fund manager activity but provide flexibility for investment 
decisions 
x Comprehensive reporting system provides transparency on fund performance 
x Dedicated legacy management body, providing a strategic oversight of past funds  
x ,QWHJUDWHG PRGHO ZLWK IOH[LELOLW\ WR µUight-VL]H¶ DFURVV IXQGV GHSHQGLQJ RQ
performance and reflecting changing market gaps 
x Additional human resources allocated within sub-region which had not participated 
as well in the FBNE, which resulted in an uptake of funds 
x Most funds have the flexibility to structure loans, quasi-equity and equity. Only 
one pure loan fund, which caters for simpler, small business needs 
x Early focus on planning for exits to maintain returns profile 
x Reaction to under-utilisation in sub-region by establishing additional presence to 
promote fund. 
x Fund managers have successfully levered additional investment at the deal level 
x User-friendly online system to capture economic impacts. 
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4.4 EQ4: What does the monitoring and evaluation system show?  
Monitoring and evaluating progress in FI implementation and capturing results is a vital 
part of sound implementation. This section describes the characteristics of the indicator 
system linked to FIs and comments on the completeness. The reporting provisions and 
the reliability of reported data are examined. Moreover in this section evaluations carried 
out in the 2007 to 2013 programming period are reviewed. 
Key findings 
x Monitoring of most FIs appears to be inadequate to assess their performance. At 
EU and at programme levels the quality of information on the implementation of 
FIs is poor. While monitoring provisions were an obligatory element of each 
funding agreement from 2006, it should be noted that data reporting was 
obligatory only from 2011, and even then some data was reported only on an 
optional basis. 
x Case studies indicate that there is no continuous control of the quality of 
monitoring data provided, apart from ERDF-related audits, State aid inspections 
and European Court of Auditors visits. 
x Overall, the evidence from evaluations of the performance of FIs is very limited. 
The academic literature is focused on venture capital. However, equity is the 
least used of the three main types of ERDF co-financed FIs. Loans and 
guarantees are relatively under-evaluated. 
x Few evaluation studies consider the rationale for the form of intervention ± 
grants as opposed to repayable mechanisms ± or the relative efficiency of public 
funds disbursed in repayable form and their capacity to draw in private funding. 
x Very few studies addressed the capacity of FIs to contribute to wider regional 
development objectives (the main aim of ERDF programmes). 
The overall quality of information on FIs is poor. This is partly due to the fact that 
at the start of the 2007-13 period, specific reporting on FIs was not required (though of 
course standard requirements and the principles of sound financial management applied 
to FIs, as to the other areas of Cohesion policy expenditure). However, it was 
subsequently recognised that because of the additional complexities of FIs this was a 
significant gap in understanding how managing authorities were implementing the Funds 
and in 2011 an amendment to the Regulation73 obliged Member States to report on 
financial instruments in their Annual Implementation Reports. The year 2012 was 
therefore the first year in which MAs were required formally to report on the 
implementation of financial instruments. Even so, these requirements were rather limited 
in scope (Article 67(2)(j)): 
x a description of the financial engineering instrument and implementation 
arrangements 
x identification of the entities which implement the financial engineering instrument, 
including those acting through holding funds 
                                          
73  Regulation 1310/2011 of 13 December 2011 as regards repayable assistance, financial engineering and 
certain provisions related to the statement of expenditure, OJ L337/1 of 20.12.2011, amending Article 67 of 
the General Regulation.  
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x amounts of assistance from the Structural Funds and national co-financing paid to 
the financial engineering instrument 
x amounts of assistance from the Structural Funds and national co-financing paid by 
the financial engineering instrument. 
The legacy of this is that financial information is at best patchy and there is evidence 
that the reporting requirements for FI spend have often been misunderstood. Because 
many elements of the reporting under the AIR were voluntary, quite basic data is often 
missing so that it may be unclear, for example, whether information is unavailable on the 
operation of a given FI, or whether there really have been no investments made. 
Conversely, there are instances where the amount invested in final recipients exceeds 
the OP commitments, suggesting that returns to the fund have been double counted if 
reinvested. The extent to which this has happened is unknown, making it impossible to 
provide quite basic aggregate data on the extent to which OP commitments have actually 
been invested, let alone assessments of how much they really cost to run and what 
impact they might have had on jobs or investment. 
Monitoring and evaluation systems were generally not in place in the case study 
OPs for the start of the period (e.g. no evaluation plans). The case studies suggest that 
there is generally no ongoing quality control of data monitoring beyond that arising 
from ERDF-related audits, State aid inspections and European Court of Auditors visits. 
Audits forced MAs to improve data collection; however, these enhanced efforts may be 
misdirected if irrelevant data for evaluation purposes are collected or if data are not 
accessible for evaluators. 
The monitoring systems in place usually have only a few indicators and these are 
generally inadequate to provide the basis of an assessment of impact. The indicators 
collected by the MA cover in most cases spending, output indicators and a limited set of 
result indicators ± if any (jobs, total investment volume). Effects on employment are 
monitored by many OPs, however, there are some OPs with no result indicators (OP 
Technological Fund (ES), OP Economic Growth OP (LT), OP COMPETE (PT)). Existing FI-
UHODWHG ³LPSDFW´ LQGLFDWRUV LQ WKH 23V HJ LQ WKH 23 (FRQRPLF *URZWK 23 /7 DUH
actually context indicators which do not reveal much relevant information on the effects 
of FIs. Indicator sets were in most caVHVGHYHORSHGIRUJUDQWVUDWKHUWKDQIRU),V³JUDQW
WKLQNLQJ´ It is also worth noting that little has been formally recorded anyway since 
investment projects are still ongoing. 
There is a great deal of soft information on the effects of FIs which is difficult to capture 
via the classical indicator sets and which requires a FI-specific approach (e.g. start-ups 
and companies receiving intensive non-financial support to build up their business 
competence). 
Outcomes on company growth, improved survival rates of new businesses, turnover, 
sales, innovation capacity or indicators on the horizontal priorities (sustainability, 
equality) are not collected in the central monitoring system. Part of the reason for this is 
to avoid additional costs and administrative burden for the implementing bodies (the 
approach being to keep monitoring light and leave the optional evaluation to collect more 
in-depth data). 
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The exception is the North East England OP (UK), where the FI-related indicator set is 
more advanced. Indicators are used to monitor a number of different strategic 
objectives, such as increasing business density (including in disadvantaged areas), 
improving survival rates of new businesses, and creating/safeguarding jobs (including in 
disadvantaged areas). 
Across the case study OPs as a whole, there is a general lack of information at end user 
level (final recipient), however, the stakeholder seminar concluded that it is difficult to 
impose more requirements. The collection of result indicators at the level of end users 
(final recipients) is costly and increases the administrative burden and transaction costs 
for the financial intermediaries who deliver FIs. Micro and small companies which receive 
FI support are often overburdened to report more elaborate performance data. In 
addition, experienced staff are necessary to establish and run more sophisticated and 
reliable monitoring systems, and often such skills are unavailable (and are anyway 
costly).  
Information is sometimes collected on the ground but not shared or reported in the IT 
system (i.e. it may be known to fund managers but not shared with evaluators). Venture 
capital funds with a small number of investments are, in theory, easier to monitor; 
however, commercial confidentiality issues also arise as an important consideration. Fund 
managers may be opposed to sharing in-depth information on their portfolio (e.g. 
performance of enterprises, invested sectors). In the Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) OP, a 
much broader range of indicators seems to be available for individual FIs, covering the 
structure and development of each company supported, yet this information could not be 
accessed due to confidentiality rules in the funding agreements. 
Existing evaluations provide very limited evidence on the effectiveness of ERDF-
supported FIs for enterprise support. Evaluations which assessed FIs in relation to 
recipient firms in general indicated that the SMEs increased jobs and turnover, but only 
in a few cases were such outcomes measured in terms of the net effects of FI support.  
It remains unclear what is the capacity of FI to contribute to regional development 
objectives; the relative efficiency of FI as opposed to grants is also unknown and 
underexplored. 
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Table 18: Monitoring systems in the case study OPs generally have few 
indicators and are inadequate to assess the intervention logic 
OP name Examples of indicators related to FIs 
Output indicators Result indicators Context indicators 
DE: OP 
Bavaria 
*Supported enterprises 
*No of investments 
*VC investments 
*Loan fund investments 
*Jobs created /safeguarded *Employment trends 
in lagging regions 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
*No of projects financed by FIs 
*No of companies involved 
*No of SMEs financed 
*No of innovative SMEs support.  
*No of investments in SMEs with 
high development potential 
*Gross direct jobs created in 
FTE 
*Survival rate at 3 years 
after start-up  
  
UK: OP 
North East 
England 
*No of SMEs receiving financial 
assistance 
*No of start-ups supported 
*No of gross jobs created / 
safeguarded 
*Private sector leverage 
*Improved environmental 
management 
*Collaboration with 
knowledge base 
*No of businesses created / 
attracted 
*No of businesses created / 
attracted surviving 12month 
  
CZ: OP 
Enterprises 
& Innovation 
*No of supported projects of 
direct support to SMEs 
*No of newly established 
firms 
*No of newly created jobs 
(gender) 
  
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
*No of enterprises supported *Created jobs in micro, 
small and medium 
enterprises 
  
LT: OP 
Economic 
Growth 
*No of SME supported by FIs 
*private investment attracted 
n/a *Investment in fixed 
capital formation as 
% of GDP 
*Labour productivity 
(% of EU15 average) 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
*Financing oriented to potential 
growth sectors 
*No of guarantees 
*Management costs as % of 
invested capital 
n/a   
ES: OP 
Technologica
l Fund 
*No of projects per size, sector 
*No of employees in final 
recipient 
n/a   
HU: OP 
Economic 
Develop-
ment 
*Decrease of the number of  
SMEs without access to financing 
resources (Loan) 
*Gross no of jobs created *Growth of GVA 
*Change in e-
business index 
*Induced private 
investments 
Source: Case study research 
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A mixed picture of evaluation activity emerges from the case studies. In some cases, no 
specific evaluations have been undertaken (OP Technological Fund (ES)); others were 
early in the lifetime of the FI (OP Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP COMPETE (PT)) or did 
not cover the FI in sufficient detail to draw meaningful conclusions (OP Economic 
Development (HU)). North East England (UK) was interesting in commissioning parallel 
evaluations of all three JEREMIE instruments in England, allowing for cross-comparison 
and shared learning. In some cases, evaluations have been designed to draw lessons to 
inform programming for 2014-20 (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), North East England (UK)). 
In Bavaria (DE), the MA initiated a mid-term evaluation of the OP, which also addressed 
the implementation of FIs. The focus was on delivery of the FIs as well as on the early 
effects (a counterfactual evaluation indicated statistically significant effects of venture 
capital funds). For the new programme period, three recent ex-ante assessments have 
retrospectively viewed the three venture capital instruments and the loan funds operated 
under the previous 2007-13 programme. 
Table 19: Case study evaluation activity 
OP name Evaluation carried out Comments 
DE: OP Bavaria OP Mid-Term-Evaluation (MTE) 
incl. FI 
Ex-ante assessment of FIs 
Focused on delivery and early 
effects 
FR: OP Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Early FI review Focused on lessons for 2014-
2020 
UK: OP North East England  FI MTE, in parallel with other 
JEREMIE regions 
Cross-cutting theme ex-post 
evaluation 
Additional review looking ahead to 
2014-20 
Examined delivery and early 
effects; compared 
performance across 3 regions 
Cross-cutting theme 
evaluation optimism not 
borne out by realisation 
period. 
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 
Thematic FI MTE Focused on absorption 
capacity 
PL: OP 0DáRSROVNLH FI MTE Focused on system 
functioning, not effects and 
contribution to OP 
LT: OP Economic Growth 3 evaluations on FIs for 
enterprises, one of them assessing 
early impact of FIs 
A counterfactual impact 
evaluation was carried out 
PT: OP COMPETE OP MTE incl. FI Too early in FI lifecycle to 
assess progress 
ES: OP Technological Fund' No specific FI evaluation  
HU: OP Economic 
Development 
No informative evaluation Existing studies descriptive or 
partial 
Source: case study research 
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Reporting provisions and quality control mechanisms are defined in the different 
financing agreements and monitored by regular audits. Audit reports are in some cases 
strictly confidential (e.g. Bavaria (DE)) and therefore of limited use for evaluators. 
In the OP Economic Development (HU), a standardised monitoring information system 
was developed to serve as a central system for collecting and monitoring all kinds of data 
from the FI managers. Data obligations were specified for different timespans, including 
daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly reporting obligations. For venture capital operations, 
the monitoring system required more detailed information about each project than for 
loans and guarantees. In the quarterly report, the funds investment policy and the 
quality and progress of the portfolio has to be summarised. The quarterly reports and the 
yearly reports of the fund managers which contain similar information are not public and 
therefore beyond the scope of evaluators. 
In the OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ), the fund manager regularly updates the data in 
the monitoring system and regularly reports to the MA. However, the MA does not have 
special quality control mechanisms to cross check data reported by the fund manager, 
although it can check during an on-site inspection of a project. 
In the OP Economic Growth (LT), the FI manager INVEGA publishes performance reports 
four times a year. These include the main indicators for separate FIs. Key indicators 
reported to the MA are the number of SMEs supported and private investment attracted 
through FIs. These are OP±level indicators and their accuracy can be checked by the 
Monitoring Committee, especially if there are inconsistencies. However, there is no 
systematic cross-checking of data reported by FI managers to the MA. 
In North East England (UK), the funding agreements between the HF and fund managers 
require regular reporting on a range of indicators (see Box). Investee SMEs are prompted 
to provide updated information at six-monthly intervals through a user-friendly online 
real-time database.   
The Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) case highlighted challenges in establishing consistent 
data sets on key indicators (jobs) in a multi-actor environment. For example, the number 
of jobs created that was monitored through the OP monitoring system is lower than the 
number of jobs reported in the EIF reporting system, because the former also includes 
jobs maintained. The 2013 AIR indicates that the guarantee instrument had created or 
maintained a total of 6,725 jobs by the end of 2012, whereas an EIF presentation 
quantifies the number of employees hired or maintained in SMEs by October 2012 for all 
three FIs at only 1,369.  
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Box 5: Good practice in OP North East England (UK) ± effective monitoring and 
reporting  
In the North East England OP, reporting by Fund Managers to the HF takes place at 
three levels (and the requirements are specified in the Funding Agreements): 
x Monthly reports containing basic compliance information for each investment; 
outline information for each investment made during the relevant month; general 
fund reporting; and manager activity. 
x Quarterly reports detailing: jobs created and safeguarded; turnover created and 
safeguarded; investment leverage; status of investments; new IPR registered; 
etc. 
x Annual reports including include number, amount and recipients of investment; 
failure rate of investment; level of arrears; income and expenditure accounts; 
YDOXDWLRQ RI )XQG¶V DVVHWV MREV FUHDWHGVDIHJXDUGHG SULYDWH VHFWRU OHYHUDJH
variation from baseline projections in the Business Plan; geographical breakdown, 
and a general report on the key actions and events in relation to the Fund over 
the period. An overview table shows clearly performance against Key 
Performance Indicators, with a traffic light system to flag areas of concern. 
x The HF managers (North East Finance) have developed a real time database used 
by all Fund Managers and investees. The database includes all necessary 
information from the point of enquiry to the investment decision.  The investee 
SMEs are then prompted to update the database online at six-monthly intervals 
directly, with data on performance since the investment. This is regarded as 
much more efficient and effective than previous methods of surveying SMEs by 
phone. 
x The HF manager makes biannual visits to each Fund Manager to undertake desk-
verification of files to cross check data reported. Other safeguards are in place, 
e.g. requirement for all jobs to be evidenced by contracts.  
Source: Case study research 
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4.5 EQ5: What are the outcomes and how effective have financial 
instruments been? 
This section verifies the initial outcomes of FI implementation including the leverage 
effect, the extent to which FIs revolve and remain in a cycle, and short- and long-term 
results. Ideally, funds invested in FIs become self-sustainable, which increases their 
impact compared to grant-based mechanisms. This section also assesses achievements 
regarding operational and strategic goals as set out in the ToC based on the evidence 
collected and draws conclusions on the optimum scale of the FIs, and the impact on the 
related market of venture capital and equity, where relevant. 
Key findings 
x There are large variations between countries in the level of private sector money 
attracted. Most private co-financing was for venture capital (although VC remains 
a very small part of the overall picture), while much lower contributions went to 
loans and guarantees. Case studies show that, at the level of private sector 
contributions to holding funds or individual FIs, only minimal private money was 
attracted to FIs in most cases. This, however, does not take into account the 
amount invested directly by companies in expanding or renewing capacity, as the 
data reported do not cover any additional private resources at the level of the 
financial product or the final recipients. Case study interviews suggest much 
higher levels of private contributions at firm level in all cases.  
x There is little information on revolved funds and there is insufficient reliable data 
to EHXVHGIRUHYHQDWHQWDWLYHHVWLPDWHRIµUHYROYHG¶SXEOLFPRQH\ 
x Among the case study OPs, the revolving nature of funds seems to be treated 
very differently. Many of the FIs do not have an explicit strategy for revolving 
funds or providing a legacy. 
x The loan schemes of five case study OPs have already reported revolved money 
± with a range between 25% and 200% of the original amount disbursed ± while 
other loan schemes have not yet reached the stage of revolving, partly due to 
the late start and the average loan duration. 
x Most venture capital funds have been established for a fixed duration, typically 
10 years. With the exception of the UK, the final financial outcome and hence the 
sustainability of the public money invested has not been estimated.  
x In some case studies, FIs clearly improved access to finance for a considerable 
number of enterprises (e.g. around 7% of all SMEs in Lithuania). Accordingly, an 
important OP objective, to ´increase SME access to finance´ was achieved. 
x In terms of final outcomes such as productivity, employment etc. too few MAs 
provide such data related to FIs to make any assessment of their impact: job 
outcomes are reported in only five cases; and only North East England (UK) has 
collected data that shows the effects on innovation capacity. 
x Case studies show that effects of the FIs on the turnover, job creation, the 
innovation capacity and competitiveness of supported companies are not 
systematically measured. Although some enterprises were able to improve 
technology and upgrade their business processes, FIs were also used for 
financing working capital. 
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As part of the study data on effectiveness of FI was sought, including private sector 
money attracted, the extent to which public money has revolved and final outcomes such 
as productivity, employment etc. at the firm level. 
Overall, the evidence from evaluations of the performance of FIs is very limited, 
whether in the existing literature or from information generated in this study. The 
academic literature is focused on different dLPHQVLRQVRIWKHµDFFHVVWRILQDQFH¶TXHVWLRQ
and much of it focuses on publicly-backed venture capital. However, equity is the least 
used of the three main types of ERDF co-financed FI and tends to be focused on market 
niches. Loans and guarantees are relatively under-evaluated, particularly in countries 
without a strong tradition of regular policy appraisal. There are no studies that give 
detailed consideration to the rationale for the form of intervention ± in what 
circumstances are repayable instruments more effective or efficient than grants? What is 
their capacity to draw in private funding that would not have been provided otherwise? 
In terms of private sector money attracted, analysis of OP contributions shows that 
RXWRI¼10.5 ELOOLRQSDLGWRKROGLQJIXQGV+)DQGVSHFLILFIXQGV1+)RQO\¼533 million 
(5.1 %) came from private sources.  
Table 20: Private sector contributions to FI (HF, NHF) in the stocktake countries 
are generally modest, though there are exceptions 
  OP Private %   OP Private % 
HF 3,826.7 325.0 8.5 NHF 6,718.7 207.9 3.1 
BE - - - BE 395.7 0 0 
CZ - - - CZ 234.5 0 0 
DE - - - DE 1,296.4 27.4 2.1 
DK - - - DK 13.6 2.2 16.3 
ES 402.6 5.7 1.4 ES 617.8 0 0 
FR 55.2 0 0 FR 363.5 55.4 15.2 
HU 849.1 0 0 HU 47.5 0 0 
IT 724.3 3.4 0.5 IT 2,967.5 35.7 1.2 
LT 228.5 0 0 LT 37.4 0 0 
PL 548.0 0 0 PL 336.1 5.8 1.7 
PT 312.3 6.0 1.9 PT 31.9 0 0 
UK 706.8 309.9 43.8 UK 377.0 81.4 21.6 
Source: Own calculations from European Commission (2015) Summary Report. 
There are wide variations between countries, with the UK attracting inputs from the 
private sector, and smaller sums in France and Portugal, but some stocktake countries 
attract no private funding at all.  
Most private co-financing was for venture capital ¼400 million ± 23%), while much lower 
contributions wHQW WR ORDQV¼105 million - 2.1%) aQGJXDUDQWHHV¼7 million - 0.4%). 
The capacity to attract private co-financing for venture capital improved substantially 
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during the period. Private investors contributed only 10% of resources for FIs set-up 
during 2007-09, but their share of total contributions increased to 24% for FIs 
established during 2011-14. Nevertheless, venture capital remains a very small part of 
the overall picture of co-financed FIs.  
National or regional authorities, and any other investor, may provide funding that is not 
part of the OP. However, data on these resources is very limited. Also, the data reported 
do not cover any additional private resources at the level of the financial product or the 
final recipients. These resources may represent an important share of private 
contributions attracted by FIs. Although considerable effort has been invested in getting 
a clear picture of the effect of FIs there are still uncertainties left concerning its 
quantification in many case studies. Nevertheless, a tentative indication of leverage (in 
the sense of funds attracted, whether public or private, other than co-financing) is given 
below. 
National or regional authorities, and any other investor, may provide funding that is not 
part of the OP contribution. However, data on these resources is very limited. In addition, 
the data reported do not cover any additional private resources at the level of the 
financial product or the final recipients. These resources may represent an important 
share of private contributions attracted by FIs. A proper assessment of the capacity of 
FIs to act as a catalyst for further private funding should consider all the different levels 
at which additional resources can intervene, including the financial products and final 
recipients, so the AIRs focus on contributions to the OP underplays the likely role of 
private funds. 
The leverage effect in the following table is calculated in principle on the basis of the total 
public (EU and national) and private financing levered in at various levels of the 
implementation chain related to the ERDF contribution (EC definition). The data base, 
however, is very heterogeneous in the case studies, which makes a comparison of the 
figures difficult. For example, in OP Bavaria (DE) the calculation of the leverage effect is 
based on a comprehensive retrospective analysis undertaken by Prognos (2014) as part 
of the ex-ante evaluation, whereas in the case of OP Technological Fund (ES) the figures 
are estimates, due to the lack of a reliable existing study. Further, in some cases the 
calculation has been based on committed funds (e.g. PT), in others on disbursed funds 
(e.g. FR). 
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Table 21: Leverage - attraction of private and public financial resources 
compared to the ERDF contribution 
OP name No of 
FIs 
G L E  Notes 
DE: OP Bavaria 4   2.2 
4.9 
to 
20.4 
Very high leverage in one risk capital fund (S-
refit) from including a further private fund 
(usual range is between 1.5 to 7) 
Source: Prognos 2014 
FR: OP  
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
3 18.0 4.0 8.5 
Credits to SMEs from the guarantee fund were 
entirely private  
Source: PWC-evaluation report, April 2015 
UK: OP North 
East England 8   3.1 
2.3 
to 
9.2 
Wide variation between FIs 
Source: Holding Fund December 2014 
quarterly reports 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
4 9.0 2.2   
Guarantee fund supports loans from private 
banks  
Source: Data given by fund manager 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 14 
1.2 
to 
1.5 
1.2 
to 
1.5 
  
Minimal leverage; mainly national public co-
financing not private contribution.   
Source: Calculation by national expert based 
on 2014 AIR  
LT: OP 
Economic 
Growth 
24 5.3 1.5 1.4 
Considerable private money only in guarantee 
funds 
Source: Calculation by national expert  
PT: OP 
COMPETE 27   1.3 
1.4 
to 
2.0  
Leverage rather modest 
Source: COMPETE Execution Report 2014 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
3 2.0 
1.2 
to 
1.35 
  
Only minimal private money attracted to FIs 
Source: Estimate by national expert based on 
2013/2014 AIR 
HU : OP 
Economic 
Development 
11 2.4 1.3 1.7 
Leverage is highest in the case of guarantee 
schemes 
Source: MA weekly report (first week 2015) 
Source: Case study research; Guarantees, Loans, Equity. Please note that not all contributions at all levels are 
covered 
It has become evident that comparison within and between Member States only makes 
sense on the level of FI type (guarantees, loans, equity). Even so, the differences are 
higher than can be easily explained. 
For guarantee schemes, high leverage might be expected (or multiplier as it is referred 
to in the Financial Regulation) as the amount of loans disbursed to final recipients (by the 
credit institutions receiving the guarantee) is usually much higher than the guarantee 
amount (to the credit institutions). Indeed, in three cases (out of six case studies with 
guarantee schemes) the multiplier ranges between 5.3 (OP Economic Growth (LT)), 9.0 
(OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ)) and 18.0 (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR)). Other case 
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studies reported leverage of 2.4 (OP Economic Development (HU)) and below, with OP 
0DáRSROVNLH3/ being the lowest (1.2-1.5). In most cases the assumption is that not all 
resources paid to the final recipients have been accounted for. The money levered in 
comes in all cases from the loan-awarding bank, which in general is a private institution 
(with exceptions in OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ) and OP Technological Fund (ES)), 
thus most of the multiplier is generated by private money. 
For loans, the leverage factor ranges between 1.2 and 4.0, with only two OPs showing 
as outliers on the upper end of the scale (Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) at 4.0 and North 
East England (UK) at 3.1). The values between 1.2 and 2.2 originate from the funding 
decision at OP-level and thus represent basically how much national (public) money has 
been allocated to these FIs. Private money plays a (quantitatively) small role, unless the 
loan funds are managed by private institutions (Bavaria (DE) and Languedoc Roussillon 
(FR)) and interest subsidies are not given by the scheme (North East England (UK)). 
The differences in leverage are higher for equity, yet they also seem to be the most 
reliable. The leverage in the OP Economic Development (HU), OP Economic Growth OP 
(LT) and OP COMPETE (PT) ± all three in countries where VC market-making was a 
prominent goal ± is hardly larger than for loans and involves only modest private 
contributions. For the equity schemes in Bavaria (DE), Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) and 
North East England (UK), the leverage is considerable, ranging from 2.3 to 20.4 (without 
the outliers between 3.8 and 10.6). Most of the money levered in is private and managed 
by the equity fund (this does not include all (private) investments at the level of final 
recipient). 
In terms of the extent to which public money has revolved, the only indication of 
revolving money comes from comparing contributions invested in enterprises and 
resources paid to FIs. However, there was insufficient reliable data to be used for even a 
WHQWDWLYHHVWLPDWHRIµUHYROYHG¶SXEOLFPRQH\ 
The revolving nature of funds seems to be treated very differently among the Member 
States. Many of the FIs do not have an explicit strategy for revolving/providing a legacy 
(with exceptions in North East England (UK) and Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) ± e.g. the 
holding fund in North East England has a policy of repaying the EIB loan first before 
targeting a sizeable legacy fund). Some case study OPs aim to let the revolving of FIs 
(and hence) legacy take place at the level of fund managers, others at the level of 
holding fund. However, few loan schemes (and no guarantee schemes) have yet reached 
the stage of revolving (except in Bayern (DE), the Economic Development OP in Hungary 
and 0DáRSROVND (PL)) partly due to the late start of the loan schemes and the average 
loan duration. In the ROP Languedoc-Roussillon and in Lithuania (Economic Growth) a 
substantial share has already been repaid to the HF, where the timing and process of 
reuse is not yet fixed and will most likely not take place in the 2007-2015 period. 
For equity funds the issue is different; most of equity funds have been established for a 
fixed duration, typically 10 years. Although there are reported exits (with positive and 
negative results) from many funds, they involve fewer than 10 % of the total number of 
deals. With the exception of the UK, the future/final financial outcome and hence the 
sustainability of the public money invested has not been estimated. North East England, 
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on the other hand, expects its holding fund (comprising loan and equity sub-funds) to 
generate close to 100 % of ERDF plus the public sector match.  
Table 22: Returns achieved and strategy for revolving funds 
 
 
OP Clear indication of 
revolved funds 
(FI set up date) 
Actual 
paybacks 
(2013, 
estimated) 
OP contri-
bution = 
100% 
Destination of 
revolved funds  
Comments 
Loans Equity Loans Loans Equity 
DE: OP 
Bavaria 
Yes  
2010 
No 
2007-
2009 
25% FM FM  
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Yes  
2010 
No  
2010 
30%* HF HF No recycling 
foreseen within 
programme period  
UK: OP North 
East England 
No 
2011 
No 
2009-
2010 
 
0 
HF No recycling 
foreseen within 
programme period 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
No 
2007  - 
 
0 
NHF     -   
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
Yes  
2009-
2010 
  
20% -200% FM -   
LT: OP 
Economic 
Growth 
Yes  
2009-
2010 
No 
2010-
2012 
64% ± 
126%** 
HF HF  
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
No 
2008-
2013 
No 
2010-
2013 
0 HF HF  
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund  
No 
2012-
2013 
  
0 NHF -   
HU: OP 
Economic 
Development 
Yes 
2007-
2011 
No 
2009-
2012 
 
34%*** 
MA MA Repaid amounts are 
kept in a separate 
programme account 
Source: Case study research; FM=Fund Manager; HF=Holding Fund; *repayment to HF; **small Loans to 
SMEs only, ***repayments from fund managers to MA 
Overall, in terms of job creation, approximately 115,000 jobs were reported as created 
by the FIs, although this figure was affected by reporting inaccuracies.  
In terms of final outcomes such as productivity, employment etc. too few MAs provide 
such data related to FIs to make any assessment of their impact. In the case studies, job 
outcomes are reported in only five cases; jobs created in Bavaria (DE) are below 
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expectations, whereas results for the OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ) appear over-
proportional in relation to the total OP figure. Only North East England (UK) has collected 
data that shows the effects on innovation capacity (in line with a key strategic objective); 
its system and evidence of outcomes appear sophisticated. Weaknesses in performance 
capture are evident in a number of case studies (output data is only available for OP 
Technological Fund (ES), OP Languedoc-Roussillon (FR), OP Economic Growth OP (LT) 
and OP COMPETE (PT). 
In some cases, and especially for equity FIs, it is too early for an assessment, in others 
the strategic programme goals are too broad e.g. long-term economic growth of the 
programme area, to allow for any separate assessment of the net effects of FIs.  
As described in the earlier report chapter on theories of change, MAs have tended to view 
FIs as mechanisms for improving access to finance for SMEs, which is often an important 
component of an OP strategy, rather than as alternative tools for pursuing wider OP 
(regional development) objectives. Improved access to finance is achieved when funds 
are disbursed, so evidence of what the investment itself contributed to (and achieved) 
would not necessarily be sought.  
Indeed, the case studies show that effects of FIs on turnover, job creation, the 
innovation capacity and competitiveness of supported companies are not systematically 
measured. Although some firms upgraded their technology and technology and business 
processes, it seems that FIs in some countries were extensively used for financing 
working capital as opposed to fixed investment. As reported in the case studies from PL, 
FR, PT and HU loans for working capital are often awarded in combination with loans for 
investment as an accompanying measure to ensure the implementation of an overall 
project. To what scale loans are given exclusively for working capital is unclear. 
In the following table the scale of working capital supported through FIs is estimated. 
  
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 78 
Table 23: Scale of working capital supported through FIs 
OP name 
Total 
no of 
FIs 
Share of loans for 
working capital as 
% of all L/G-
products (volume) 
Comments 
DE: OP Bavaria 
4 Not eligible  
FR: OP Languedoc-
Roussillon 3 11%  
UK: OP North East 
England 8 Not eligible  
CZ: OP Enterprises & 
Innovation 4 Unclear eligibility  
3/230DáRSROVNLH 
14 
9% 4 Loan products with working 
capital eligible; usually combined 
with investment credit 
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 24 
~60% Estimate based on interview with 
MA 
PT: OP COMPETE 
27 Partly eligible, but no figure available  
ES: OP Technological 
Fund  3 Not eligible  
HU: OP Economic 
Development 11 ~7,5% 
1 dedicated product, (very small) 1 
product with working capital eligible 
Source: Case study research 
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Table 24: Case study outcomes 
OP name Main sectors/targeted (actual) Target areas No of SMEs 
supported 
(start-ups) 
New jobs 
created 
(safeguarded) 
Effects on 
performance, 
innovation capacity, 
competitiveness 
Comments  
DE: OP Bavaria Loan: crafts and trade 
VC: technology firms 
lagging areas 460 513 No data Job effect below 
expectations 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Loan: young micro-enterprises 
VC: developing SME technology firms 
Guarantee: established SME, wholesale trade, 
renting activities, ICT 
unspecific 1,285 No data No data   
UK: OP North East 
England 
Loan: wide spectrum 
VC: large proportion of tech 
geographical 
distribution of SMEs 
supported and jobs 
created is measured 
689  
(44% start-
ups) 
1,953  
(2,803) mainly in 
disadvantaged 
areas 
136 new collaborations 
with knowledge base 
18.9 million R&D 
levered in 
Survival pattern of 
start-ups is observed 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
No data unspecific 2,100 5,780 No data Over-proportional job 
effect in relation to 
total OP 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
77% Micro-enterprises 
Sectors: Manufacturing, Trade, services 
geographical 
distribution of 
investments available 
1,544 162 No data   
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 
Guarantees: mainly young enterprises 
Loans: mainly wholesale and retail 
VC: mainly technology firms 
unspecific 4,700 No data No data No systematic 
approach to capture 
effects 
PT: OP COMPETE SMEs in a wide range of economic activities Convergence region 3,900 No data available 
(only for total 
OP) 
No data A positive effects on 
enterprises is expected 
but evidence is lacking 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
752 SMEs, 191 large enterprises 
Industrial sector, agriculture,  wholesale 
Convergence regions 756 No data No data   
HU: OP Economic 
Development 
Loans: 96% micro-enterprises 
Guarantees: 59% micro-enterprises 
VC: young micro-enterprises 
Sectors: 1) wholesale, trade 2) professional, 
scientific and technical activities 3) 
manufacturing 
geographical 
distribution of 
investments available 
14,752 61,896 No data   
Source: Case study research 
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Achievement of FI objectives in the case study OPs 
The assessment of effectiveness in the case study research examines FI attainment of 
strategic and operational policy objectives (the intended change). Operational 
objectives are short-term results for the target group (e.g. improved access to finance,) 
and include also assumptions for the successful implementation of the FIs (e.g. sufficient 
response by start-ups and companies in the focus area). Strategic objectives relate to 
longer term Cohesion policy objectives which are stated in the OPs (e.g. FIs should 
contribute to strengthening of the entrepreneurial base, to market making for private 
investments or boosting growth and job creation). The evaluation question related to 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV LV µ+RZ DQG WR ZKDW H[WHQW have the stated policy objectives been 
achieved?¶ 7KLVUHIHUVEDFNWRWKHEXLOGLQJEORFNVRIWKH³WKHRU\RIFKDQJH´ZKLFKVKRXOG
be critically assessed based on evidence and the perceptions of stakeholders. Based on 
the collected evidence in the case study research, a judgement (rating) is made on the 
effectiveness in achieving the operational and strategic goals and assumptions for 
successful implementation of the FIs that were set out in the conceptual model. The 
ratings provide options on a scale of 1 to 5, ZLWKLQGLFDWLQJ³YHU\ORZFRQWULEXWLRQ´DQG
 LQGLFDWLQJ D ³YHU\ KLJK FRQWULEXWLRQ´ ,W LV DOVR SRVVLEOH WR FKRRVH ³GRQW NQRZ´ WR
indicate lacking evidence. 
In total 114 FI-related goals in the 9 OPs were evaluated, of which 63 are operational 
objectives (e.g. improved access to finance) and 51 strategic objectives (e.g. growth and 
employment). In general the appraisal of all the operational objectives (63 individual 
objectives including assumptions in the case study OPs altogether) of the priority axes 
within which the FI were implemented showed that almost all of them were achieved, 
70% to a high degree. For the strategic objectives (more related to the regional economy 
or the SME sector), the appraisal was clearly positive for less than half of them (39% of 
goals were achieved to a high or very high extent). For almost half (45%) of these 
REMHFWLYHV DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH ),¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ ZDV QRW SRVVLEOH GXH WR ODFN RI
appropriate data. In these cases it was not possible to assess whether FIs have achieved 
their strategic goals. The full list of rated goals is provided in the annex 6.7 
(Experts´judgement on the contribution of FIs supported to the intended change). 
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Figure 11: Effectiveness in achieving operational and strategic objectives of FIs  
 
Source: case study research (9 OPs with 114 objectives in total); the full assessment is provided in annex 6.7 
At OP level, a very heterogeneous picture can be seen. The case study research assessed 
OP Bavaria (DE), OP Languedoc-5RXVVLOORQ)5230DáRSROVNLH3/23&203(7(37
and OP North East England (UK) highly in terms of operational effectiveness, whereas 
strategic effectiveness was harder to assess at this stage. Only OP North East England 
8.DQG230DáRSROVNLH3/have achieved most of their strategic objectives so far.  
In Bavaria many of the assumptions for the successful implementation of risk capital 
funds worked out in practice, e.g. interviews confirmed a high response by business 
angels, numerous awareness activities were introduced by fund managers, the due 
diligence is strict, and interviews confirmed stable partnerships of financing partners. In 
this case the effectiveness in achieving operational objectives was rated as high. In 
contrast, for the loan fund, although the fund manager confirmed the focus on innovative 
projects, there is insufficient evidence that the innovative focus is translated into practice 
and that in-house innovation really happens as intended by the loan instrument. For 
strategic OP objectives such as strengthening the entrepreneurial base and sustaining an 
adequate level of employment, it is not possible to prove whether the interventions have 
been effective. Some proxies (such as investment and employment representing the 
entrepreneurial base) may give an indication, but must be interpreted with caution. 
In the Economic Growth OP (LT), FIs clearly improved access to finance for a 
considerable number of enterprises, around 7% of all SMEs in Lithuania. It is assumed 
that for most of the SMEs (and in particular for start-ups), FIs represented the only 
source of finance. The number of SMEs supported and private investment attracted 
through FIs met the expectations of the programmers. However, to date, little can be 
said on the effectiveness of FIs in achieving strategic objectives in the context of the OP. 
This is due to the limited number of studies which have taken place. Evaluation of the 
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impact of EU structural assistance on SMEs (2014)74 concluded that FIs were an 
important factor in increased labour productivity in Lithuania, although this statement is 
not supported by any hard evidence. In the Lithuanian OP, the clearest inconsistency 
between the (retrospective) Theory of Change and FI implementation was how SMEs 
used FI funds. The programme documentation identified the need for investment in 
modern technology and equipment. However, the crisis caused a shift in the purpose and 
form of FIs, as a result of which FI were often used to help SMEs survive difficult 
economic conditions. 
In the 0DáRSROVNLH5HJLRQDO23 (PL), implementation of FIs has proven largely consistent 
with the retrospective Theory of Change and the respective strategic and operational 
goals of the OP. However, increased competitiveness and innovation cannot be measured 
by hard evidence but can only be based on fund manager perception. 
In North East England (UK), the Finance for Business North East scheme has fulfilled a 
key objective of the OP in building a comprehensive regional revolving fund, and 
developing the private investment community and capacity in the region. Its focus on 
supporting technology and innovation tied in with OP objectives, while other funds 
covered the broad business stock, enabling start-ups and growth in non-priority sectors. 
The more experimental pilot Creative Content Fund has been less successful, however, 
with poor returns and high failure rate. 
In the OP Technological Fund (ES) there are indications (but no evidence) that the ICO 
Guarantee Fund and CDTI Loan Fund will be able to achieve some of their specific and 
strategic objectives. However, the ICO Loan Fund is unlikely to meet its objectives. 
With regard to the cost-effectiveness of FIs of different types compared to grant 
schemes, the case studies came to very different conclusions (see also table below): 
x The costs of FIs are significantly higher than the cost of an additional job created 
by non-repayable support for SME investment (Bavaria (DE), 0DáRSROVNLH(PL)) 
x The actual cost per gross job created by FIs (FBNE) are in the same range as by 
grants from a major domestic grant scheme, the Regional Growth Fund (North 
East England (UK). The piloted (sector-specific) Creative Content Fund (CCF) was, 
however, less cost efficient than grants. 
x FIs (credit fund, guarantee fund) are more cost effective to create jobs than 
grants (OP Enterprises & Innovation (CZ)). 
In Lithuania the cost-efficiency of FIs and grants was evaluated in 2014. However, there 
were no clear conclusions as the instruments were found to be too different. 
In other cases (OP Technological Fund (ES), OP Economic Development (HU), COMPETE 
(PT)) there was not enough information to compare the cost-effectiveness of non-
refundable and refundable assistance. 
                                          
74  Evaluation of the impact of the European Union structural assistance on the small and medium-sized 
bXVLQHVVHQWLWLHV&RQGXFWHGE\8$%µ%*,&RQVXOWLQJ¶IRUWKH0LQLVWU\RI(FRQRP\0DUFK 
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Overall, there is limited evidence on cost-effectiveness of FIs, but it seems FIs do not 
perform unambiguously better than grants. ,Q%DYDULD'(0DáRSROVNLH3/DQG1RUWK
East England (UK) the costs of some FIs are significantly higher than the cost of an 
additional job created by non-repayable support for SME investment. It is, however, 
unclear if existing calculations take account of net grant equivalent and/or revolving 
money. 
Table 25: Cost-effectiveness of different types of FIs and grant schemes in 
terms of costs of additional jobs created 
OP name FIs FI and grants 
DE: OP Bavaria 
Risk capital funds II is the most cost 
efficient and the loan fund is the least 
cost efficient to  create jobs 
Cost per job created through the grant 
scheme is significantly lower than the 
average employment effect of the FIs 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Creation of jobs in the seed phase is 
less expensive than the creation of 
jobs in the growth phase, which 
requires more investment in 
equipment and research. 
  
UK: OP North 
East England 
The current net cost per deliverable 
(job created) is currently considerably 
higher than planned (FBNE planned 
¼FXUUHQW¼&&)
SODQQHG¼FXUUHQW¼ 
With current actual cost of ¼42,160 to 
¼ per gross job created the FIs 
are in the same range or less cost 
efficient than grants from the 
(domestic) Regional Growth Fund 
¼7,400) 
CZ: OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
The Guarantee Fund is more cost-
effective to create jobs than the  
Credit Fund  
FIs are more cost effective to create 
jobs than grants 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
Measuring cost-effectiveness of 
different FIs is greatly distorted by 
shortcomings in reporting 
(underestimating jobs created, no 
turnover or GVA figures). The cost of 1 
additional job varies within the loan 
instruments between ¼45,000 and 
¼300,000 (average of over ¼100,000).  
Costs created by FIs (¼100,000) are  
twice as high as the cost of an 
additional job in non-repayable support 
for SME investment (¼41,000) 
LT: OP Economic 
Growth 
The cost of 1 additional job varies 
within the loan instruments between 
54,000 lita and 109,000 lita (¼
DQG¼ 
The cost-efficiency of FIs and grants 
was evaluated in 2014. However, no 
clear conclusions could be made since 
the instruments are too different.  
PT: OP COMPETE 
Full data on the cost-effectiveness is 
not yet available 
  
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
  
There was not enough information to 
compare the cost-effectiveness of non-
refundable and refundable assistance 
HU Economic 
Development 
Full data on the cost-effectiveness of 
job creation is not yet available 
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Source: Case study research 
In terms of optimal fund size, the case study research suggests that the scale of the 
FI, as such, is not a determinant factor, but rather it is how well support is targeted to 
meet its policy goals. Across the stocktake countries, individual funds range from just 
RYHU ¼ WR VRPH ¼ PLOOLRQ, but vary widely in geographical scope, financial 
product and policy objectives, which means that it is difficult to generalise. Nevertheless, 
many funds appear to be too small to have the necessary critical mass referred to by the 
Court of Auditors; on the other hand, some very large funds appear to be among the 
worst performing in terms of absorption.  
Among the stocktake countries, some of the very loan large funds perform much worse 
than average in terms of the share of OP payments to funds invested in final recipients. 
For example, there are 25 ORDQV IXQGV H[FHHGLQJ ¼PLOOLRQ DQG E\ HQG VL[ RI
these had lent less than 20% of their funds to final recipients. Overall, loans exceeding 
¼ PLOOLRQ ZHUH MXVW 5% invested by end 2014, while smaller funds OHVV WKDQ ¼
million) were almost 82% invested ± see Table 13 above. Importantly, however, the 
impact of a few very large funds which have invested very small amounts is significant in 
the aggregate. For example, three of the large funds in Table 26 together WRWDOOLQJ¼
million ± i.e. approaching 10% of all payments to loan funds in the stocktake countries ± 
have invested less that two percent in final recipients.  
Table 26: (TXLW\IXQGVLQYHVWHGLQILQDOUHFLSLHQWV!¼PLOOLRQ 
MS Fund Set-up 
date 
OP contribs 
paid to fund 
OP 
contribs 
invested 
in final 
recips 
% 
inves
ted  
DE Risikokapitalfonds II 2007 85.1 54.3 63.8 
FR Nord France Amorçage - Lille (N° 
présage 40255) 
2012 68.4 6.4 9.3 
HU Szechenyi Capital Investment 
Programme and Fund 
2010 47.5 21.0 44.3 
DE Technologiegründerfonds Sachsen 2008 47.4 41.1 86.7 
DE VC Fonds Technologie, Berlin 2007 47.0 41.3 87.9 
UK Finance Yorkshire Equity LP, Barnsley 2010 45.5 45.5 100.0 
UK Early stage equity investments (Low 
Carbon Innovation Fund, Norfolk) 
2010 43.1 16.2 37.6 
DE Beteiligungsfonds Niedersachsen (RWB-
Gebiet) 
2009 40.0 27.9 69.9 
DE Hessen Kapital I GmbH, Frankfurt a.M. 2007 38.5 31.2 80.9 
DE BFB Wachstumsfonds Brandenburg 
GmbH, Potsdam 
2009 37.5 31.1 82.9 
DE VC Fonds Kreativwirtschaft, Berlin 2007 32.0 27.7 86.7 
PT 32822 - FCR REVITALIZAR NORTE - 
Lisboa 
2013 32.0 30.0 93.8 
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MS Fund Set-up 
date 
OP contribs 
paid to fund 
OP 
contribs 
invested 
in final 
recips 
% 
inves
ted  
PT 32823 - FCR REVITALIZAR CENTRO - 
Lisboa 
2013 32.0 37.5 117.1 
UK Biomedical Fund - Northwest Priority 1 2010 30.5 30.5 100.0 
UK Venture Capital Fund Northwest Priority 
1 
2010 30.5 30.5 100.0 
UK NE Accelerator Fund, Northstar Equity 
Investors Limited  
2010 30.4 30.4 100.0 
UK North East Technology Fund, IP Group 
Plc 
2010 29.3 29.3 100.0 
DE Innovationsfonds Rheinland-Pfalz 2008 27.0 17.8 66.1 
UK NE Growth Fund, NEL Fund Managers 
Limited 
2010 26.3 26.3 100.0 
DE BFB Frühphasenfonds Brandenburg 
GmbH, Potsdam 
2010 25.0 22.8 91.2 
 7RWDOHTXLW\IXQGV!¼PLOOLRQ  795.0 598.9 75.3 
 Total equity funds <¼PLOOLRQ  954.4 684.0 71.6 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report. 
This pattern does not hold true for equity products where there appear to be no 
particular differences along size lines ± although in terms of absorption, funds exceeding 
¼PLOOLRQSHUIRUPVOLJKWO\EHWWHUWKDQVPDOOHURQHVRQDYHUDJH ± the majority of large 
equity funds are over 80% invested. Indeed, it is notable that the very wide disparaties 
in levels of investment by large loan funds are not evident among large equity funds. 
That said, the available data bear out the claim that very small funds are more costly to 
run than larger ones. Table 27 suggests that all the funds where fees amount to more 
than 20% of sums invested in final recipients are ¼PLOOLRQRUVPDOOHULQVL]H 
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Table 27: Equity fund management costs & fees and investment in final 
recipients in the stocktake countries 
MS Fund OP 
contribs 
paid to 
fund 
OP contribs 
paid: 
0DQDJH¶W
costs & fees 
OP 
contribs 
invested 
in final 
recips 
0DQDJH¶W
costs & fees 
as % of 
fund 
invested 
DE S-Refit EFRE Fonds Bayern 
GmbH, Regensburg 
14.0 2.0 1.2 161.9 
PL Speed Up Innovation Sp. z o.o. 
6.$3R]QDĔ 
0.4 0.1 0.2 78.7 
PL Inovo Sp. z o.o. Venture Fund I 
SKA, Warszawa 
0.8 0.2 0.3 72.8 
PL Assets Management Black Lion 
Sp. z o.o. SKA SKA, Warszawa 
1.7 0.6 1.1 49.6 
DE Beteiligungsfonds Niedersachsen 
(Konvergenzgebiet) 
16.0 4.2 8.5 49.2 
PL Skyline Venture Sp. z o.o. SKA, 
Warszawa 
1.3 0.4 0.9 42.3 
UK Mezzanine Fund Northwest 
Priority 1 
9.0 3.6 9.0 39.9 
PL Internet Ventures FIZ, Warszawa 4.5 1.1 3.2 34.6 
PL Innovation Nest Sp. z o.o. SKA, 
Kraków 
1.6 0.3 1.0 32.9 
UK Lachesis Seed Fund Limited 
Partnership  
4.8 0.7 2.4 30.4 
LT Business Angels Co-investment 
Fund I KUB Vilnius 
6.3 1.2 5.0 24.1 
PL GPV I Sp. z o.o. SKA, Warszawa 4.1 0.8 3.2 24.1 
LT LitCapital I KUB Vilnius, Lithuania 10.4 2.0 8.4 23.8 
FR FCPR RUN DEVELOPPEMENT 
VIVERIS MANAGEMENT,  
6.8 0.3 1.5 23.0 
IT "Partecipazioni minoritarie e 
temporanee al Capitale di rischio 
di imprese innovative"  
15.0 1.1 5.2 21.8 
LT Lithuanian SME Fund KUB, 
Vilnius, Lithuania 
8.2 1.4 6.8 21.2 
DE Berlin Kapital, Berlin 13.0 0.7 3.3 21.0 
UK NE Angel Fund, Rivers Capital 
Partners Limited 
9.7 1.9 9.7 20.0 
Source: Consortium calculations from 2015 Summary report. 
More generally, it can be observed that larger and more centralised solutions tend to be 
less flexible, so the cost advantages accruing from centralized fund management need to 
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be weighed against the disadvantages of being less responsive (see also Forstner et al 
201475). On the one hand, the Lithuanian experience shows that small FI schemes can be 
very efficient in filling a market gap; on the other, some large FIs in Spain and Italy have 
invested a small proportion of their funds. 
Participants at the stakeholder seminar noted that µRSWLPDO¶ IXQG size is very much 
context dependent and may also be affected by the presence of domestic funds on which 
co-financed measures are sometimes built. Some stakeholders argued that it was 
important that funds were not too specialised because this would result in small funds 
that were difficult to spend, but others said that funds should be targeted otherwise they 
were too difficult to monitor. Importantly, it was also noted that there was a size below 
which financial intermediaries were simply not interested in being involved, though the 
exact level was difficult to determine. If the fund is too small, it may not be successful 
since it is not appealing to commercial banks (given their own resources), and ³QRERG\´
wants to manage a small fund due to the associated administrative burden.  
To establish a fund it is important to find private partners willing to invest; this implies 
that the terms offered should be attractive to them. Further, it is important also to get 
the incentives right in order to induce the private actors to contribute with their own 
resources. The size of funds should also take into account the fact that absorption 
capacity may be limited. 
With respect to improved market making for equity/venture capital funds there 
are clear signs of ERDF support having helped the creation of a venture capital market in 
some of the case study areas where it was poorly developed (OP Economic Growth OP 
(LT), OP Economic Development (HU), OP COMPETE (PT)), including being the catalyst 
for the adoption of the necessary legislation e.g. on risk capital funds. In these cases, 
public support is still needed to fully develop the private market. The activity of business 
angels has also been supported through co-financed FIs (see Box).  
  
                                          
75  Forster, B, Grajewski, R (October 2014) Beurteilung von alternative Finanzierungsarten und ±instrumenten 
zur Umsetzung von investiv ausgerichteten Fördergrundsätzen der GAP; Thünen Working Paper 29 
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Box 6: Good practice in OP Bavaria ± encouraging the participation of Business 
Angels  
Co-financed FIs in Portugal, Lithuania and Bavaria have had positive experience of 
stimulating the domestic business angel market. In Bavaria, the ERDF Cluster Fund has 
had particular success with awareness-raising activities. The ERDF Cluster Fund (Bayern 
Capital) has specialised in co-investment, supplementing activities of lead investors 
(business angels). The activities of the ERDF Cluster Fund provide a strong incentive for 
EXVLQHVVDQJHOVWRHQJDJHDQGWKXVKHOSVWRµWLSWKHVFDOHV¶ LQJHWWLQJWKHPWRLQYHVW
Apart from supplementing business angel funds, the Cluster Fund also promotes 
encounters where entrepreneurs are invited to present their business plans and 
H[SHFWDWLRQVVREXVLQHVVDQJHOVFDQGHFLGHZKHWKHUWRLQYHVW7KHVHµWUDGHIDLU¶HYHQWV
(so far there have been three major meetings) not only facilitate networking between 
the parties; there are also indirect effects, such as entrepreneurs not finding a partner 
immediately but being referred to business angels not participating in the event, or 
networking effects going beyond finance, such as links in R&D and business. As an 
example, at a trade fair event in Eastern Bavaria 20 private investors were present to 
meet with start-ups. In addition, business plan competitions are carried out in addition 
to internet presentations. Such networking is also a major advantage for business 
angels as information costs are reduced. Improved information may render better 
opportunities to diversify the investment portfolio in terms of risk and composition. 
Business angels also have the chance to build up tailor-made venture capital consortia 
with funds from the ERDF Cluster Fund. Risk reduction thus works both horizontally 
(diversification) as well as vertically (sometimes over several investment rounds).  
Source: Case study research 
The main added value of ERDF venture capital funds as compared to private funds is 
their orientation to early stage investments (seed and start±up). Furthermore, some 
ERDF±financed risk capital funds are in a position to make riskier investments as 
compared to private risk capital funds since the former have a higher tolerance of losses. 
Therefore, ERDF±financed risk capital funds provide funding opportunities for SMEs that 
would not receive support under normal market conditions (OP Economic Growth OP 
(LT), OP COMPETE (PT)). Through the support of ERDF, it has been possible to 
implement different types of venture capital funds to support SMEs in pre-seed stages.  
In Bavaria (DE) and Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) ERDF funds did not significantly change 
the regional panorama of FIs but helped the regions increase their offer of financing, 
focusing on specific sectors and/or specific phases of business development. It is also 
clear that OP funding strengthened the capacity of fund managers and made them more 
visible as regional players. Without ERDF, the regions of Bavaria and North East England 
could have developed access to finance instruments but at a greatly reduced level. There 
would have been a loss of the ability to provide a continuum of finance across the 
funding lifecycle. Without ERDF funds, it would not have been possible to achieve a 
critical mass of venture capital. A minimum volume is needed to generate a perceptible 
change in the performance of the private sector in the economically weaker regions. 
ERDF funding allowed a high initial endowment of the funds and the achievement of a 
critical mass. 
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Regarding a general market making for FIs, the Hungarian case study stressed the 
importance of severe bottlenecks on the demand side of the financial market, i.e. lack of 
knowledge of the advantages of guarantee schemes among companies and loan agents, 
perception of high administrative burden in the case of guarantee schemes by banks, low 
number/ proportion of start-ups with viable business plans and innovative ideas. These 
demand-side challenges are hard to solve by market making and by improving the 
accessibility of FIs. There is a strong need to provide soft business support (in line with 
or even as a pre-condition to taking JEREMIE-type loans) and thereby improving the non-
financial characteristics of the main target groups ± micro- and small firms, and 
innovative start-ups. 
In summary, ERDF co-funded FIs can add value in specific ways, such as:  
x A clear finding from the stakeholder seminar was that FIs are considered to 
generally have worked well in terms of supporting a move away IURP D µJUDQW
dependenc\¶ FXOWXUH DQG HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH FDVH RI HTXLW\ IRVWHULQJ DQ
entrepreneurial culture. 
x ERDF funding can support access to and reduce the cost of SME financing. This is 
especially so in the context of the economic crisis a result of which SMEs typically 
faced greater financial difficulties in accessing credit through the banking sector. 
x Covering a broad spectrum of financing needs is simpler with FIs than with grants. 
),V FDQ EH D µGHDOPDNHU¶ EHWZHHQ EDQNV DQG HQG-users (a catalyst for further 
private funding). There are more opportunities for working capital to be supported 
than under grant schemes, and working capital is often what SMEs require, rather 
than money to contribute to fixed asset investment. Where funding agreements 
are appropriately framed, the due diligence process carried out by financial 
institutions should distinguish viable enterprises from non-viable ones to avoid 
lending support to failing companies (regardless of the purpose for which capital is 
required). Sectoral coverage is also more flexible with scope to support trade and 
retail activities which are not really suited or often eligible for grants. 
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The aim of this study has been to assess the rationale, implementation and early 
evidence of effectiveness of ERDF co-financed financial instruments for enterprises. 
The study has undertaken a stocktake of financial instruments in the 12 countries which 
account for the bulk of FIs and associated spending commitments, together with case 
studies of FIs in nine varied OPs. These have been complemented by a detailed literature 
review and an interactive stakeholder seminar. This final section of the report highlights 
the main conclusions from the study and draws out some policy implications. 
A key challenge for the study team was the sheer complexity of financial instruments 
operated in widely differing contexts: the rationales for FIs are multifaceted, the 
implementation models are extremely diverse and the evidence for their effectiveness is 
currently rather thin. It can also be said that a full analysis of the scale of FIs, the extent 
to which they are invested in final recipients, how far funds have been recycled and how 
much FIs cost to run is hampered by the lack of reliable quantitative data.  
There are several dimensions to the rationale for financial instruments for enterprises. 
From a policy design perspective, FIs are an alternative delivery mechanism to non-
repayable support. This is only feasible where the ultimate investment is income 
generating, enabling the initial support to be repaid. Three principal benefits are 
conventionally highlighted from the use of FIs as opposed to grants: first, that FIs are 
more sustainable, because funds are repaid and can be reinvested in other projects; 
second, that FIs can improve project quality - because of private sector involvement in 
SURMHFW DVVHVVPHQW DQG EHFDXVH KDYLQJ WR UHSD\ VXSSRUW µVKDUSHQV WKH PLQG¶ RI WKH
recipient. Third, that FIs can make more cost-effective use of public funds because of 
their capacity to attract private funds.  
From an economic development perspective, the rationale for FIs is to address market 
imperfections in the availability of capital. Publicly funded FIs are justified on the basis of 
two main types of market imperfection. The first is information asymmetry: for example, 
start-ups and new technology firms may lack sufficient track records or other information 
for potential investors to be able to assess risks. The second concerns positive 
externalities and the notion that purely commercial assessments of returns on 
investment may not capture the wider societal benefits of, for example, investing in 
ground-breaking R&D and innovation (which may be assessed negatively due to risk) or 
reintegrating disadvantaged individuals into the economy by supporting social or 
microenterprises (because the uncertainty of returns and small sums sought do not 
justify the cost of examining investment proposals).  
These two sets of rationales are not incompatible, but they give rise to complex 
challenJHVDQGDQXPEHURISRWHQWLDOWHQVLRQVµRQWKHJURXQG¶)RUH[DPSOHDSHUFHLYHG
benefit of FIs from a policy design perspective is the involvement of the private sector in 
project selection and the attraction of private funds, and yet the economic development 
rationale is the need to fill a finance gap that the private sector is unwilling to. 
Reconciling these issues involves the careful calibration of incentives for the private 
sector in the form of management fees or, potentially, asymmetric returns on 
investment. Another challenge is the degree of risk implied by the terms of the funding 
agreement and how this is decided. One of the arguments for FIs is their sustainability 
and the establishment of a legacy fund for reinvestment. So, final recipients must be 
viable and repay support, and yet the economic development rationale for public 
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intervention is the need to take a risk where purely commercial interests may be 
unwilling to. Again careful consideration is needed to avoid crowding-out private markets 
but still produce a return that sustains the fund. 
The stocktake research undertaken for this study implied that the use of FIs was 
principally motivated by economic development rationales - i.e. the need to address the 
finance gap, especially for SMEs, rather than the policy design rationales related to FIs as 
an alternative delivery mechanism to grants. As such, the justifications related to 
sustainability, project quality and cost-effectiveness were not prominent in the stocktake 
countries. For many MAs, the emphasis in much of the period was on the practicalities of 
set-up and implementation of the funds against the backdrop of a highly complex and 
sometimes uncertain regulatory environment. For all but those with extensive experience 
in running FIs (among the case studies, most notably North East England (UK)), the 
immediate operational challenges involved in setting up FIs seem to have overshadowed 
concerns at the long-term rationale of sustainability through the creation of a legacy 
fund. Similarly, issues related to project quality and cost-effectiveness (specifically in 
relation to the attraction of private sector finance) do not appear to have been important 
motivating factors in establishing FIs, instead, the need to absorb funds seems to have 
taken precedence. 
That said, the stakeholder seminar suggested a shift in perspectives as closure of the 
2007-13 programming period approaches. TKHSRVLWLYHDVSHFWVRI µPRYLQJDZD\IURPD
JUDQWFXOWXUH¶were noted by several seminar participants, as well as by the case study 
for the Languedoc-Roussillon OP (FR). One managing authority (OP Bavaria, DE) claimed 
that viable firms would prefer a loan covering 80% of investment needs to a grant 
covering 20% of the same. This reflects the fact that maximum grant levels are 
insufficient to cover investment costs and that loans can cover total financing 
requirements. This claim was endorsed by participants at the seminar. Related, some 
participants maintained that viable firms preferred loans to grants because the 
application process was less onerous and the use to which the funds could be put more 
flexible. For instance, there is greater scope to use FIs to finance working capital needs; 
this proved to be widespread in the wake of the financial crisis, but is also important for 
activities that are not capital intensive. This view was generally shared among seminar 
SDUWLFLSDQWVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWµSURMHFWTXDOLW\¶DVDPRWLYDWLRQIRU),s could gain traction in 
the future. However, stakeholder discussions focused on the preferences of investee 
firms, rather than on the role of financial intermediaries in judging project quality. 
Similarly, while sustainability (in the sense of repayments available to reinvest) was not 
generally high on the agenda at the start of the programming period, the prospect of a 
legacy fund seems to have become an attractive proposition and is likely to be a more 
significant motivating factor in future.  
The case studies showed that other motivations were important in certain contexts. In 
some - for example in the Economic Growth OP (LT) and OP COMPETE (PT) - the need to 
respond to the economic crisis was important, reflecting the severe impact of the 
downturn on certain economies. Indeed, in Lithuania, the gap in access to finance prior 
to the crisis was considered modest, but in the aftermath, FIs were used as the principal 
mechanism to stimulate recovery. In the North East England OP (UK) one of the 
rationales was to develop local financial markets to offset the agglomeration tendencies 
that concentrate such activities in London or in secondary regional markets in Yorkshire 
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and the North West of England. Related, in the Economic Development OP (HU), FIs 
were, among other things, seen as a mechanism to foster competition in certain 
segments of the financial sector. External or indirect factors are sometimes also in 
evidence ± under the Technological Fund OP (ES) the need to avoid decommitments did 
not underpin the use of FIs as such, but it did play a role in the scale of funding allocated 
to them, with the result that some funds are overcapitalised and are unlikely to be fully 
LQYHVWHGEHIRUH FORVXUH ,Q WKH0DáRSROVNLH23 3/),s were an important part of the 
response to flooding, providing support to viable SMEs enabling them to remain in 
business, although here too there was ultimately an underspend. More generally, 
Commission enthusiasm for FIs also played a role, as evinced in the Bavaria OP (DE), 
where the managing authority was encouraged to deploy FIs and did so on an 
µH[SHULPHQWDO¶EDVLVDQGZLth some success.  
In short, while a range of specific and general factors underpinned the use of FIs in 
2007-13, the overriding motivation was to improve access to finance among SMEs, 
rather than to consider FIs as an alternative policy delivery mechanism to grants. 
However, as the 2007-13 programmes approach closure, indications are that MAs are 
addressing the rationale for FIs with more rigour in the new period, that the generation 
of legacy funds will, for many, become a higher priority than in the past and that closer 
attention will be paid to the respective roles of grants and FIs. Also important, the future 
development of financial markets emerged as an important factor in several case study 
OPs, including North East England (UK), Economic Growth (LT) and Economic 
Development (HU).  
The implementation of FIs is characterised by extreme diversity. This is true of the 
scale of FIs, governance structures and the funding agreements which determine project 
selection criteria. The Structural Fund Regulations left open many aspects of how FIs 
could function, so that national and regional contexts and institutions played a significant 
role in outcomes. The landscape of co-financed FIs is so varied that implementation 
mechanisms defy easy comparison. Measures range from major nationwide guarantee 
mechanisms for firms in general (as under the OP Research and Competitiveness (IT), 
ZLWK FRPPLWPHQWV RI ¼ PLOOLRQ WR VPDOO WLJKWO\ IRFXVHG HTXLW\ VFKHPHV WDUJHWLQJ
narrow market segments in single regions and with leVV WKDQ ¼ PLOOLRQ XQGHU
management (such as the Creative Content Fund in the North East England OP). 
Governance structures can involve holding funds that feed several specific funds, each 
run by one fund manager (as in Lithuania), or the same set of financial products offered 
through a national network of financial intermediaries (as in Hungary). The EIB Group 
(EIB or EIF) has played a significant role in FI planning and implementing enterprise FIs 
in some countries,76 including in Bulgaria and Romania (which were not among the 
stocktake countries), as well as some regions. Indeed the EIF conducted a large number 
of gap analyses, many of which concerned French regions, although the Languedoc-
Roussillon OP (FR) was alone among them in appointing the EIF as holding fund 
manager. FI support can range from commercial terms offered through co-investment 
funds to loans comprising a substantial subsidy element through submarket interest 
rates. The only commonality is the implementation of co-financed repayable support. 
                                          
76  The EIB notably through FIs set up under the Jessica initiative, which is outside the scope of this study. 
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Despite management and operational structures varying widely across Member States 
and regions, key implementation challenges were very similar for many stakeholders. 
While the lack of detail in the regulations offered flexibility in some respects, it also gave 
rise to uncertainties, which in turn often caused significant delays in operationalising FIs. 
The issues faced have been documented elsewhere77 and need not be rehearsed here. 
However, it is fair to say that regulatory lacunae were a significant obstacle to the 
smooth implementation of FIs in 2007-13, and this is reflected in the slow take up and 
low levels of investment in final recipients under many FIs. In the Enterprise and 
Innovation OP (CZ) the effect of the regulatory dimension was particularly severe ± even 
though Czech funds were among the first to be set up, uncertainties surrounding the 
precise requirements contributed to a suspension of the funds by the auditors.78  
The implementation of FIs is highly demanding in terms of administrative capacity and 
the varied skill sets required. The set-up and operation of FIs is administratively complex 
and, among other things, requires detailed understanding of Structural Fund Regulations, 
State aid compliance, procurement rules and investment principles. This complexity may 
mitigate against one of the claimed advantages of FIs, namely the involvement of the 
private sector in implementation. This may be because the presence of existing (public) 
promotional banks offers a quicker and simpler implementation route (funds which did 
not involve a competitive selection or procurement process were the fastest to be set up) 
or because the regulatory context can act as a disincentive to private actors.  
Evidence on the effectiveness of FIs has proved difficult to compile. This partly owes to 
the rather limited scope of data collection and partly to the fact that such analysis may 
be rather premature given the delays in implementation and the time lags implicit in 
seeing the impact of support. Nevertheless, there is evidence that co-financed FIs were 
successful in improving access to finance for SMEs ± in Lithuania, for example, co-
financed FIs benefited over seven percent of all SMEs ± some 4,270 firms and 83 percent 
of the target set. More generally, data shortcomings notwithstanding, several points can 
be made even at this early stage.  
First, the scale of private sector finance appears to be disappointing, especially as this is 
one of the benefits claimed for FIs. Where there does appear to be private co-financing, 
this is mainly through venture capital schemes, but as these are a modest part of the 
overall picture (less than 20 percent of FI investments in final recipients), so too is 
associated private funding. Importantly, however, the scale of private funding other than 
at the co-financing stage is difficult to detect and quantify so that the real picture may be 
less negative than initially appears. Indeed, the case studies suggest that guarantees, in 
particular, can leverage significant private funding ± as reflected in the data for 
Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) and OP Economic Growth (LT).  
                                          
77  See, for example, Michie R and Wishlade F (2011) op cit and Van Ginkel et al (2013) op cit. 
78  At the beginning of the programming period, the Managing Authority selected the public Fund Manager 
ý0=5%GLUHFWO\ZLWKRXWRSHQLQJRISXEOLFWHQGHUý0=5%ZDVQRWVHOHFWHGE\WKH3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW$FW
but was appointed for providing guarantees in accordance with Czech Law. According to the EC auditors, it 
was non-transparent and in conflict with EU legislation in the field of public procurement (despite the fact 
that Czech Law No 47/2002 Coll., on support of SMEs, as amended, as a public law expressly entitles 
ý0ZRB as an entity that is authorised to provide funding, guarantees or loans with reduced interest rates, 
essentially to allow the use of public funds for this purpose through other entities). The EC also disagreed 
with the management fees. According to the (&¶VREVHUYDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWIHHVZHUHSDLGLQGLUHFWO\E\
contributing to the price of the guarantee while the EC challenged this setup. Provision of guarantees from 
the Guarantee Fund had been suspended for over two years because of these issues. 
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Second, the scale of legacy funds is largely unknown. Sustainability is one of the 
perceived benefits of FIs, but it remains unclear whether sums have simply not yet 
revolved or whether the systems are not yet in place to track it. Nevertheless, among the 
case study OPs it appears that only Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) and North East England 
(UK) have clear legacy strategies. At the same time, and again among the case studies 
only, very few loan schemes and no guarantee schemes have yet reached the stage of 
revolving. 
Third, in terms of final outcomes such as productivity and employment on, too few MA 
collect enough data to make any realistic assessment of the impact. Among the case 
studies only five report job creation data; among these, those in the Bavaria OP (DE) 
were below expectations, while the figures for OP Enterprise and Innovation (CZ) appear 
disproportionately high.  
Last, while quantitative data may be lacking, softer evidence provides some insight into 
how FIs have been working in practice, and in ways that go beyond simple impact 
indicators. For example, FIs can be seen to have had a tangible positive impact in 
improving access to finance for SMEs in Lithuania, in supporting the development of a 
sustainable regional revolving fund in North East England (UK), in developing the 
business angel finance market in Bavaria (DE) and in nurturing regionally-based financial 
LQWHUPHGLDULHVLQ0DáRSROVND3/DQGLQ+XQJDU\ 
In thinking about the wider policy implications of this study, the overarching theme that 
emerges relates to capacity. In general terms, the emphasis on promoting FIs as a 
policy delivery mechanism was not coupled with the level of guidance needed in many 
OPs. While for some, the rather thin regulatory framework was positive insofar as it 
enabled existing domestic approaches to be deployed relatively quickly, typically, lack of 
detail contributed to insecurity among MAs about how the mode of implementation 
chosen would be perceived at audit. This has resulted in a regulatory environment that 
has evolved during the lifetime of the 2007-13 programmes, many of the lessons from 
which have been consolidated into the regulatory framework for 2014-20. 
Some of the particularities of Structural Fund spending mechanisms had unforeseen 
consequences in the context of FIs. In particular, the emphasis on ensuring that 
Structural Funds are committed and paid, or subject to automatic decommitment works 
for grants where the beneficiary is the project or SME. In the context of FIs, the 
beneficiary is the fund, the unintended consequence of which has been an incentive to 
µSDUN¶ PRQLHV LQ IXQGV DV D ZD\ RI DYRLGLQJ GHFRPPLWPHQW LQ WKH VKRUW-term and 
increase flexibility longer-term. It is difficult to quantify the extent to which this has 
KDSSHQHGEXWDQXPEHURIODUJHIXQGVDSSHDUVLJQLILFDQWO\RYHUFDSLWDOLVHGWKRXJKµWUXH¶
absorption will not be known until closure in early 2017. The phasing of payments to FIs 
is one of the key changes introduced in 2014-20 regulations. This, alongside the explicit 
requirement for an ex ante assessment prior to introducing an FI, should contribute to 
more evidence-based allocations.  
The slow start to implementation in 2007-13 also partly owed to the complex skill set 
required to establish financial instruments and the lack of capacity in some managing 
authorities. The set-up and operation of financial instruments is administratively 
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challenging and the detailed knowledge of a range of regulatory and other matters 
require a steep learning curve.  
These demands meant that often the most straightforward route was to entrust 
implementation to an existing body, such as a promotional bank ± in the Walloon OPs 
(BE) for example, co-financed FIs are implemented through so-FDOOHG µ,QYHVWV¶ 7KHVH
fund structures are the same as those for purely domestic policy, so that Cohesion policy 
co-finances an additional source of funding for SMEs, but not one that actually differs 
from existing sources. The experience of major domestic players was important in 
several case study OPs, including ýMZRB in the Czech Republic, INVEGA in Lithuania and 
BGK in Poland. Indeed, this study and other research suggests that FI implementation 
should, at least initially, build on previous experience in the region/Member State before 
setting up new structures for FI implementation - for example, the implementation of co-
financed FIs in Germany has typically involved the Land-owned investment banks where 
the perceived advantages include familiarity with the financial situation and difficulties of 
local firms, longstanding working relationships with Land ministries and existing links 
with commercial/cooperative banks.79  
Such structures are not present everywhere, however, and the case study research and 
VWDNHKROGHUVHPLQDUERWKKLJKOLJKWHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISDVWH[SHULHQFHLQVRPHµPDWXUH¶
FI systems such as those in North East England (UK). These are not dependent on a 
major promotional bank, since historically these are not present in the UK, but FIs have 
evolved over more than one programme period and policy is able to benefit from learned 
wisdom and the evaluation of past approaches to develop future policies. In the absence 
of such domestic structures, some OPs have implemented FIs with EIB Group support 
(e.g. Languedoc-Roussillon (FR)), but reflecting growing experience and confidence some 
plan to implement independently of the EIB Group in 2014-20 (e.g. Slovakia). 
Effective links with the private sector are an important component of capacity and are 
needed to mobilise its resources and expertise. This may require incentives such as the 
introduction of yield restriction or loss mitigation clauses, or asymmetric models for the 
distribution of profit (such as in OP COMPETE (PT)) and more widely. Careful 
consideration must be given to the design of such incentives in order to ensure adequate 
alignment of public policy objectives with private sector motives for involvement.80 In 
some cases FIs can be used a means to mobilise or develop capacity in the private sector 
± as seen in a number of case studies, including the Economic Development OP (HU) and 
Bavaria OP (DE).  
An important dimension of capacity is understanding that the design and implementation 
of co-financed FI is also context specific. This includes local economic conditions, banking 
and legal systems and previous experience with implementing FIs. Context matters 
because the underlying economic situation and existing institutional structures and 
practices set the parameters within which FIs operate, affect how they work and 
influence domestic policy choices about what instruments to co-finance. In France, for 
example, the use of FIs is comparatively limited, largely reflecting the difficulty in 
adapting the domestic legal context to the use of FI in Cohesion policy which proved 
                                          
79  Michie R and Wishlade F (2011) Op cit.  
80  Michie R, Wishlade F and Gloazzo C (2014) Op cit. 
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complex and contributed to the low uptake of FIs in French regional OPs. In some 
countries and regions, even though there is domestic experience with FIs, they are not 
used under Cohesion policy owing to small allocations which make the administrative 
burden too high (as in Flanders (BE)) or because the OP focus is on projects that are less 
likely to generate the returns required to make FIs workable.  
In terms of the economic context, this study confirms the need for a quality ex ante 
assessment of the market and of the size and nature of the funding gap. As mentioned, 
such assessments were not obligatory in 2007-13, but are for 2014-20; these may prove 
technically challenging and are not a panacea, but should provide a firmer evidence base 
for the scale and focus of policy than has sometimes been evident. In Spain, for 
example, there has been a significant underinvestment of FIs under the Technological 
Fund OP, partly owing to an over-allocation of funds to avoid decommitment, but also 
due to a mismatch between the geographical focus of the FI (with 70 percent of the 
allocation earmarked for Convergence regions) and the targeting of innovative projects, 
which are less prevalent in more disadvantaged regions.  
An important lesson from this study is that the context can change. There may be a need 
to adjust the strategy during the course of implementation, drawing on evaluations, 
market research and monitoring data to recalibrate instruments to reflect changing 
market needs. However, of particular note in 2007-13 was the impact of the crisis. In 
several of the case study OPs (for example COMPETE (PT) and Economic Growth (LT)) 
co-financed FIs were used in response to the economic crisis. In Lithuania this involved 
diluting the planned focus on innovative SMEs in order to provide more general 
investment and working capital. Indeed, case study evidence suggests that around 60% 
of loan volumes (as a share of all co-financed loan and guarantee products) in Lithuania 
were for working capital. Working capital was also supported in other OPs (including 
Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) ± 11%; Malopolskie (PL) ± 9%; and Hungary c7.5%), but 
sometimes the scale cannot be estimated (OP COMPETE ± PT) or eligibility is unclear (OP 
Enterprise and Competitiveness (CZ). Elsewhere, working capital is explicitly ineligible 
(OP Bavaria (DE); OP North East England (UK) and OP Technological Fund (ES)).  
Effective monitoring systems set up by the MAs can play an important part in 
determining the nature of any adjustments needed, as well as providing information on 
the effectiveness of intervention. It is clear from this study that the information collected 
for 2007-13 has been insufficient for a concrete assessment even of the extent to which 
monies paid to funds have actually been invested in final recipients, let alone a detailed 
understanding of the impact of policy across a range of indicators. Notwithstanding these 
shortcomings, it is important that monitoring is also adapted to context. It is arguable 
that reporting mechanisms should be commensurate with the scale of funds in order for 
costs to be proportionate. For example, North-West England maintains a highly 
sophisticated bespoke real-time system for tracking FI investments, but the cost of such 
a set up would be prohibitive in other contexts. 81 
The importance of policy coordination as a contributor to and reflection of capacity is 
evident both in relation to the components of policy and the roles of the various actors. 
More specifically, FIs should be part of a holistic package of SME support. FIs will be only 
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one component of the business support ecosystem and should take account of the wider 
business support/entrepreneurship and innovation environment, as these structures help 
develop investible propositions for FIs.82 Demand side policies to develop entrepreneurial 
and investment talent and networks are critical and there is a strong need for provision 
of information, advice and hands-on support.83 There is also a need for the SME support 
offer to be appropriately dovetailed with grant support, and for the availability of support 
to be communicated ± in Languedoc-Roussillon OP (FR) for example, availability of 
support was considered poorly communicated owing to the absence of non-financial 
support in the package.  
Related, the 2007-13 experience shows the importance of close coordination of the 
various actors involved from the outset. In this context policymakers have pointed to the 
importance of understanding of the market, as implied by an ex ante assessment, but 
also the motivations of different actors in the field and the need to ensure that interests 
and incentives are aligned. FI implementation is characterised by multilevel principal-
agent relationships, the definition of which requires detailed calibration. As such, funding 
agreements need to be sufficiently attractive to fund managers to secure their 
involvement, but also enforceable so that the policy objectives are met; balancing the 
need for flexibility (to respond to changing circumstances) DJDLQVWWKHULVNRI µREMHFWLYH
GULIW¶PD\EH FKDOOHQJLQJ7KHUH LVSRWHQWLDO IRU WHQVLRQEHWZHHQ WKH FRPSOH[ UDQJH RI
managing authority goals and the profit-oriented focus of private sector fund managers. 
This may be seen for example in relation to attitudes towards risky or innovative 
projects, with managing authorities typically seeking to support innovative projects and 
private fund managers seeing these as potentially undermining profit. While the 
development of a regional SME base is a core objective for the managing authority, it is 
merely an incidental by-product to a profit-driven private investor. Importantly, though, 
the principal-agent relationship cuts both ways. The potentially large number of actors 
involved in implementation and the consequent distance between the managing authority 
DQGWKHDFWXDOGHOLYHU\RIILQDQFLDOSURGXFWVWRILQDOUHFLSLHQWVµRQWKHJURXQG¶PHDQVWKDW
PDQDJLQJDXWKRULWLHVPD\ORVHDVHQVHRIµRZQHUVKLS¶RI),VKDYLQJHIIHFWLYHO\GHOHJDWHG
responsibility elsewhere. This risk is arguably higher in the context of FIs where the 
emphasis is on commercially managed operations than in other areas of Cohesion policy 
and points to the need for carefully crafted funding agreements and appropriate 
monitoring mechanisms.   
The disparate nature and scale of the instruments deployed against the backdrop of 
diverse economic and institutional contexts, coupled with limited data makes it hard to 
draw concrete or comparative conclusions about the conduct and performance of FIs in 
2007-13. The implementation of co-financed FIs in 2007-13 has faced many challenges ± 
the impact of the financial crisis, gaps in the regulatory framework, the sheer complexity 
of the administrative structures involved and the wide range of skills required. If there is 
an overarching narrative, it is perhaps to be found in the role of time and experience in 
policy evolution. This may be a truism, but in spite of the challenges, FI under some OPs 
                                          
82  Mason C and Brown R (2013) Creating good public policy to support high-growth firms, Small Business 
Economics, 40 (2), 211-225 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11187-011-9369-9; Brown R, Mason 
&DQG0DZVRQ6,QFUHDVLQJµ7KH9LWDO3HUFHQW¶'HVLJQLQJ(IIHFWLYH3XEOLF3ROLF\Wo Support High 
Growth Firms, Nesta Working Paper No. 14/01, NESTA; Saublens C and Walburn D (2009) Smaller Firms, 
the Equity Gap, Regional Policy and Growth: Will We Ever Learn?, Local Economy, 24:6-7, 620-624. 
83  Wilson, K and Silva, F (2013) Op cit.; NEA2F (2013) North East Access to Finance: The Future Shape of 
Access to Finance: Strategic Overview and Recommendations. 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 98  
have performed well in terms of investment in final recipients or development of local 
financial markets, for example, and arguably those that have performed best are those 
that were able to draw extensively on the experience either of existing systems and 
structures or past programmes while committing funding allocations that could 
realistically be absorbed. Even among those FIs that have performed less well, the 
indications are that the experience of FIs in 2007-13 will inform and enrich the design 
and implementation of financial instruments in 2014-20, contributing to more mature and 
responsive policy instruments in future. 
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6.1 Data sources 
Data sources used for the brief stocktaking of the private markets in the twelve relevant 
Member States are listed below (see the first intermediate report for more details): 
European Central Bank data on the euro area for non-financial corporation 
European Commission Survey on Access to Finance for Enterprises 
European Business Angel Network (EBAN) 
European Mutual Guarantee Association (AECM) 
Eurostat, General and regional Statistics, European and national indicators for short-term 
analysis, National Accounts 
Eurostat, Industry, trade and services, Structural business statistics, Access to finance 
Eurostat, Industry, trade and services, Structural business statistics, Business 
demography 
Eurostat, Industry, trade and services, Structural business statistics, Main indicators 
European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) 
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6.3 List of interviewees (Name, Organisation) 
Interviewees are listed in the case study reports 
6.4 Concordance table: the final report structure vs the ToR questions 
Evaluation Question Reference 
Task 1 FR section 
1.1 Take brief stock of the private markets for equity/venture capital, loans and 
guarantees operating in the programme area. To what extent do markets exist 
and are they growing? Under what terms are private sector equity / venture 
capital, loans or guarantees typically offered? What are the gaps in markets for 
each instrument? The intention is not to conduct a lot of original research, but to 
briefly provide a baseline. 
4.1.1 
1.2 Outline the main forms/packages of support offered by each FEI scheme. 
This may include non-financial support such as advice, management support and 
networking help. 
4.2.1 
1.3 Outline the rationale underlying these forms of support and the types of 
business eligible/targeted (e.g. size, sector, etc.). 
4.1.3 
1.4 Outline the management and operational structure of the scheme. How are 
projects selected, how is support delivered, what is the repayment structure 
and/or exit strategy? 
4.3.1 
1.5 Quantify the support (total and firm-level expenditure, number and type of 
enterprises, form of support, timing, level and involvement of the public sector 
etc.) and set out other available descriptive statistics. 
4.2.2 
1.6 Where available, collect data on effectiveness, including private sector 
money levered in, the extent to which public money has revolved already and 
final outcomes such as productivity, employment etc. at the firm level. 
4.5 
1.7 Crosscheck the above (as far as possible) with the data reported by member 
states in the 2012 summary of data on FEIs, published beneficiary data, as well 
as with the results of the parallel ex post evaluation work package 0 (data 
collection and quality assessment). 
3.2  
Task 2 EQs  FR section 
:KHUHDQGZK\GRSXEOLFO\IXQGHG)(,VWRHQWHUSULVHZRUNRUGRQ¶W work)? 
What are the theories of change and contribution stories of FIs? 
4.1.2 
Annex  
Task 3 EQs (The case Studies) CS section 
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Evaluation Question Reference 
1. Goals and theory of change.  
1.1 What are the goals of the schemes and the theory of change?  
1.2 What is the quality of the market gap assessment?  
1.3 How do the schemes contribute to the regional development goals of the 
operational programme as a whole? 
1.4 What motivated the managing authority to set up one or more FEIs?  
1.5 Does implementation and practice (e.g. selection of firms, forms of support, 
outcomes) actually fit with statements of goals and theory of change?  
1.6 Where there is more than one FEI in a programme, what is the division of 
labour between them?  
1.7 How do they fit with other instruments offered by the programme (notably 
grants or non-financial support) or (if relevant) similar, non-Cohesion Policy 
instruments operating in the same area? 
 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
 
2.4 
 
 
 
2.5 
 
2.6 
2. Management.  
2.1 What is the governance structure of each FEI?  
2.2 Who are the fund managers (or managers within the programme) and what 
is their background?  
2.3 In their understanding, what are the key differences between public and 
private sector FEI schemes?  
2.4 What is success for the manager (and is this translated into an indicator, 
UHSRUWHGWRWKHPDQDJLQJDXWKRULW\":KDWDUHPDQDJHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVSDFNDJHV
and performance requirements?  
2.5 What can be done to keep management costs to an acceptable level, while 
still running the funds adequately?  
2.6 What is the relationship with the managing authority and the programme 
strategy? 
 
3.1 
3.2 
 
3.3 
 
3.4 
 
 
3.6 
 
3.1 
3. Implementation and costs.  
3.1 How much did the schemes cost to set-up and how long did it take?  
3.2 How much do they cost to run?  
3.3 How well do they manage in attracting firms (especially where there are 
other forms of support e.g. grants available)?  
3.4 Are there other implementation issues?  
3.5 How do costs and other implementation issues compare to private FEIs and 
other public financial support (grants, guarantees etc.) in the same 
region/country?  
3.6 Are there good examples in terms of management, including not just 
successful investments, but also costs and delays?  
3.7 What features of administrative and institutional capacity are crucial in 
successfully running such funds?  
3.8 To what extent do the case study Member State and regions have these 
capacities?  
3.9 How could such capacities be built/developed further and which instruments 
could be used to do this? 
 
3.5 
3.5 
3.7 
 
3.8 
3.9 
 
 
6.7 
 
3.11 
 
3.11 
 
3.11 
4. Managing the portfolio.  
4.1 What is the status and health of the projects in their portfolio? 
4.2 What is the approach to risk, e.g. do they target safe investments or high 
 
3.12 
3.13 
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Evaluation Question Reference 
risk, high return projects?  
4.3 What is the repayment structure for loans, the exit strategy for equity and 
venture capital? What happens when a firm does not fail, but does not turn a 
profit? 
 
3.14 
 
5. Monitoring and evaluation.  
5.1 What indicators are collected? Do they cover spending and outputs only, or 
also results and other long term outcomes?  
5.2 What is reported to the managing authority? How does this relate to the 
reliability of data reported to the Commission, notably in terms of expenditure 
codes and the 2012 summary of data on financial instruments? What data is 
available on repayments?  
5.3 Have there already been evaluations of these or similar schemes (and if so, 
what did they find)? Are evaluations planned? What will they contain ± and what 
data is already being collected to feed them? 
 
4.1 
 
4.2 
 
 
 
4.3 
6. Outcomes.  
6.1 How much private money has been levered in?  
6.2 How much of the money has revolved?  
6.3 What is the initial evidence of effectiveness? This last should include 
productivity and jobs, but also failure rates ± it should also include other goals 
relevant to the scheme, e.g. if a venture capital scheme sets out to stimulate 
early stage research, development and innovation.  
6.4 What is the initial evidence for efficiency/cost-effectiveness (i.e. comparing 
outcomes to costs such as those in point 3 above)? How does this compare 
between different FEIs and with the main alternative sources of finance in the 
region/country (e.g. grants, private schemes)?  
6.5 What is the evidence for and against the theories of change and contribution 
stories? 
 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
 
 
 
6.3 
 
 
 
6.2 
7. Optimum scale. Given implementation, costs and outcomes what can be said 
about the minimum, optimum and maximum sizes of scheme and level of 
individual support? 
6.4 
8. Market-making for equity/venture capital funds. Is there evidence of 
successful creation/expansion of the equity/venture capital market in the 
region/country? Is this likely to be sustained / sustainable in the long term, even 
if public money is withdrawn? How much of a funding gap remains, what links 
with universities, what other means of supporting high-tech start-ups?  
8.1 Is there any evidence of added value of ERDF vs private equity/venture 
capital funds? 
6.5 
 
 
 
 
6.6 
9. Good practice.  
Are there any good practice examples in the above terms 
(setup/implementation, early signs of effectiveness, sustainability/expansion of 
markets, good practice projects). What do we learn from comparing good 
practice cases with others? What makes the difference? 
 
6.7 
 
Task 4 EQs FR section 
4.1 Which of the theories of change and contributions stories drawn up in task 2 
(and rationales from task 1) are actually borne out by the case studies (including 
the good practices) in task 3. The evidence for and against each narrative should 
be critically examined. 
On the 
level of  
Case 
studies 
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Evaluation Question Reference 
4.2 The costs (e.g. in setting up schemes) and initial evidence of benefits (e.g. in 
terms of private money levered in, public money revolved, increased investment, 
production, productivity and jobs). How do these vary between different FEIs 
(equity/venture capital, loans and guarantees) and what we know of the effects 
of other forms of support (grants, non-financial support)? The analysis should 
also include wider benefits such as creating a venture capital market. 
4.5 
4.3 What has been learned about when, where, how various FEIs work ± and 
ZKHQWKH\GRQ¶WZRUN7KLVVKRXOGLQFOXGHDGLVFXVVLRQRI 
4.3.1 A comparison of the main characteristics (pros and cons, roll out time and 
mechanism, target group, impacts) of each type of FEI. What can be said about 
how to choose one or more FEIs in the light of the goals and context of a given 
region or Member State? 
4.3.2 The optimum size of a given FEI scheme. 
4.3.3 Optimum scope (e.g. sectors and firms targeted, combination of 
instruments etc.). 
4.3.4 How to keep implementation delays and management costs to a minimum, 
while still running an effective scheme which achieves the desired results. What 
administrative and institutional capacities are necessary to run such schemes 
successfully ± how a Member State or region could go about building them. 
4.3.5 How to optimise the impact of FEIs. Impact includes not just leverage and 
revolving, but also final impact in terms of productivity and jobs. 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
4.5 
4.5 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
6.5 Link of Case study sections to Task 3 Evaluation Questions 
Case study sections Task 3 EQs 
1 Short presentation of the FIs in the OP 
and context 
 
1.1 OP characteristics  
1.2 Description of FIs  
1.3 Financial performance at the level of the 
OP and the funds 
 
2 Goals and theory of change of FIs  
2.1 Overview on goals of the FI schemes and 
the theory of change (ToC) 
1.1 What are the goals of the schemes 
and the theory of change?  
2.2 Market gap assessment in the context of 
the private market in a given region (key 
element of the ToC) 
1.2 What is the quality of the market 
gap assessment?  
2.3 Contribution of FI schemes to regional 
development goals of the OP (key 
element of the ToC) 
1.3 How do the schemes contribute to 
the regional development goals of the 
operational programme as a whole? 
2.4 Motivation of the MA to set up FIs 1.4 What motivated the managing 
authority to set up one or more FEIs? 
2.5 Division of labour between FIs in an OP 
(key element of the ToC) 
1.6 Where there is more than one FEI in 
a programme, what is the division of 
labour between them? 
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Case study sections Task 3 EQs 
2.6 Fit of FIs set out in the OP with other OP 
instruments (grants, non-financial 
support) and similar non-cohesion policy 
instruments in the same area 
1.7 How do they fit with other 
instruments offered by the programme 
(notably grants or non-financial support) 
or (if relevant) similar, non-Cohesion 
Policy instruments operating in the same 
area? 
3 Management and implementation of FIs  
3.1 Governance structure of FIs, role of MA 2.1 What is the governance structure of 
each FEI? 
2.7 What is the relationship with the 
managing authority and the programme 
strategy? (Extent to which the MA can 
influence the conduct of the FI) 
3.2 Type and background of fund managers 2.2 Who are the fund managers (or 
managers within the programme) and 
what is their background? 
3.3 Key differences in the management of 
public and private sector FI schemes 
(goes partly beyond the OP scope) 
2.3 In their understanding, what are the 
key differences between public and 
private sector FEI schemes? 
3.4 Performance and success indicators for 
fund management; incentives linked to 
performance 
2.4 What is success for the manager 
(and is this translated into an indicator, 
reported to the managing authority)? 
:KDWDUHPDQDJHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVSDFNDJHV
and performance requirements? 
3.5 Preparation time and costs to set-up FIs 3.1 How much did the schemes cost to 
set-up and how long did it take? How 
much do they cost to run? 
3.6 Management costs and fees for sound 
fund management 
2.6 What can be done to keep 
management costs to an acceptable 
level, while still running the funds 
adequately? 
3.7 Capacity to attract firms for FIs 
compared to other forms of support 
3.2 How well do they manage in 
attracting firms (especially where there 
are other forms of support e.g. grants 
available)? 
3.8 Implementation challenges 3.3 Are there other implementation 
issues? 
3.9 Comparison of costs and implementation 
issues of FIs with private and other 
public financial support (goes partly 
beyond the OP scope) 
3.4 How do costs and other 
implementation issues compare to 
private FEIs and other public financial 
support (grants, guarantees etc.) in the 
same region/country? 
3.10 Success factors for sound administration 
and management of FIs 
2.4 What is success for the manager 
(and is this translated into an indicator, 
reported to the managing authority)? 
:KDWDUHPDQDJHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVSDFNDJHV
and performance requirements? 
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Case study sections Task 3 EQs 
3.11 Capacity of MA and fund managers to 
successfully run FIs; capacity building 
3.6 What features of administrative and 
institutional capacity are crucial in 
successfully running such funds? To what 
extent do the case study Member State 
and regions have these capacities? How 
could such capacities be built/developed 
further and which instruments could be 
used to do this? 
3.12 Status and health of projects in the FI 
portfolio 
4.1 What is the status and health of the 
projects in their portfolio? 
3.13 Approach to risk management 4.2 What is the approach to risk, e.g. do 
they target safe investments or high 
risk, high return projects? 
3.14 Key features of the repayment structure 
for loans / exit strategy for equity and 
venture capital 
4.3 What is the repayment structure for 
loans, the exit strategy for equity and 
venture capital? 
4.4 What happens when a firm does not 
fail, but does not turn a profit? 
4 Monitoring and evaluation of FIs  
4.1 Characteristics and completeness of the 
indicator system 
5.1 What indicators are collected? Do 
they cover spending and outputs only, or 
also results and other long term 
outcomes? 
4.2 Reporting provisions for fund managers 
to the MA and reliability of reported data 
to various stakeholders 
5.2 What is reported to the managing 
authority? How does this relate to the 
reliability of data reported to the 
Commission, notably in terms of 
expenditure codes and the 2012 
summary of data on financial 
instruments? What data is available on 
repayments? 
4.3 Evaluations carried out to date or 
planned 
5.3 Have there already been evaluations 
of these or similar schemes (and if so, 
what did they find)? Are evaluations 
planned? What will they contain ± and 
what data is already being collected to 
feed them? 
5 Outcomes of FI implementation  
5.1 Private money levered in at the various 
levels of the implementation chain 
(leverage effect according to ec 
definition) 
6.1 How much private money has been 
levered in? 
5.2 Financial sustainability of FIs  6.2 How much of the money has 
revolved? 
5.3 Actual, expected and unexpected 
outcomes (output and results, wider 
effects) for each fi implemented, 
6.3 What is the initial evidence of 
effectiveness? This last should include 
productivity and jobs, but also failure 
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Case study sections Task 3 EQs 
concrete examples of outcomes rates ± it should also include other goals 
relevant to the scheme, e.g. if a venture 
capital scheme sets out to stimulate 
early stage research, development and 
innovation. 
6 Conclusions on the effectiveness and 
added value of FIs 
 
6.1 Consistency of implementation and 
practice with statement of goals and 
theory of change 
1.5 Does implementation and practice 
(e.g. selection of firms, forms of support, 
outcomes) actually fit with statements of 
goals and theory of change? 
6.2 Achievement of FI strategic and 
operational objectives in the context of 
OP objectives, as defined in the TOC 
6.5 What is the evidence for and against 
the theories of change and contribution 
stories? 
6.3 Cost effectiveness of different types of 
FIs and grant schemes 
6.4 What is the initial evidence for 
efficiency/cost-effectiveness (i.e. 
comparing outcomes to costs such as 
those in point 3 above)? How does this 
compare between different FEIs and with 
the main alternative sources of finance 
in the region/country (e.g. grants, 
private schemes)? 
6.4 Optimum scale of FI schemes 7. Optimum scale. Given 
implementation, costs and outcomes 
what can be said about the minimum, 
optimum and maximum sizes of scheme 
and level of individual support? 
6.5 Improved market making for 
equity/venture capital funds 
8. Market-making for equity/venture 
capital funds. Is there evidence of 
successful creation/expansion of the 
equity/venture capital market in the 
region/country? Is this likely to be 
sustained / sustainable in the long term, 
even if public money is withdrawn? How 
much of a funding gap remains, what 
links with universities, what other means 
of supporting high-tech start-ups? Is 
there any evidence of added value of 
ERDF vs private equity/venture capital 
funds? 
6.6 Added value of ERDF vs. private 
equity/venture capital funds 
8.1 Is there any evidence of added value 
of ERDF vs private equity/venture capital 
funds? 
6.7 Elements of good practice from the case 
study 
9. Good practice. Are there any good 
practice examples in the above terms 
(setup/implementation, early signs of 
effectiveness, sustainability/expansion of 
markets, good practice projects). What 
do we learn from comparing good 
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Case study sections Task 3 EQs 
practice cases with others? What makes 
the difference? 
3.5 Are there good examples in terms of 
management, including not just 
successful investments, but also costs 
and delays? 
6.8 Problems and solutions in carrying out 
the case study 
 
6.6 Generalized ToCs for different types of firms and FIs  
Input from First Intermediate Report section: A stylised theory of change 
Developing retrospective theories of change through the case studies 
A significant challenge in the present study is applying a theory of change approach at 
different scales and in a multidimensional context. The discussion above has highlighted 
the crucial role of a robust ex ante assessment/ gap analysis in determining what role 
financial instruments might play in contributing to the objectives of the Operational 
Programme. This in turn implies an in-depth analysis of the entrepreneurial landscape of 
the region (or country). From here the picture becomes more complex. A range of 
different target enterprises may emerge from the gap analysis ± including start-ups, 
µPDLQVWUHDP¶60(VKLJKJURZWK ILUPVVSLQ-out companies, social enterprises, etc. The 
financing needs of such enterprises are diverse and there may be little commonality 
emerging from the gap assessment beyond the fact that the existing capital 
requirements of apparently viable operations are not being met by the market. The aim 
RIWKHGLVFXVVLRQDQGLOOXVWUDWLRQVWKDWIROORZLVWRµXQSDFN¶WKLVRXWFRPHLQDVW\OLVHGZD\
first from the perspective of various types of enterprise and their needs and second from 
the perspective of the main forms of financial instrument and how they are intended, in 
principle, to address those needs. 
Start-XSV DQG µPDLQVWUHDP60(V¶PRVW FRPPRQO\ WXUQ WR GHEW ILQDQFH (Figure 12 and 
Figure 13).  
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Figure 12: Stylised theories of change for different types of firm: start-ups 
 
For small firms, debt instruments imply no loss of control over how the business is 
managed and the amount of capital and interest are known amounts that can be factored 
into business planning. For MAs and intermediaries, loans are relatively straightforward 
to administer. Mezzanine finance may be attractive to small firms which are resistant to 
pure equity. Where small firms lack collateral or track record, guarantees can be useful in 
addressing credit rationing. 
  
Context: rationale for intervention: information asymmetry (e.g. 
ILUPVODFNWUDFNUHFRUGILUPVODFNFROODWHUDOKLJKWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV« 
Problem 
being 
addressed: 
Lack of suitable 
credit/at 
affordable price 
Target firm:  
micros 
start-ups 
entrepreneurs 
Financial 
instruments 
offered: 
Microfinance 
(loans, loan 
guarantee on 
commercial 
loan)  
Intended 
change: 
Firm 
started up, 
creates 
new jobs 
(contribute 
to OP 
targets) 
increases 
profits, 
repays 
investment 
Assumptions and pre-conditions: soft support may be needed 
alongside FIs to improve skills, high business birth rate underpins 
regional economic growth 
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Figure 13: Stylised theories of change for different types of firm: mainstream 
SMEs 
 
The use of micro-finance is widespread to tackle problems of exclusion from financial 
markets, with a focus on the long-term unemployed and on disadvantaged areas (Figure 
14). 
  
Context: rationale for intervention: information asymmetry (e.g. 
firms lack track record), firms lack collateral 
Problem being 
addressed: 
Lack of suitable 
credit/at 
affordable price 
Target firm:  
SMEs 
Relevant FI: 
Loans, loan 
guarantees, 
mezzanine 
finance 
Intended 
change: 
Firm 
grows, 
creates 
new jobs 
(contribute 
to OP 
targets), 
increases 
profits, 
repays 
loan 
Assumptions and pre-conditions: 
Mature SMEs may prefer loan funding as allows control to be kept of 
firm and they have stable cash flow to allow repayments to be made 
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Figure 14: Stylised theories of change for different types of firm: disadvantaged 
groups/social enterprises 
 
Firms with high growth potential may lack the cash flow necessary to borrow from 
conventional sources, and may find equity finance attractive Figure 15. On the other 
hand, managing authorities and investors may find equity investment attractive as it has 
the potential to generate substantial returns, and contribute to regional economic 
development. The level of capital input may be very substantial, and it does not have to 
be repaid (although an entrepreneur may ultimately opt to buy out an investor in order 
to regain total control of the firm). 
  
Context: rationale for intervention: information asymmetry (e.g. 
firms lack track record), firms lack collateral 
Problem being 
addressed: 
Lack of access 
to financial 
markets 
Target firm:  
Disadvant-
aged groups/ 
social 
enterprises 
Relevant FI: 
Microfinance 
(loans, loan 
guarantee on 
commercial 
loan) 
Intende
d 
change: 
Social 
benefits, 
reduction 
in 
unemploy
-ment, 
increase 
in 
employm
ent (OP 
targets) 
Assumptions and pre-conditions: soft support needed 
alongside FIs to improve skills? 
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Figure 15: Stylised theories of change for different types of firm: high growth 
firms 
 
Thus, as noted above, the barriers faced by different types of undertaking may differ and 
require different types of intervention to address them.  
Figure 16 illustrates the basic logic underlying loan schemes. In practice, there are many 
different possible options in the design of loan schemes (institutional issues aside) 
including not only variants in the seniority of the debt, the rate of interest and repayment 
period, but also the scope to combine loan funds with guarantees ± particularly common 
for microfinance ± or to convert debt into quasi-equity in the form of mezzanine funding.  
  
Context: market unwilling to take risk, takes too long until profitability, 
information asymmetry (e.g. firms lack track record), firms lack 
collateral 
Problem 
being 
addressed: 
Funds not 
available at 
scale required 
Target firm:  
High growth 
firms 
Financial 
instruments 
offered: 
Loans 
Equity finance 
Mezzanine 
finance  
Support for VC 
industry  
Intended 
change: 
Firm grows, 
creates 
additional 
jobs (OP 
targets), 
increases 
profits, 
repays 
investment 
Assumptions and pre-conditions: only HGFs contribute to 
regional economic growth? 
U
lt
im
a
te
 a
im
: 
co
n
tr
ib
u
te
 t
o
 s
u
st
ai
n
ab
le
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 g
ro
w
th
  
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 120  
Figure 16: Stylised intervention logic underpinning loans 
 
1. An enterprise fails to gain access to the funding required because insufficient 
funds are available for lending resulting in commercial banks focusing on investor 
with a track record or larger project where transaction costs are lower.  
2. The loan fund manager assesses the application, taking account of the viability of 
the project and wider elements of the investment strategy. The terms of the loan 
are set, including collateral, interest rate, duration, repayment holidays, etc. 
3. The loan fund advances capital to the enterprise which it would not otherwise 
have been able to access.  
4. The enterprise pays interest on the loan. 
5. The firm repays the loan in full or  
6. The firm defaults, in which case there is a loss to the fund. 
There are potential negative effects of different types that should be noted, and factored 
into the design of the measure. First, that the loan fund should not crowd out the 
commercial banking sector by, for example, lending to creditworthy investments at less 
than market rates, or, for that matter, fund uncreditworthy firms to the detriment of 
their more efficient competitors; and second, that rates of interest payable are sufficient 
to cover the defaults on loan payments and management costs of the fund in order for 
the fund itself to be sustainable. As such, a key part of the investment strategy must be 
concerned with identifying projects that are too risky for commercial banks to take on or 
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that rank lower in terms of returns on capital, and yet offer sufficient viability and 
interest from a policy perspective.  
Figure 17 illustrates the basic logic underlying guarantee schemes. Again, in practice, 
there are many different possible designs of guarantee fund, with scope to adjust interest 
rates, coverage, fees and so on, as well as so-called counter guarantee options which are 
commonplace in some countries. Figure 17 represents the most basic model. 
Figure 17: Stylised intervention logic underpinning guarantees 
 
1. An enterprise fails to gain access to the funding required because the lender 
considers it too risky or will only lend at rates of interest that render the loan 
untenable for the firm. 
2. The lender applies for a guarantee from a publicly-backed fund, which will 
typically cover 80 % of the loan. 
3. The guarantee fund also vets the loan application and may specify a maximum 
interest rate. 
4. The enterprise pays the guarantee fund a fee. 
5. The lender advances capital to the firm which is would not otherwise have been 
able to access. 
6. The firm repays the loan in full or  
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7. The firm defaults, in which case the guarantee fund repays the lender the agreed 
proportion of the loan. 
Again there are potentially negative effects of public guarantees. First, that risk is shifted 
inappropriately with the guarantee fund taking on risk that the bank would otherwise 
have accepted; second, that the fees payable by borrowers to the fund fail to cover the 
defaults arising, undermining the sustainability of the fund in the longer term. As such, 
an important element in the design of the scheme is to maximise the additionality of the 
guarantee while seeking to ensure that costs are covered on the portfolio of guarantees 
offered.  
Equity is the most complex (and least used) form of publicly-funded financial instrument 
Figure 18. Like loans and guarantees, equity can take different forms. The two principal 
forms are so-called hybrid funds where public funds are invested by a fund manager and 
co-investment funds, where public funds are invested alongside private funds on a pari 
passu basis with due diligence being undertaken by private investors. This second model 
depends on the presence of sufficient private investment capital in the region.  
Figure 18: Stylised intervention logic underpinning equity finance 
 
1. An enterprise fails to gain access to the funding required because the lender 
considers it too risky, the amounts sought are too large or the enterprise will not 
be in a position to make repayments within an acceptable timescale. 
PUBLIC 
FUNDS 
EQUITY FUND 
Barrier to address? 
High risk / scale of 
capital needs 
Failure to access 
sufficient capital due to 
high risk and 
information asymmetries 
ENTERPRISE 
IN
VE
ST
M
EN
T 
FU
N1 
2 
3 
4 
EXIT: TRADE 
SALE; IPO 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 123 
2. Investment is sought from an equity fund; this may charge for the due diligence 
process and may seek close involvement in the management of the firm 
3. Assuming the enterprise grows, the value of the equity rises. 
4. 7KLVHQDEOHVWKHVDOHRIWKHKROGLQJDWDSURILWWKH³H[LW´LQSULQFLSOHUHWXUQLQJD
profit to the fund. 
7KLV VHFWLRQ KDV GHYHORSHG ZKDW PLJKW EH WHUPHG HOHPHQWV RI D µVW\OLVHG¶ WKHRU\ RI
change and provided a narrative of the issues implicit in developing such a theory. These 
elements or building blocks are necessarily broad and generic. The nature of FI, and of 
the context within which they operate, means that the extent to which a theory of 
change can be generalised is very limited. A genuine theory of change capable of 
answering evaluative questions must be specific and must be developed at case study 
level, based on the answers to questions designed to elicit information on how FIs were 
intended to achieve certain goals within certain contexts.  
The importance of context, pre-conditions and assumptions were already emphasised: 
these are decisive iQGHWHUPLQLQJ³LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDSSURDFKHV´DQG³LQVWUXPHQWGHVLJQ´
KLJKOLJKWHGLQWKHFHQWUHRIWKHGLDJUDP7KHVHFXUUHQWO\DSSHDUDVµEODFNER[HV¶ LQWKH
stylised theory of change. Some of the implications of targeting different types of firm, 
and the implications of using different types of instrument, are illustrated in the diagrams 
which followed. A key task of the case study phase of the project is to explore and 
expose the implementation and design of FIs within the specific case study contexts. This 
in turn means that the case study questions must be tailored to the case at hand. 
Nevertheless, the key issues to be explored at a general level can be framed as follows: 
x What was the change that the intervention sought to bring about? 
- This will be determined by the Operational Programme, the OP Priority under 
which the FI has been introduced and the objectives of the FI itself.  
x Who were the intended beneficiaries of that change? 
- Again, at a general level the region as a whole is the intended beneficiary, but 
which markets or sectors are specifically targeted? 
x What were the barriers to achieving the change? 
- Some of these are beyond the scope of FI, or even the OP, to influence (e.g. 
tax and regulatory structures), but others can be components of key 
complementary policies ± such as investment readiness or business mentoring 
programmes. 
x How was the change quantified? 
- What indicators reflect the change brought about? 
x What assumptions were made about the context, behaviours, finance, target 
market? 
- What was assumed, for example, about the finance gap or the extent to which 
absence of finance was a constraint on business development? 
x How did all of the above lead to the choice of instrument(s)? 
- What other factors contributed e.g. perceptions of efficiency of FI, expected 
project quality, ease of disbursement of funds? 
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x How were the instruments designed and implemented to reach the change 
sought? 
More specifically, does the design and implementation of FIs deliver the desired end 
result, and if not, why not? 
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6.7 ExpeUWV¶MXGJHPHQWRQWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRI),VVXSSRUWHGWRWKHLQWHQGHGFKDQJHFDVH
studies) 
OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
DE: OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Sufficient response by start-ups 
and companies in the focus area 
(out of the planning region of 
Munich)  
4 The adjustment of the target area resulted in a high 
response from companies. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Mobilisation of business angels 
through awareness and publicity 
measures 
4 Interviews confirmed a high response of business 
angels. Numerous awareness activities were 
introduced by fund management. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Private funds mangers are 
motivated to cope with ERDF 
obligations (extra burden) 
4 There was an enormous increase in knowledge by 
learning on the job. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Properly selected start-ups and 
companies 
5 The due diligence is strict. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Raised awareness of business 
angels and investors 
5 Multiple action was taken by the fund managements. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Generated investment volume 4 Good progress 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Business angels and investors 
form a funding consortium that 
can go along with the various 
rounds of financing  
4 Interviews confirmed high interest from financing 
actors. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Start-ups and companies 
receive intensive non-financial 
support to build up their 
business competence 
4 Interviews confirmed a high level of support, but not 
via other ERDF interventions. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Operational 
objective 
Funds are long-term stable 
partners for the companies 
4 Interviews confirmed stable partnerships. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
There is an open market for 
private investments in the long 
0 No evidence available 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
run 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
Local businesses and local jobs 
remain in the region  
0 No evidence available 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that some of the 
exits are profitable and the risk 
capital funds are revolving and 
can be multiplied to support 
growth and job creation in the 
long run 
0 Too early for a final answer 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
Short- and medium term 
objective is strengthening of the 
entrepreneurial base (M2.1 
goal) 
0 No direct evidence available on the improvement of 
the innovation capacity and competitiveness of 
supported enterprises. The monitoring indicators 
showing investment and employment effects may be 
used as proxy variables to show progress. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
Long term-strategy is sustaining 
an adequate level of 
employment under 
consideration of globalisation 
and technological progress (PA2 
goal)  
0 Positive development trend of employment in 
economically weak regions in the 2005-2013 period 
(context indicator, source: AIR 2013, p 6). The 
contribution of FIs to that positive trend is not yet 
known 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Equity  Strategic 
objective 
Broad policy objectives: 
Boosting growth and 
convergence of struggling areas 
through strengthening of 
competitiveness of existing 
SMEs and supporting promising 
business ideas of start-ups 
(overall strategic goal) 
0 Unclear how to assess that goal in relation to FIs.  
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Operational 
objective 
Support provided only to 
innovative projects in growing 
enterprises, such as new 
machinery, new process 
0 The fund manager confirmed the focus on innovative 
projects, furthermore, there are also clear provisions 
in the application guidelines and forms, and 
apparently the allocation of loans in enterprises is 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
systems, logistics, energy 
efficiency, eco-friendly 
production, diversification of the 
product profile, patents 
also controlled by random audits. There is no 
evidence showing that theory is translated into 
practice and that in-house innovation really happens 
as intended by the loan instrument.  
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Operational 
objective 
It is assumed that domestic 
banks as distributors of the FI 
are interested in offering the 
instrument to their clients 
3 Up to now the loan instrument has been attractive 
but demand has already slumped due to low interest 
rates. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Operational 
objective 
It is assumed that domestic 
banks make a thorough 
assessment of the applications 
based on their local knowledge 
of firms  
4 Interviews confirmed a thorough assessment 
(perception). 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Operational 
objective 
It is assumed that targeting 
works and domestic banks as 
distributors of the FI have 
selected innovative investments 
with growth perspective only 
4 Interviews confirmed a thorough assessment 
(perception). 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Operational 
objective 
Supported credit investment 
volume in the pre-defined fields 
and areas 
4 Territorial targeting is implemented. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that most of the 
firms can repay the loan and the 
loan funds are revolving and can 
be multiplied to support growth 
and job creation in the long run 
4 The loan fund already started to revolve; whether it 
will further revolve in the long run cannot be said at 
the moment. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that the ex-ante 
assessed job effect at the 
application stage will last for a 
longer period (no ex post 
validation of job effects is 
made) 
0 No sufficient information available. 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Strategic 
objective 
Short- and medium term 
objective is strengthening of the 
entrepreneurial base (M2.1 
goal) 
0 No sufficient evidence is available on the 
improvement of the innovation capacity and 
competitiveness of supported enterprises. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Strategic 
objective 
Long-term strategy is sustaining 
an adequate level of 
employment under 
consideration of globalisation 
and technological progress (PA2 
goal) 
0 Positive development trend of employment in 
economically weak regions in the period 2005 to 2013 
(Source: AIR 2013, p 6)). Net impact of FI is not 
known. 
DE:  OP 
Bavaria 
Loans Strategic 
objective 
Boosting growth and 
convergence of struggling areas 
through strengthening of 
competitiveness of existing 
SMEs and supporting promising 
business ideas of start-ups 
(overall strategic goal) 
0 Unclear how to assess that goal in relation to FIs. 
This would stipulate an ex-post assessment of all 
enterprises supported and how they developed over 
time (in turnover and employment) as compared to 
similar enterprises not being supported.  
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Operational 
objectives 
Number of FI schemes available 
to the target group increased 
4 There was a considerable gain from learning by doing 
in the financial market (especially in case of LEDAs 
and FEs). The adjustments to the first set of FI 
schemes (launched in 2008-2009) were made in view 
of changing market context taking into account  
feedback from final recipients.   
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Operational 
objectives 
Volume of total funds allocated / 
invested to SMEs with no access 
to bank loans (no track record 
of bank loans) 
3 Monitoring data confirms targeting of SMEs with no 
bank loans - even if their share decreases throughout 
the period Numerous training and demonstration 
activities introduced by Holding Fund (targeted on 
LEDAs and FEs, dealing with the highest share of the 
target group SMEs) 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Operational 
objectives 
Increasing share of SMEs 
benefiting from partial 
compensation of interest rates / 
3 The EDOP FIs may have contributed to the market 
expansion and closing the financial gap - but hard 
evidence is missing due to lack of a counterfactual-
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
guarantees / venture capital  based impact assessment. In the case of loan 
schemes the max. 9% interest rate threshold is far 
below the benchmark market rate (15-20% in 
dependence of the scope of loans).  
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Operational 
objectives 
Proper selection of new, 
innovative start-ups and 
companies - in case of venture 
capital funds 
4 The due diligence is strict, investment strategies are 
in line with the overall strategic framework 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Induced investment volume  3 Good progress in leveraging private money - even if 
lower leverage effect than planned 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Improving access to equity 
finance  
4 Both market data and interviews confirm the 
increased interest of financing actors in equity finance 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
There is a market making for 
private investments in the mid 
run 
4 Increased number of VC funds in the programme 
period 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
There is a market making for 
private investments in the long 
run 
0 No evidence available 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Strengthening regional position 
of the domestic capital market 
0 No evidence available 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
It is assumed that some of the 
exits are successful in economic 
terms and the risk capital funds 
are revolving and can be used 
multiply to support growth and 
job creation in the long run 
0 Too early for a final answer 
HU:  OP 
Economic 
Development 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Broad policy objectives: 
Boosting growth and job 
creation to help Hungary catch 
0 Unclear how to assess that goal in relation to FIs 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
up with Europe (overall strategic 
goal) 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Increase of SMEs to financing 
sources 
4 The effect of FIs has been augmented by the 
economic crisis. The problem of external financing 
became even more pressing for SMEs and for some of 
them FIs represented the only source of finance. The 
number of SMEs supported and private investment 
attracted through FIs met the expectations of the 
programmers. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Flexibility of the MA and 
Intermediate Body in the face of 
changing conditions of FI 
implementation 
4 The MA and Intermediate Body reacted to the 
economic crisis by increasing the budget allocation to 
JEREMIE HF from EUR 80 million to EUR 210 million in 
2009. Furthermore, INVEGA HF was founded. These 
measures were meant to help SMEs to deal with the 
lack of external financing during the economic 
downturn. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Institutions responsible for the 
implementation of FIs must 
have good knowledge of the 
situation in the financial market 
and its developments 
0 There is no data allowing for this assumption to be 
assessed. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Differences between FIs and 
grants must be taken into 
account in the administration of 
FIs 
3 Different administration systems were created for 
grants and FIs. Administration of grants was assigned 
to the Implementing Body (state agency), while FIs 
were implemented by financial intermediaries (mostly 
private banks). However, in some cases the MA and 
Intermediate Body disregarded the differences of 
grants and FIs, asking HF managers to apply 
excessive control mechanisms in their interaction with 
financial intermediaries. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Risk capital funds satisfy SME 
need for finance in early stage 
4 A total of 63% of all investments made by JEREMIE 
venture capital funds by the end of 2013 were seed 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
Growth of development and encourage 
innovation 
and start±up. A significant share of investments by 
this specific instrument was made in innovative 
enterprises. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Popularity of risk capital among 
SMEs grows 
4 Increased popularity of risk capital followed the start 
of activities of ERDF±funded risk capital funds but still 
needs to be increased. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Loans and guarantees improve 
SME access to finance 
5 Up to the end of 2013, 4,720 SMEs benefited from FIs 
(7% of all SMEs). Almost all of these enterprises 
received loans and guarantees while 55 enterprises 
benefited from risk capital funds. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Partial compensation of interest 
improves borrowing conditions 
for SMEs 
4 Interviewees singled out partial compensation of 
interest as the key advantage of FIs. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
SME investment is aimed at 
improving technology and 
processes which leads to higher 
labour productivity 
2 Although some enterprises were able to improve 
technology and upgrade their business processes, FIs 
were extensively used for financing working capital. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
New enterprises supported by 
risk capital are innovative and 
successful with high labour 
productivity 
4 According to the 2014 evaluation, turnover of 
enterprises supported by risk capital funds increased 
by 43%, the number of employees by 12% while 
losses fell by 71%. In 12 of 30 enterprises analysed 
the turnover increased despite the number of 
employees staying the same, or reducing, both 
signalling a rise in labour productivity. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Economic climate is suitable for 
SME investment 
1 Economic crisis made the economic climate unsuitable 
for SME investment. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Risk capital funds predominantly 
oriented towards seed and 
start±up capital 
4 63% of all investments made by JEREMIE venture 
capital funds by the end of 2013 were seed or start±
up. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Increase in labour productivity 2 Higher productivity was largely a result of a cut in 
wages, reflecting the economic and financial crisis. 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 132  
OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
Growth 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Increase in investment in fixed 
capital formation 
3 Investment has not recovered to the pre-crisis level, 
but the fall was less marked than expected. 
LT:  OP 
Economic 
Growth 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Long-term economic growth of 
the country 
0 Not possible to asses net effects of FIs 
CZ:  OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Increase SMEs access to 
financing sources 
4 2,100 SMEs benefitted from better access to finance; 
the specific characteristics of the SMEs are not known 
CZ:  OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Increase employment  5 Reported created jobs contribute greatly to the 
overall outcome of OP EI in employment. 
CZ:  OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Improved start-up support 1 Start up support was weak 
CZ:  OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Increase the motivation for 
starting a business 
0 No specific impact evaluation is available 
CZ:  OP 
Enterprises & 
Innovation 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Increase the competitiveness of 
firms through implementation of 
new production technologies; 
intensify development of 
information and communication 
technologies and business 
services. 
0 No evidence available on the attribution of FIs to 
improvement of the innovation capacity and 
competitiveness of supported enterprises, but it is 
increasing generally. 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Promote the creation, takeover 
and transfer of enterprises  
3 The transfer of enterprises less covered by the three 
FIs 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Increase capital for the 
development of innovative SMEs 
4 As a result of JEREMIE more than EUR 130 million 
was made available in addition to grants and the FIs 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
Roussillon already available a regional level.  
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Develop the offer of seed and 
start-up capital for new and 
young innovative companies 
5 The funds completed and strengthened the regional 
offer for investments in SMEs 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Facilitate access to loans and 
risk capital 
5 Loans were easily accessed by firms, especially with 
the reduction in collateral requirements. More capital 
was made available in the early phase of 
development with seed loans and capital risk 
development. Financial resources increased in the 
first round of investment, the most risky time for the 
funds.  
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Put devices for microcredits and 
µSUrWG¶KRQQHXUV¶at the disposal 
of project promoters and 
companies 
4 The microcredit line was not activated; while the seed 
ORDQ µSUrWV G¶KRQQHXUV¶ instrument achieved its 
objectives. 
FR: OP 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
Transform innovations and 
research into economic success 
by encouraging the 
development of an environment 
conducive to innovation 
3 The FIs helped to reach the strategic objective of axis 
1 for innovation and competitiveness; completing the 
financial offer of grants and the funding of networking 
activities. The character experimental of the 
intervention limited however its economic impacts at 
regional level. In addition, no OP indicator was able to 
provide a clear picture on the real FIs impacts in 
economic terms. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Supported investments. It is 
assumed that the support is 
provided in the form of loans of 
guarantees to financially viable 
projects in all sectors of the 
regional economy (without 
restrictions applicable in the 
case of grants - i.e. imposed by 
the State aid rules).  
5 By the end of April 2015, 1,794 investments had 
been supported (loan and guarantee agreements 
signed). Allmost all loan schemes, including the best 
performing ones, have managed to avoid State aid 
restricitions.   
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
New funds created or capital for 
existing debt funds increased. 
5 The high number of funds supported under the MROP. 
14 funds have been selected in the calls for 
applications (against the target of 4 under the OP 
output indicator). All of the funds have received OP 
contributions that increased their investment capital. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Territorialised deployment of 
support, esp. to locally based 
SMEs. 
5 The funds are based in all the sub-regions. All the 
fund managers are regional or local entities. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
SMEs that recovered after 
natural disasters. It is assumed 
that half-repayable loans are 
the least burdensome, efficient 
and effective instrument for the 
recovery of the SMEs affected 
by natural disasters. 
4 Loans for SMEs affected by natural disasters allowed 
to generate the investment volume of EUR 5.5 
million. By the end of 2014, 115 enterprises have 
been supported and 49 gross jobs have been created. 
3 out of 4 funds have disbursed to SMEs its entire 
initial OP contribution. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that enterprises 
receive investment and working 
capital (if applicable) for 
development purposes which 
directly influences their 
competitiveness (mostly in 
terms of scale of operations - 
investments/assets, 
employment, outputs). 
5 The IB reporting provides evidence on the amounts of 
investment and working capital paid to enterprises. 
There is also evidence of jobs created by supported 
SMEs. There is indirect evidence of the increase in 
SMEs competitiveness regarding the scale of 
operations (fund managers and OP institutions 
opinions based on e.g. returning clients, further 
investments, etc.). 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that the fund 
managers grow in terms of 
financial and institutional 
capacity, and their business 
support offer (financial and non-
financial) is enhanced, which 
allows for further strengthening 
of the regional SMEs 
4 The fund managers have received OP contributions to 
their investment capital and to cover management 
costs (incl. staff, equipment, premises). This has 
increased their operational (institutional) capacities. 
All the loan funds have increased their investment 
capital in more than one revolving round. By the end 
of 2015, they are likely to serve 1,915 companies, 75 
% more than the OP target. All of the funds offer 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
competitiveness.  non-financial advisory support.  
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
The short/medium-term goal 
particularly for FI support is 
creating strong and competitive 
SME sector through providing 
alternative sources for financing 
enterprise activities (M2.1 goal) 
5 The FIs and OP indicators' achieved values prove that 
the resources are paid to the final recipients and are 
revolved (1,915 expected to be supported by the end 
of 2015). There is a publicly-funded system of 
external financing of the SME business activity. The 
value of loans and guarantees expected by the end of 
2015 (PLN 195.8 million / EUR 48.9 million) is 8 times 
higher than the OP target 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
The short/medium-term goal for 
the overall grant & FI support is 
increasing the competitiveness 
of enterprises (PA 2 goal) 
5 There is the evidence of jobs created by supported 
SMEs. There is indirect evidence of the increase in 
SMEs competitiveness regarding the scale of 
operations (fund managers and OP institutions 
opinions based on e.g. returning clients, further 
investments, etc.).  
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
It is assumed that most of the 
firms can repay loans, the loan 
and guarantee funds revolve 
and can be used again to 
support growth and job creation 
in the long run. 
5 All the loan funds have revolved the resources initially 
contributed from the OP allocation. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
The long-term specific OP goal 
is increasing competitiveness 
and innovativeness of Lesser 
Poland (OP specific goal) 
4 The increased competitiveness in the region can be 
justified based on the achievements of the PA2 
indicator related to Microenterprises that owing to the 
OP support have become Small enterprises (37 by the 
end of 2014 and 60 expected by the end of 2015; 43 
is the OP target). The impact of innovativeness would 
require further studies. 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
The long-term specific OP goal 
is the development of 
institutional potential of Lesser-
Poland-based entities (OP 
4 As above. This could also be justified in terms of the 
indicator related to the number of FI supported under 
the MROP (target of 4, achievement expected by the 
end of 2015 of 14). 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
specific goal) 
PL: OP 
0DáRSROVNLH 
All FIs Strategic 
objective 
The long-term general OP goal 
is to create conditions 
facilitating economic growth and 
employment (OP strategic goal) 
0 The impact of the OP intervention to the regional GDP 
and net jobs created will be subject to economic 
modelling after the OP closure. 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
Creative 
Content 
Fund 
Operational 
objective 
Support companies in 
commercial creative sector 
2 Mostly TV and film projects were supported, rather 
than the diverse portfolio envisaged 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
Creative 
Content 
Fund 
Operational 
objective 
Funds are matched by private 
sector investment 
5 50:50 match achieved 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
Creative 
Content 
Fund 
Strategic 
objective 
To create revolving fund  1 Poor level of returns 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
Creative 
Content 
Fund 
Strategic 
objective 
To test the market for co-
investment in creative sector 
3 Market was tested (albeit restricted range of sub-
sectors) 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
Creative 
Content 
Fund 
Strategic 
objective 
Private sector more engaged in 
sector 
2 CCF model confirmed risk level 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Strong networks with financial 
services, intermediaries, 
universities generates dealflow 
4 High application rate 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Specific funds target 
investments in technology 
sectors 
4 IT, scientific, health are well represented 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Representation of investment 
across region (objective added 
later) 
4 Steps taken to increase presence and investment in 
Tees Valley after slow start 
UK: OP North 
East of 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Increased participation of 
business angels 
3 Still hard to attract angel investment in start ups; 
more progress with existing companies 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
England 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Generated investment volume 5 Progress on target 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Fund managers add value to 
companies through strong 
portfolio management 
4 Consultancy and input of non-executive directors 
common 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Operational 
objective 
Fund managers achieve 
successful exits to timetable 
3 Economic conditions delaying optimum exit period; 
behind schedule on some product funds; concern that 
some exits will be earlier than optimum 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Increase capacity of private 
investment community in NE 
4 New players attracted to region. Healthy competition 
between investment companies. 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Increasing business density by 
creating new start-ups 
4 304 new starts supported by 31 December 2014 
(44% of all SMEs receiving financial assistance) 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Stronger priority sectors 4 Evidence of rising enterprise rates in key priority 
sectors 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Increasing start-ups in 
disadvantaged areas 
4 Some 2/3 of Microloan start ups are in disadvantaged 
areas 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Improving survival rates of new 
businesses 
4 Survival rates are monitored. Data indicates 90% 
survival rate at 12 months. 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Increasing the growth rate and 
profitability of existing SMEs 
0 No data available on profitability. 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Creating/safeguarding jobs 4 4,756 jobs created/safeguarded by end 2014. Further 
500 in Q1 2015 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
UK: OP North 
East of 
England 
FBNE Strategic 
objective 
Creating/safeguarding jobs in 
disadvantaged areas 
4 High proportion of jobs created and safeguarded in 
top 30% most deprived areas. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Guarantee Operational 
objectives 
1. To promote innovative 
business behaviour 
4 Demand for guarantees from eligible companies has 
been high, and therefore it is assumed it has sped up 
R&D project investment. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Guarantee Operational 
objectives 
3. To support R&D for 
companies 
4 It is assumed that most projects achieve some 
product innovation and enable the promoter to take a 
leadership market position through expansion of 
product range and quality improvement. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Guarantee Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to Spanish 
economic modernisation 
0 No evidence available 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Guarantee Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to structuring the 
Spanish science and technology 
system throughout the territory 
4 Most programmes have to be spent in Convergence, 
Phasing-out and Phasing-in regions although less 
than half the population and companies are in those 
areas. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Operational 
objectives 
1. To promote innovative 
business behaviour 
2 Although the CDTI Loan Fund might contribute to 
improved innovation and investment within 
businesses, it is too early to verify. According to the 
investment type promoted, this kind of project will 
not really change the structural framework of final 
recipients 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Operational 
objectives 
3. To support R&D in companies 4 The projects are closely linked to pre-
commercialisation stage. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Operational 
objectives 
1. To promote innovative 
business behaviour 
0 The 11 projects approved do not provide enough 
information to form a judgement. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Operational 
objectives 
3. To support R&D results to 
companies 
1 No suitable proceeding 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to Spanish 
economic modernisation 
0 No evidence available 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to structuring the 
Spanish science and technology 
system throughout the territory 
4 The CDTI Loan Fund, at the end of 2014, had 
approved 76% of projects and committed 73% of 
funds to Convergence, Phasing-out and Phasing-in 
regions 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to Spanish 
economic modernisation 
0 The 11 projects approved do not provide enough 
information to form a judgement. 
ES: OP 
Technological 
Fund 
Loans Strategic 
objectives 
To contribute to structuring the 
Spanish science and technology 
system throughout the territory 
0 The 11 projects approved do not provide enough 
information to form a judgement. 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Encourage venture capital 
intervention in support of SMEs, 
favouring the early stages of 
their life cycle and investment in 
innovative projects 
3 Three VCFs aiming at early stages and investment in 
innovation and internationalisation were 
implemented: Pre-Seed, Early Stages and Innovation 
and Internationalization. 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Strengthen the mutual 
guarantee system and promote 
the expansion of its intervention 
to companies and projects that, 
considering their risk or 
innovative nature, present 
greater difficulties in obtaining 
bank financing 
4 The Investe QREN Credit Line involved the financing 
of the mutual guarantee system. Investe QREN 
supported approximately 96 SMEs. 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Promote the contracting of 
credit lines within the financial 
system to facilitate SME access 
to finance 
4 The Investe QREN Credit line involved financial 
systems, e.g. national banks to facilitate SME access 
to finance. 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Promote the use of new 
instruments, including the 
5 Before the introduction of COMPETE (prior to 2007) 
the involvement of business angels was insignificant. 
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OP name FI Objective 
type 
Full Objective Rating 
(max 
5) 
Justification 
participation of venture capital 
investors (business angels) in 
order to maximise funding for 
SME small projects 
The COMPETE Programme promoted Business Angel 
financing and a total of 51 business angels vehicles 
(companies mainly owned and under the 
management of business angels whose investment 
policy is to participate in companies in stages of seed 
capital or early stages). 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Support SME financing and 
innovation in an integrated 
perspective of equity and debt 
components 
4 Implemented FIs covered the spectrum of equity and 
debt components.  
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Operational 
objective 
Encourage entrepreneurship 
while providing capital and 
management skills required in 
higher risk initiatives 
4 With VCFs, a detailed application and selection 
process required proof of capacity to not only manage 
the fund, but also have the human resources to 
support SME entrepreneurship.  
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Increase the spread of 
alternative FIs 
4 Three main types of FIs were implemented: VCFs, 
Finance Line for Business Angels and Credit Lines. For 
VCFs, 6 different funds were created, aiming at 
different SME development stages. 
PT: OP 
COMPETE 
All FIs Strategic 
objectives 
Facilitate access to credit for 
SMEs (particularly those 
managed by women and young 
people) 
3 However, despite the significant number of FIs, the 
number of SMEs that received financial support is 
considered low. In some cases, only 1 and sometimes 
no SMEs received support from the different VCFs 
(numbers from COMPETE Execution Report 2013. 
From an interview with COMPETE, there is indication 
that during 2014, all FIs were supporting at least 1 
SME).  
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 141 
6.8 Effectiveness in achieving strategic and operation goals of the FIs 
(synthesis of case study findings) 
Figure 19: Overall picture: Effectiveness in achieving strategic and operation 
goals (average of ratings per OP; max = 5) 
 
Source: case study research (9 OPs with 114 objectives in total; please note that case studies were elaborated 
by different experts which could lead to a biased rating) 
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Figure 20: Detailed picture: Number of ratings per OP, objective type and rating 
category 
 
Source: case study research (9 OPs with 114 objectives in total); very high = 5 
 
  
very high 1 2 1 2 2 1 3
high 3 1 10 7 2 4 2 4 1
medium 1 1 2 2 1 1
low 1 1 1
very low 1 1 1
don´t
know 1 1 1
very high 4
high 2 1 2 7 1 3
medium 1 1 1 1 1
low 1 1
very low 1
don´t
know 4 2 10 1 4 1 1
Loans Guaran-
tees
Loans Loans Loans Equity Guaran-
tees
Loans Loans
Guaran-
tees
Loans Equity Guaran-
tees
Equity Loans Equity Equity Guaran-
tees
Equity Guaran-
tees
Loans
ES: OP 
Technolo-
gical Fund
CZ:  OP 
Enter-
prises & 
Inno-
vation
DE:  OP 
Bavaria
LT:  OP 
Economic
Growth
HU:  OP 
Economic
Develop-
ment
UK: OP 
North 
East of 
England
FR: OP 
Langue-
doc-
Roussillon
PT: OP 
COMPETE
PL: OP 
0DáRSRO-
skie
S
tr
at
eg
ic
 o
b
je
ct
iv
es
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 o
b
je
ct
iv
es
Case study
OPs and FI 
type applied
Total
4
16
5
2
1
23
12
34
8
3
3
3
114
Number of ratings per OP, objective type and rating category
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 143 
6.9 ToC key elements 
The ToC illustrates the intervention logic and the underlying assumptions that lead from 
inputs to outcomes for a specific FI instrument in a specific context. Key elements of a 
ToC are the following: 
x Context & needs related to FIs for enterprise support (addressed e.g. in the 
SWOT, market gap assessment) 
x The longer term results or broad policy objectives of FIs in the framework of 
cohesion policy (end-objective of OP) related to context and needs, and 
corresponding indicators and target values. Barriers to achieving the broad policy 
objectives (expected change) and conditions to remove the barriers (within or 
beyond the scope of the OP, e.g. on the demand or supply side) related to policy 
objectives / expected change. Conditions form an important building block to 
establish a plausible theory at the objective-level. Conditions are required (not in 
place yet) to remove the barriers and bring about the broad policy objectives (e.g. 
a suitable legal framework has to be created, a capable implementing body has to 
be established, there is a critical mass of enterprises which want to grow). 
x Target group, intended beneficiaries, sectors, markets of FIs (detailing policy 
objectives)  
x Short term results which should delivered by the support schemes at different 
levels (enterprises, market, instrument, target group) reflecting the broad policy 
objectives and related quantified indicators  
x Design and nature of support, inputs and activities (financial & non-financial) to 
bring about the policy objectives and reach the focus areas, target group, sectors 
and related quantified indicators 
x Underlying assumptions to implement the planned support and to achieve the 
expected outcomes. In contrary to conditions (which have to be newly created or 
significantly improved), the so called underlying assumptions are more related to 
the mechanism and micro-steps associated with the implementation of the 
planned support (activity level) and should be in place to achieve step by step the 
H[SHFWHGRXWFRPHV$VVXPSWLRQVGHVFULEHZKDW WKH ³DUURZV´ LQ WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ
logic or result chain imply. Assumptions are crucial because if they are incorrect 
(e.g. targeting should be in place but is not working in practice or there should be 
mechanism against objective drift) it can completely alter how the intervention 
works. There it should be checked during the verification process if the stated key 
assumptions required for a successful intervention work in practice. 
The key elements can be translated into a graphic to illustrate the intervention logic of a 
FI (narrowing down the full ToC). 
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Figure 21: Graphic to illustrate the intervention logic and underlying 
assumptions that lead from inputs to outcomes for a specific FI instrument in a 
specific context 
 
Source: consortium 
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6.10 Country Annexes (12 MS) 
6.10.1 Belgium 
There is a longstanding history of using non-grant funding as an instrument of domestic 
economic development policy in Belgium. Responsibility for economic development policy 
lies principally at the subnational level with the Walloon, Flanders and Brussels 
governments. The ERDF has co-financed FIs in Belgium since 1994-99. In the current 
period, of the four Belgian ERDF OPs, three contain at least one FI. The Flanders 
government opted not to offer any FI for their small programme with the associated 
costs of establishing a co-financed OP. None of the ESF OPs contain FIs. 
In all three ERDF OPs, support is overwhelmingly in the form of loans (of various types 
and with different degrees of seniority). There is a small guarantee scheme in Wallonia. 
Loan terms vary but State aid is covered by the General Block Exemption Regulation in 
most cases, or is below the de minimis threshold. Financial support is typically 
accompanied by a package of advisory support. 
Table 28: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Belgium in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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6.10.2 The Czech Republic 
Interest rate support and guarantee FIs were first used in the Czech Republic in the 
1990s, financed from national sources. Since then Structural Funds enabled the support 
to be broadened and new tools to be introduced.  
In the 2007-2013 period, the Operational Programme Enterprise and Innovation (OP EI) 
had a total ERDF contribution of EUR 3.1 billion. Some 5% of the OP allocation (EUR 
147.5 million) should be delivered through two FIs (Guarantee Fund and Credit Fund), 
which are linked to four sub-programmes. The Guarantee fund has committed OP 
contributions of EUR 159 million and the Credit fund EUR 75 million. The funds come 
solely from public funding sources. Both of them support SMEs. The Credit Fund provides 
SMEs with assistance through interest rate support and loans. The Guarantee Fund 
provides SMEs with guarantees for loans. 
Table 29: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Czech Republic in the 
2007-2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
6.10.3 Case Study OP Enterprise and Innovation  
Financial instruments (FIs) in the form of interest rate support and guarantees started in 
the Czech Republic in the 1990s, financed from national sources. Since then Structural 
Funds enabled the support to be broadened and new tools to be introduced.  
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The FIs under scrutiny  
In the 2007-2013 period, the Operational Programme Enterprise and Innovation (OP EI) 
had a total ERDF contribution of EUR 3.1 billion. A total of 5% of the OP allocation (EUR 
147.5 million) should be delivered through two FIs (Guarantee Fund and Credit Fund), 
which are linked to four sub-programmes. The Guarantee fund has committed OP 
contributions of EUR 159 million and the Credit fund EUR 75 million. The funds come 
solely from public funding sources. Both of them support small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The Credit Fund provides SMEs with assistance through interest rate 
support and loans. The Guarantee Fund provides SMEs with guarantees on loans. 
The context for introducing FIs 
x The Czech Republic is one of the Member States with the highest allocation per 
capita under European Union Cohesion Policy. This is because the managing 
authorities (MAs) prefer grants to ensure high financial absorption capacity. 
Venture Capital (VC) and loans are seen more as an experimental approach. 
x Generally, FIs have not been widely introduced in the Czech Republic, although 
some programmes supported SMEs in the 1990s. 
x Only one institution has implemented revolving funds at this time: the Czech-
Moravian Guarantee and DevelopmHQW%DQN>ýHVNRPRUDYVNi]iUXþQtDUR]YRMRYi
EDQNDý0=5%@ 
x 7KH NH\ DFWRUV 0LQLVWU\ RI ,QGXVWU\ DQG 7UDGH ý0=5% DUH FRQVHUYDWLYH ),V
implemented under the 2007 ± 2013 programming period were created and 
LPSOHPHQWHGDVDQµH[WHQVLRQ¶RIWKHROGHU(XURSHan Union and nationally funded 
instruments. Additionally, the financial products offered to SMEs were very similar 
to programmes used in the past, i.e. without VC. 
Goals and theory of change (ToC) of FIs 
x There was no explicit ToC in the OP. It was necessary to reconstruct this from 
different information sources. 
x A market gap assessment had not been conducted when the FIs were established. 
The FIs were based on a previous generation of revolving funds, which 
determined their goals. 
x Goals for both FIs and indicators to measure results are very similar. The key 
element of ToC is access to finance through subordinated loans or guarantees. 
Both ToCs have the same short- and long-term goals and objectives (there is not 
a ToC specifically for FIs within the OP).  
x There is no regional or sectoral preference within the OP and FIs. The strategy is 
broadly defined. 
x The FIs have no specific targets or results included in the funding agreement. 
7KHUHLVDPXWXDODVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKH),VVKRXOGFRQWULEXWHµDVPXFKDVSRVVLEOH¶
to the OP goals. 
x There was no experience with VC funds. Thus, preparation of this instrument was 
delayed and finally postponed to the 2014-2020 programming period. 
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Management and implementation of FIs 
x The governance structure of the FIs is simple and fXQFWLRQDOý0=5%LVWKHRQO\
manager and was appointed directly by the MA. The fund manager used its 
H[WHQVLYH H[SHULHQFH WR VHOHFW WKH ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW PDQDJHU ý0=5% LV D
state-owned bank with a long history of implementing nationally funded FIs in the 
2004 ± 2006 programming period. 
x However, selection without a public procurement process resulted in spending that 
was not certified by the European Commission and the programmes were stopped 
until the issue was resolved. The Guarantee Fund has not provided guarantees for 
over two years, being suspended because of correction issues. 
x Despite these delays, the financial performance of FIs is good. Recently, 90% of 
the planned volume of funds has been paid to FIs, of which 91% has already been 
disbursed to final recipients. The investment strategy of both funds has remained 
stable since they were set up in 2007. 
Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
x The system of monitoring indicators is the same for both FIs and provides only 
basic information without details of final recipients. This low-profile monitoring 
limits the opportunity to evaluate intervention and impacts. 
x Indicators collected by the MA include financial and output indicators, a result 
indicator (newly established firms) and an impact indicator (newly created jobs). 
Outcomes on company growth, turnover, and sales are not recorded by the 
monitoring system. The horizontal priorities are observed only within the result 
indicator (newly created jobs for men and women). Reporting provisions are 
detailed in the funding agreement. The fund manager reports the main 
characteristics such as loan draw-downs as well as the indicators required and 
reported in the programme monitoring system. These indicators need to be 
reported at the end of project implementation and three years later. 
x The fund manager has a monitoring system that provides information for 
reporting and managing FIs. Achievements are not yet formally recorded, since 
projects are still being implemented. 
x The MA has carried out one evaluation on absorption capacity of the FIs as well as 
several programme evaluations, which also covered FIs in the OP EI. There has 
not been any specific impact evaluation of FIs. Impact evaluation would provide 
the MA with important evidence of overall effects in sectors and regions as well as 
comparisons between grants and FIs. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
x The FI contributed significantly to job creation (in non-specific sectors). This is 
explained through the focus on growth projects, rather than risky, earlier stage 
investments. Around 17% of newly created jobs in the OP have been reported as 
due to FIs. These seem to be more cost-efficient than grants in the use of public 
funds. Costs of one additional job are significantly lower for FIs as compared to 
grants. 
x Start up support is weak and below expectations. The START programme lasted 
only for six months. 
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x The MA did not set any outcome targets when FIs were established. The only 
information that the fund manager reports concerns horizontal themes. The role 
of FIs in the context of Cohesion Policy has not yet been firmly set, except for a 
generic consideration that the MA should promote FIs because of their benefits. 
x The Guarantee Fund has a high leverage effect. Leverage for the Loan Fund is 
only 2 because there is no private participation. Co-investment in the Credit Fund 
is EUR 57 million and the leverage effect is 2. The leverage effect for the 
Guarantee fund is also 2; however these figures do not include the loans granted. 
With these the total leverage on ERDF sources is 9 (with guaranteed credits of 
EUR 626 million). 
x The financial sustainability of the Credit Fund is not yet clear, because there is no 
defined exit policy and defaults are expected to increase. However, the fund 
manager expects that residual funding will be used either for a special 
government development credit programme or will be added to existing financial 
products. According to the fund manager, the Guarantee Fund has been designed 
to be non-revolving, which means that guarantees on non-performing loans will 
probably consume the entire Fund allocation. 
x The Guarantee and the Loan funds will be able to achieve some of their short term 
objectives, such as increasing access to finance and increasing employment. It is 
not possible to assess achievement of longer term objectives, for example, the 
competitiveness of companies due to lack of evidence. 
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6.10.4 Denmark 
In Denmark, the first FI funded by Structural Funds was set up in the 2000-06 
programme period (Mål 2 Lånefond). The FIs are capital funds at regional level that make 
investments or provide loans to businesses. In the 2007-13 programme period there 
were nine regional capital funds in Denmark, five co-financed by ERDF and four by ESF. 
Of these, seven were for enterprise support (Article 44a of Regulation 1083/2006), three 
of which were co-financed by ERDF under the OP Innovation and Knowledge. The 
remaining two ERDF funds were categorised under Article 44c related to energy efficiency 
and renewables. There were no national FIs supported by Structural Funds.  
The Danish Business Authority (Erhvervsstyrelsen, DBA) acts as managing authority for 
the two Structural Funds programmes in Denmark (one ERDF and one ESF). The regional 
growth fora (RGF) are responsible for making recommendations to the managing 
authority on the use of Structural Funds and for setting up the regional capital funds. 
Support under the regional capital funds includes loans, equity investments or a 
combination of the two. Non-financial support is also offered, for instance the Fonden 
CAT Invest Zealand not only provides capital for SMEs, but also help for entrepreneurs 
with business development, including counselling and establishing strong management 
and networks. 
Table 30: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Denmark in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Innovation and Knowledge'   3 16.8 8.3 3.9 3.8 13.6 13.7 100.3 66
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6.10.5 France 
French ERDF OPs have been using FIs since the 2000-2006 programming period, partly 
with the support of national institutions, like OSEO (National Innovation Agency) for 
loans and guarantees to innovative firms. In the 2007-2013 period, 16 OPs had at least 
one FI, and only Region Bretagne decided not to activate any.  
Compared to similar countries such as Germany and the UK, French OPs have not used 
FIs on such a large scale up until now84. Innovative enterprises have significant 
requirements for financial support for firm creation, growth and transferring results from 
research activities into innovation. These will be major challenges to be addressed in the 
2014-2020 programming period. 
Increased use of FIs has been constrained by the legal framework85, but also by the 
cultural gap between regional and managing authorities on one side and financial 
intermediaries on the other. 
In the 2007-2013 period, ERDF FIs provided loans in about one third of the schemes, as 
well as venture capital (18%) and guarantees (15%). Each OP co-funded five schemes 
on average, and around half of them offered each of the three products.  
3UrWV G¶KRQQHXUV (soft loans with a zero interest rate) are the most common loan 
instrument. Guarantee schemes are managed at regional level mostly through 
agreements with OSEO-Régions. Venture capital is mainly used to support the creation 
and expansion of innovative firms and, more rarely, for innovation transfer. Venture 
capital supports economic sectors that are in the competitive clusters identified in the 
³3{OH GH FRPSpWLWLYLWp´ RU VHFWRUV ZLWK D ³VWUXFWXULQJ UROH´ LQ WKH UHJLRQDO HFRQRP\
Under some OPs, venture capital (VC) also targeted ICT or the green economy, especially 
eco-efficiency, renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Venture capital is often provided together with advisory support, delivered by the scheme 
(for example SORIDEC in Languedoc Roussillon) or intermediate bodies. Such packages 
include support for partner selection, fund raising and financial management. 
Loans or guarantees were mostly provided with no aid, or were below de minimis 
thresholdsµPari passu¶ZDVRIWHQensured with venture capital, while any State aid was 
provided under specific schemes notified at national level86. 
 
                                          
84  FIs account for around 2% of ERDF allocation in France in the 2007-2013 programming period, against 12% 
in UK and 8.5% in Germany. Source: Datar, 2013.  
85  The general framework evolved during the programming period to allow Regional Councils (Conseils 
Régionaux) to invest directly in capital risk funds. 
86  $V VSHFLILHG LQ WKH ³9DGHPHFXP VXU OHV UqJOHV DSSOLFDEOHV DX[ GLVSRWLIV G¶LQJpQLHULH ILQDQFLqUH´ 6*
issued on 5 January, 2012. 
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6.10.6 Case study OP Languedoc Roussillon  
The FIs under scrutiny 
Three FIs were set-up under Priority Axis (PA) 1 of the Operational Programme (OP) for 
Languedoc-Roussillon in the 2007±2013 SURJUDPPLQJSHULRG7KH),VZHUHDµVHHGORDQ¶
instrument, offering unsecured and zero interest rate loans, a co-investment fund, which 
was an equity fund, and a guarantee fund, i.e. first-loss portfolio guarantee. The FIs were 
LPSOHPHQWHGWKURXJKD+ROGLQJ)XQG+)µ)RQGGH3DUWLFLSDWLRQ-HUHPLH¶)3- 
The OP Languedoc Roussillon invested EUR 30 million of public money, half of this from 
the ERDF. The funds were 6% of the ERDF financial allocation to the programme and 
16% of the financial allocation of PA 1, devoted to enterprise innovation and 
competitiveness. 
There was no comprehensive public policy for FIs in the 2000-2006 programming period 
and the FIs implemented over the 2007-2013 period were considered experimental in the 
public policy field. This resulted in a slow start. The specific funds became only 
operational between September 2010 and June 2011, more than three years after the 
ROP started. 
Less than half of the commitments were paid to the individual FIs by the end of 2013; by 
which time the final recipients had received 33.7% of the total JEREMIE contributions. 
Goals and theory of change (ToC)  
The goals of the JEREMIE instruments are only vaguely described in the OP and concern 
3$LQJHQHUDO7RJHWKHUZLWKWKHPDUNHWJDSDQDO\VLVIURPWKH23DQGWKH),V¶EXVLQHVV
case, a retrospective ToC has been constructed with a plausible pathway and a feasible 
chain of outcomes (including long-run outcomes). Each of the three FIs contributes to the 
objectives in a specific manner, mainly through targeting SMEs with different needs and 
at different development stages. 
+RZHYHU WKH23¶V LQGLFDWRUV\VWHPGRHVQRW IXOO\FDSWXUH WKHUHDORXWFRPHV7KH+)¶V
more comprehensive and meaningful monitoring system was not available to the country 
experts. 
The market gap analysis showed the need for four different instruments. The market was 
fairly well developed, with active investors in the region, even though these had limited 
scope and limited resources. Three of the proposed FIs were later implemented, with a 
target of financing 300 projects. 
The main motivation for FIs was driven by a long-term desire to change the delivery 
process of regional business support and to better meet the specific needs of enterprises 
in Languedoc-Roussillon.  
The lack of non-financial support actions, including awareness-raising, the small size of 
the instrument and the experimental character of the JEREMIE mechanism made it 
difficult to give information about the JEREMIE tools to enterprises. 
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Management and implementation of FIs 
The management of the HF was entrusted to the EIF jointly by the MA and the Regional 
Council. The Regional Council was designed as an Intermediate Body (IB) by the MA to 
implement FIs and other measures of PA 1. Three regional financial intermediaries were 
selected by the EIF through calls for tenders: Banque Populaire du Sud, a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), LRTI - CREALIA and a risk capital investor (EIG - 
SORIDEC). 
The HF and the three specific funds have funding agreements between them with regard 
to implementation. A steering committee with an MA representative, an IB representative 
and EIF experts supervised the activities of the HF and the three specific funds. The EIF 
provided technical support while the other members of the steering committee took the 
operational decisions. The steering committee was at the heart of the decision-making 
process for FIs. 
The whole JEREMIE structure took more than two years to establish. Selection of the 
three fund managers (out of 18 tenders) took the most time (25 months) and unforeseen 
State aid issues further slowed the process. After the governance structure was set up, 
no changes or amendments had to be made.  
The fund managers needed specific support from the EIF on the EU legislative 
IUDPHZRUN HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH ),V¶ VHW-up phase. Additional administrative costs arose 
principally during the set-up phase of the specific instruments, e.g. preparation of the 
proposal, fund manager selection, and set-up of the monitoring and reporting systems. 
Once fully operational, no subsequent costs were reported by the funds. 
Apparently, there is good cooperation between the HF and the specific funds as well as 
between the MA and the HF. The HF has provided technical assistance to CREALIA and 
SORIDEC throughout the implementation, which is considered by both parties as crucial 
for successful management of the funds.  
Management fees for the FIs are capped at 3% per year. The guarantee instrument does 
not claim any management fee, since the related loans are provided on a commercial 
basis (and thus the net-margin covers their cost). There is no evidence of a link between 
fund manager performance (and their remuneration) with the OP objectives and 
indicators as reported in the AIRs.  
Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
Four indicators from the OP were relevant for monitoring. However, these indicators were 
not suitable for capturing the LQWHQGHGFKDQJHVWRPHHWVSHFLILFREMHFWLYHµ1XPEHU
RISURMHFWV ILQDQFHGE\ILQDQFLDOHQJLQHHULQJGHYLFHV¶DQGWKH\ZHUHHYHQ OHVVVXLWDEOH
IRUFDSWXULQJWKHFKDQJHWRPHHW3$¶VVWUDWHJLFREMHFWLYH7KLVZDVEHFDXVHRQO\RQH
result indicator was directly related to measure 1.2.1, while the other three results and 
impact indicators also covered other PA 1 measures with no visible separation between 
them.  
7KHLQGLFDWRUV\VWHPHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH+)RQO\SDUWLDOO\FRPSHQVDWHVWKH23¶VLQGLFDWRU
deficiencies. Although these indicators cover the most important items, they are not 
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documented in a standardised form and do not always cover the same items and the 
same periods. There are also unresolved issues with the methodology used for individual 
indicators. A much broader range of indicators seems to be available for individual FIs, 
covering the structure and development of each company supported, yet this information 
could not be accessed due to confidentiality rules in the funding agreements.  
The threH ),V¶ ¶ERWWRP-XS¶ UHSRUWLQJ WR WKH (,) WRRN SODFH PRQWKO\ TXDUWHUO\ DQG
annually. This was challenging for the financial intermediaries, especially during the early 
stages due to a much higher than usual reporting demand, different rules and procedures 
and the need to write in English. During the remainder of the implementation period, 
however, the reporting process worked smoothly.  
The FIs were evaluated in 2012, relatively shortly after becoming operational, outlining 
the strengths and weaknesses of JEREMIE in Languedoc-Roussillon with clear indications 
of modifications for the new programming period. While the evaluation considers 
JEREMIE to be a real success for the region, it also states open issues, such as the lack of 
strategy for the guarantee fund. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
The financial performance of the funds is well-documented and reveals moderate risks. 
CREALIA (seed loans) demanded a coach from the SYNERSUD network to guide each 
applicant; hence they reported no defaults up to 2014, by which time a considerable part 
of the fund had been repaid to the HF. The equity instrument fund manager (SORIDEC) 
has reported two defaults to date and expects another in 2015. The portfolio lifespan of 
five years is not yet over and already two investments have had IPOs, leaving the fund 
with a portfolio of 22 companies. The last exit is set for 2020. The guarantee instrument 
reported EUR 1 million in default so far, which is less than 1% of the disbursed loans 
(EUR 126.3 million). Risk for the guarantee fund was restricted by limiting the funding to 
a maximum of EUR 1.5 million for each project and 20% in any one NACE sector.  
The ERDF money disbursed to the HF (EUR 15 million) triggered a considerably higher 
amount of support to SMEs. By March 2015, EUR 169 million had been disbursed to final 
recipients. The major part of this originated from the guarantee instrument, where the 
fund managers disbursed EUR 126.3 million in loans from their own funds with the 
backing of EUR 7 million from ERDF (EUR 14 million from the HF), a multiplier of 18. Co-
investment in the VC fund was EUR 30 million, a leverage factor of 8.5 which is in the 
upper range of what can be expected.  
Payments from the seed loan instrument to final recipients were EUR 3.9 million, with the 
contribution from the HF to CREALIA being increased by 100%. Since there are no other 
contributors, the effect must originate from revolving funds, with short-term loan 
repayments (minimum 6 months, maximum 48 months) being invested again. This effect 
is even higher since CREALIA has already repaid EUR 700 000 (35% of the funds 
received) to the HF. Repaid funds would be allocated to FIs or other instruments for 
enterprise support in the 2014-2020 period. Funds of the co-investment and guarantee 
FIs are not yet revolving. 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
 page 155 
Altogether, one Euro invested by ERDF in JEREMIE prompted EUR 11.30 from the 
regional development system as well as public and private bodies. In total, more than 
EUR 168 million was invested in SMEs, compared to EUR 30 million allocated to the HF by 
both the ERDF and the Regional Council. 
Information about the structure of the final recipients is unreliable and remains mostly 
qualitative. The AIR reports more than 6,800 new jobs for all instruments (97% from the 
guarantee fund), while the HF only gives 1,369 new or maintained jobs. Neither of these 
figures can be verified by this study but they are clearly overestimated for the three 
funds. 
Only the reported number of supported enterprises seems reliable and is above target for 
all three instruments. By March 2015, 81 innovative SMEs had been financed through 
seed loans; 26 SMEs of high development potential had benefited from the co-investment 
fund, while 1,228 SMEs had received funding from the guarantee instrument. In the 
same period, 97.5% of the funding allocated to the seed loans was spent (EUR 1.95 
million by JEREMIE) and 84% for the co-investment instrument (EUR 9.2 million invested 
directly by JEREMIE), while the guarantee instrument covered loans of EUR 126.3 million.  
There is no hard evidence of the type of SMEs supported. A recent evaluation gives the 
average enterprise age and size on a random sample from all three funds. The main 
sectors of final recipients are recorded. These are ICT, biotechnology, robotics, green 
businesses and health for the seed loan and the VC instrument, but wholesale trade and 
rental services (plus ICT) for the guarantee instrument. 
The ToC outcome of increased innovation capacity at enterprise level has probably been 
achieved by the co-investment fund. This focused on high-growth technological firms and 
financed research and development activities. The seed loan fund has improved the 
survival rate of enterprises and their broad orientation towards innovative projects. The 
guarantee instrument, by far the largest of all three, covered a broad range of economic 
sectors. 
At first sight, the scale of the seed loan scheme seems very small. In addition, there was 
an expectation that 600 innovative SMEs would be supported per annum. Only around 
100 could be screened by the fund manager, which then selected 30 per year. However, 
the management fees are very modest and a larger instrument may have stretched the 
IXQGPDQDJHUV¶ DQG WKH+)¶V FDSDFLW\-building resources. All stakeholders consider the 
size of the fund appropriate for the market gaps to be addressed. 
The Languedoc-Roussillon region had a VC market prior to 2007, albeit with gaps 
FRQFHUQLQJWKH23¶VWDUJHWJURXSOLWWOHSDUWLFLSDWLRQIURPUHJLRQDOFRPSDQLHVDQGOLPLWHG
resources. The regionally-backed, co-financed VC fund widened the market and the co-
investment fund attracted more companies than expected. The viability of the VC 
instrument should lead to a larger fund for the new financing period.  
The co-financed VC has shown added value in relation to private (non-co-financed) VC 
funds due to the size of supported projects and companies being smaller than the 
average for VC funds. It also seems that the JEREMIE VC funds could support riskier 
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projects than non-co-financed funds. However, only the complete funding cycle will 
reveal any differences in risk management.   
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Table 31: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in France in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'French Guiana'  4 10.3 5.7 7.7 0.1 9.4 2.8 29.3 345
OP 'Réunion'  5 26.9 16.2 14.2 0.0 26.4 50.9 193.1 613
OP 'Aquitaine'  13 11.0 5.7 3.4 0.8 11.0 15.9 144.3 1,856
OP 'Centre Region'  10 27.4 11.0 11.1 11.0 21.2 27.2 128.3 -
OP 'Alsace'  5 33.1 6.5 16.7 16.1 14.9 5.5 36.8 90
OP 'Auvergne'  17 25.2 18.0 17.9 - 25.2 - - -
OP 'Basse-Normandie'  3 18.2 8.0 9.7 8.1 12.0 19.0 158.2 59
OP 'Burgundy'  6 6.8 1.8 2.9 1.7 6.1 - - -
OP 'Franche-Comté'  3 6.0 2.1 3.1 1.5 4.5 4.4 97.3 19
OP 'Upper Normandy'  1 4.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 2.8 - - -
OP 'Languedoc-Roussillon'  2 30.0 15.0 14.7 0.0 30.0 21.4 71.4 1,653
OP 'Lorraine'  11 34.1 8.7 8.0 10.6 31.8 26.3 82.5 885
OP 'Loire'  1 2.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 2.0 4.6 232.3 26
OP 'Poitou-Charentes'  2 12.5 6.3 9.1 0.0 12.0 7.7 64.1 25
OP 'Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur'  2 39.5 19.7 14.2 0.0 39.5 6.2 15.7 -
OP 'Champagne-Ardenne' 11 10.5 4.4 5.0 0.0 8.1 - - -
OP 'Corsica'  8 49.0 22.5 39.0 17.0 49.0 64.1 130.8 1,442
OP 'Ile-de-France' 3 12.8 6.4 8.7 - 12.1 - - -
OP 'Limousin region' 5 15.9 4.4 8.4 2.6 15.9 5.9 37.4 779
OP 'Nord-Pas-de-Calais' 5 78.9 70.8 25.6 0.0 78.9 28.5 36.1 906
OP 'Midi-Pyrénées'  3 6.0 4.9 2.1 0.1 6.0 19.6 328.9 328
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6.10.7 Germany 
FIs are used in most German ERDF programmes. There are two minor exceptions for the 
2007-2013 period: Bremen and Saarland. Both programmes will however use FIs in 
2014-2020 programmes. Altogether, the German ERDF OPs operate 36 FIs. At the level 
of programmes, there are between zero FIs (ERDF OPs Saarland and Bremen) and six 
(ERDF OP Berlin). Most Bundeslaender operate two or three such funds. FIs within ERDF 
programmes have been organised either under the umbrella of the managing authority, 
or by assigning VWDWH EDQNV RU SULYDWH LQYHVWPHQW FRPSDQLHV ³&RQYHUJHQFH´
SURJUDPPHV (DVWHUQ *HUPDQ\ DQG WKH ³5HJLHUXQJVEH]LUN´ /QHEXUJ KDYH SXW PRUH
HPSKDVLV RQ UHYROYLQJ FUHGLW LQVWUXPHQWV ZKLOH ³5HJLRQDO &RPSHWLWLYHQHVV´ UHJLRQV
prefer equity funds. 
Table 32: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Germany in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
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OP 'Thüringen' 2 145.0 108.8 15.7 0.0 145.0 144.2 99.5 1,015
OP 'Brandenburg' 3 82.5 61.9 8.6 1.3 82.5 69.3 84.0 100
OP 'Mecklenburg-Vorpommern'  2 35.5 35.5 7.2 0.0 15.5 32.7 211.2 -
OP 'Saxony'  2 77.4 55.5 3.6 2.4 77.4 71.2 92.1 105
Regional OP for Lüneburg (Lower Saxony)  1 16.0 12.0 6.1 0.0 16.0 8.5 53.0 23
OP 'Saxony-Anhalt'  4 359.2 261.3 24.2 0.0 342.3 341.8 99.9 1,380
OP 'Bavaria'  4 105.0 52.5 21.1 15.0 101.0 89.0 88.1 630
OP 'Schleswig-Holstein'  2 54.0 24.0 11.4 10.4 50.3 40.5 80.5 236
OP 'Berlin'  5 194.6 97.3 18.1 0.0 194.6 143.9 74.0 -
OP 'Hessen'  3 61.1 30.5 24.8 0.0 48.1 40.2 83.5 75
OP 'North Rhine-Westphalia'  3 119.3 59.1 7.7 0.0 119.3 99.8 83.7 809
OP 'Baden-Württemberg'  1 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 1.4 1.3 90.7 7
OP 'Hamburg'  1 12.0 6.0 25.4 0.0 12.0 5.8 47.9 32
OP 'Lower Saxony' (excluding Lüneburg)  2 64.0 32.0 10.6 0.0 64.0 47.0 73.4 89
OP 'Rhineland-Palatinate'  1 27.0 13.5 10.2 0.0 27.0 17.8 66.1 138
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x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
6.10.8 Case Study ERDF OP Bavaria  
The FIs under scrutiny 
x Bavaria has implemented four different FIs ± three risk capital funds and one loan 
fund - covering the entire region and administered in a decentralised manner. The 
approach is closely linked to regional development policy, specifically addressing 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in regions that lag behind 
economically, even though the Financial Instruments (FIs) cover the entire Free 
State of Bavaria except for the Munich metropolitan region. The FIs total EUR 105 
million, of which EUR 55 million is from the ERDF.  
x The funds allocated at the start of the programming period have been almost fully 
disbursed. About 80% of financial targets at different levels from Operational 
Programme (OP) to final recipients were met by the end of 2013. 
The context within which FIs were introduced 
x The Bavarian Managing Authority (MA) has always favoured grants as the main 
funding instrument for the private sector. During the 2007-2013 period, FIs with 
venture capital (VC) or loans were considered as an experimental instrument. 
They were partly supplementary tools to grants and partly an alternative to be 
examined for any wider effects. The major purpose of introducing FIs has been to 
offset temporary imbalances in local financial markets. By and large, this policy 
offers enterprises a wider range of funding opportunities.  
Goals and Theory of Change (ToC) of FIs 
x There was no explicit ToC for the four new FIs under the ERDF OP. There was no a 
priori document sketching out the needs for structural change in the regions, or 
defining variables indicating the change, or defining a specific system of 
mechanisms leading to the desired change. There was no explicit ToC for the OP 
though it may include elements of one. However, the FIs are systematically 
embedded into the regional Cohesion Policy strategy. This may be considered as 
an implicit ToC. Programme documents indicate a general system of objectives 
that is further developed by the implementing bodies in a decentralised manner. 
Significant issues are governed by agreements between the MA and the 
implementation bodies. These agreements are commensurate with the overall 
needs. 
x Cohesion Policy objectives to support economically weaker regions are the only 
visible components of a ToC. These objectives are delivered through grants and 
FIs, where FIs play a supplementary role (10% of total OP volume, or 32% of the 
volume of Priority Axis 2). 
x Orientation of the FIs towards regional development goals is demonstrated by 
targeting less economically advanced regions. The emphasis is on small 
investments, coordination with regional cluster initiatives, partnership with local 
banks as agents of subsidised loans and, in part, implementation by local venture 
capital funds. The ERDF Cluster Fund was specifically designed to support the 
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µ&OXVWHU RIIHQVLYH ¶ ZKHQ  UHJLRQDO 5	'HQWHUSULVH FOXVWHUV LQ WKH ,7
sensor technology and life sciences sectors were established in the regions.  
x A detailed market gap analysis for the FIs was not required in the 2007-2013 
period. The programme stakeholders took advantage of this freedom to 
experiment with FIs under the ERDF regime and to collect implementation 
experience. 
x The European Commission (EC) encouraged the MA to use these new tools in the 
context of the ERDF. ERDF supported FIs have only been included since 2007; 
however, there has been substantial experience with FIs in Bavaria, mostly with 
private or national public funding. 
x The role of the various instruments in supporting different stages of business 
development (seed, start-up, later stages, and growth) is systematically defined. 
x There is no competition between grants and FIs. Eligible enterprises may choose 
one but not both options. Instead, their supplementary character is emphasised 
by the MA and the LfA Foerderbank Bayern Muenchen (LfA), which is the fund 
manager. The MA is looking for a highly diversified portfolio of funding products, 
which are tailored to the various conditions and needs of enterprises. 
x In practice, it was difficult to focus only on the initial target areas. The areas 
covered were broadened for technology firms that are rare in the initial target 
territories. 
Management and implementation of FIs 
x FIs under the Bavarian ERDF programme have been governed by a four-tier 
administrative system (MA-intermediate body-financial intermediary-final 
recipient). The MA is supported in-house by ministerial units 43 and 53, which act 
as the technical unit for administering and supervising all venture capital and loan 
funds. 
x The FIs are managed at operational level by two public and two private bodies 
with long-standing experience and established regional representation. The 
intermediary institutions managing the funds have qualified staff. Fund managers 
have in-depth knowledge of the regional and local product and financial markets. 
(i) The LfA Förderbank Bayern, founded in 1951, is the public development 
bank of the Free State of Bavaria. 
(ii) Bayern Kapital GmbH in Landshut is a public Bavarian venture capital 
FRPSDQ\IRXQGHGXQGHUWKHµ%DYDULDQ)XWXUH,QLWLDWLYH¶LQDVDZKROO\-
owned subsidiary of the LfA Förderbank Bayern. Bayern Kapital usually co-
LQYHVWVZLWKDSULYDWHOHDGLQYHVWRU7KHµ%D\HUQ.DSLWDOPRGHO¶VHHPVWREH
unique in Germany.  
(iii) BayBG is a private enterprise and has been active in the Bavarian venture 
capital market for 42 years.  
(iv) S-Refit, founded in 1990, is a private company (with municipal shareholders 
via the savings banks) based in Regensburg. S-Refit covers the private 
sector in Eastern Bavaria. 
x The public bank LfA was directly assigned to run the loan scheme. Loans are 
distributed via local banks, which assess applications and conclude loan contracts 
with final recipients. The loans support in-house innovation in eligible businesses.  
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x The venture capital funds were established by open tender. For the ERDF Cluster 
Fund (Bayern Kapital), it took eight months to get approval for the 70:30 
financing model, rather than the standard 50:50. This model is very attractive for 
business angels but requires a separate notification process through DG 
Competition. It took around one year between tender and award to establish the 
S-Refit Risk Capital Fund I. 
x Management costs and fees range between 0.5% (2010-2015) per year for the 
loan funds, and 3.0% per year for the risk capital funds. Technical assistance was 
not used to develop the FIs.  
x All these FIs have a commercial strategy and seek financial sustainability.  
x According to the MA and the institutions managing the four FIs, implementation 
experiences are largely positive. Some challenges, however, relate to ERDF 
administrative requirements, which can be burdensome. There is a perception that 
the administrative burden imposed on FIs is much greater than for grants. 
Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
x The MA initiated a mid-term evaluation, which included an assessment of FI 
implementation. The focus was on adequacy of the FI approach and on assessing 
the first detectable effects. For the 2014-2020 programme period, recent ex-ante 
assessments have included ex-post-reviews of the three venture capital 
instruments and the loan funds. This included an estimate of the leverage effects. 
x The indicators collected by the MA cover financial and output indicators and a 
limited set of result indicators (jobs, total investments volume). Outcomes on 
company growth, turnover, sales or indicators on the horizontal priorities 
(sustainability, equality) were not recorded by the monitoring system. Lean 
PRQLWRULQJ DYRLGV µGDWD FHPHWHULHV¶ VDYLQJ FRVWV DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH EXUGHQ IRU
the implementing bodies.  
x There are clearly defined reporting provisions between fund managers and the MA 
on the output and result indicators and data provision. Monitoring data are 
available on fund absorption. The financial agreements contain definitions of 
reporting provisions with regular reports to monitor financial absorption, including 
DQDXGLWRU¶VVWDWHPHQW 
x Unfortunately, achievements on employment and value added have not yet been 
documented due to some projects still being in progress. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
x The three risk capital funds leveraged investment capital by a factor of between 
4.9 (ERDF Cluster Fund) and 20.4 (Risk capital Fund I - S-Refit). However, such 
leverage should be interpreted cautiously, especially in comparison to each other. 
Leverage for Risk Capital Fund I appears to be particularly high, but can be 
explained by the inclusion of the S-Refit med tech funds, which was counted as an 
additional private contribution (Prognos 2014). 
x The loan fund Investivkredit 100 Pro (LfA) has already revolved around 25% 
(second round). This suggests that the fund serves its purpose. However it is too 
early to confirm that Investivkredit 100 Pro will operate sustainably with fees and 
interest being sufficient to cover default risk and costs. 
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x It is not yet clear how profitable the risk capital fund will be by its scheduled 
closure at the end of 2015. The fund managers expect the fund to show a profit 
E\WKDWWLPH(5')¶VDGGHGYDOXHZDVFUXFLDOIURPWKHYLHZSRLQWRIYHQWXUHFDSLWDO
fund stakeholders. Without ERDF funds, it would not have been possible to 
achieve a critical mass of venture capital. 
x Networking support was an important added value for equity funds. The fund 
managers and their networks made access to new investors and markets much 
easier. In addition, knowledge of strategic issues was transferred, leading to more 
transparency in local markets and more local policy coordination. The fund 
managers are also very involved in establishing regional business support 
initiatives and business angel networks in economically struggling sub-regions. 
x The main result indicator is for job creation in less economically advanced regions 
and border areas in line with the Cohesion goal pursued by the programme. In 
total, 1,200 jobs should be created and 2,500 safeguarded, especially in 
technology but also in more conventional sectors such as crafts and retail. 
According to the MA, it is too early to demonstrate the actual job effects because 
all four funds are currently still in the implementation phase and no final 
examination has been made. A simple extrapolation estimate, based on data from 
the mid-term evaluation, suggests either moderate success or an over-optimistic 
ex-ante forecast. There is some preliminary indication that traditional grants are 
more effective in creating jobs. 
x With respect to outcomes beyond financial absorption, there are major gaps in the 
result chain, which are partly due to data protection regulations. Positive effects 
on innovation capacity and the competitiveness of supported enterprises are 
assumed but cannot be assessed due to a lack of published data. Key 
stakeholders argue that all instruments have generated positive effects in addition 
to job creation; however, the evidence is too weak to prove any such effects. 
x )RUWKHµ,QYHVWLYNUHGLW3UR¶ ORDQIXQG/I$PRQLWRULQJGDWDDQGLQIRUPDWLRQ
are available on financial distribution across the target areas. There are also 
unofficial estimates of job effects per sector and gender. However, these are not 
sufficiently reliable. A first analysis, based on data from the mid-term evaluation, 
indicates that cost per job supported by the loan scheme is 2.9 times higher (EUR 
696 000 per job) than one supported by the grant scheme (EUR 242 000 per job). 
The open question is therefore whether this can be comprehensively explained by 
systematic differences between grant recipients and loan recipients. 
x In the 2011 mid-term evaluation, a counterfactual analysis was carried out on the 
employment effects of the FIs. The evaluators found some evidence that 
employment effects were significant for final recipients ± but only those addressed 
by venture capital.  
x A retrospective ToC viewing the transmission mechanism along with the 
intervention logic at a micro-economic scale remains fuzzy. A ToC may be re-
constructed at the overall policy level (goals of cohesion policy). 
x In general, the mix of monitoring data and interview-based information on FI 
implementation suggests progress in terms of employment, sales/turnover and 
innovation capacity but due to the lack of micro-datasets on enterprises, such 
impacts cannot be quantified or precisely defined. It is not yet possible to show 
that FIs, notably loans, have encouraged more growth than traditional enterprise 
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grants. In fact, preliminary early data extrapolation suggests the opposite. In 
RUGHUWRVKHGOLJKWRQWKLVSRWHQWLDOµRSSRUWXQLW\FRVW¶LVVXHDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRI
the different types of enterprises addressed by the different instruments is 
recommended, e.g. by cluster and MANOVA87/discriminant analysis in addition to a 
counterfactual comparison analysis.  
  
                                          
87 Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)  
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6.10.9 Hungary 
Before the launch of the JEREMIE programme there were a wide variety of government-
funded FIs targeting SMEs (some 20 programmes per year, each offering different 
financial products). Some of these instruments were co-funded by the EIB and the EBRD, 
and some of them were part of the PHARE programme. The JEREMIE products introduced 
in 2007 were the first to be co-financed by the ERDF. There had been large overlaps in 
the aims and target groups of the various financial instruments when they were running 
under different conditions. In some cases, they even competed with each other. The high 
number of products led to costly and inefficient delivery, and some of the sector-oriented 
FIs introduced unreasonable market distortions.  
During the 2007-2013 programming period, all OPs with an SME development focus offer 
JEREMIE type FIs. National authorities were and still are in charge of programming and 
implementation. This is also the case for the seven regional OPs, which have one 
common central managing authority. Most of the support is administered through loans 
or venture capital funds. 
Table 33: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Hungary in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Economic Development'   163 727.1 618.0 20.9 0.0 710.9 601.6 84.6 0
OP 'West Pannon'   1 6.8 5.8 8.4 0.0 6.8 2.1 31.5 0
OP 'South Great Plain'   1 6.8 5.8 4.4 0.0 6.8 2.6 38.8 0
OP 'Central Transdanubia'   1 6.8 5.8 7.0 0.0 6.8 3.8 56.3 0
OP 'North Hungary'   1 6.8 5.8 4.4 0.0 6.8 1.8 26.5 0
OP 'North Great Plain'   1 6.8 5.8 3.7 0.0 6.8 3.1 45.6 0
OP 'South Transdanubia'   1 6.8 5.8 7.6 0.0 6.8 2.2 31.9 0
OP 'Central Hungary'   53 147.8 125.7 25.3 0.0 145.0 135.1 93.2 0
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6.10.10 Case Study OP Economic Development  
The FIs under scrutiny 
The FIs concentrated on small loans, guarantees and venture capital schemes. The first 
loan schemes were introduced under Priority Axis 4 (PA 4) of the EDOP in 2007. There 
were two schemes in 2007 and in 2014, and another four introduced in 2010. The 
guarantee schemes varied less across the programme period than the loan schemes. 
Venture capital investments were exclusively for new, innovative start-ups, with special 
emphasis on firms in need of seed capital.  
Targets for the credit schemes were very narrow in the first half of the implementation 
period (2007-2010), focusing only on micro-businesses with no specific sectoral or 
geographical targeting. From April 2010 onward, small companies could also apply for 
loans, followed by medium-sized companies in January 2013. There was a similar shift 
with venture capital funds. 
7KHYDULRXVVFKHPHV¶ILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHVGLIIHUVLJQLILFDQWO\7KHORDQVFKHPHVKDYH
disbursed 122% of allocated funds, followed by the guarantee schemes with 64% and 
the VC schemes with 53%.  
While the credit schemes have overperformed their targets, the guarantee and VC 
schemes had a very slow take-up and consequently, slower allocation. There are many 
reasons for the different performance:  
x institutional, due to the time-consuming set-up process in the first half of the 
programming period; 
x contextual, due to post-crisis effects; and  
x VWUDWHJLF ZLWK KLJKHU GHPDQG IRU FUHGLW VFKHPHV HVSHFLDOO\ IRU WKH µ&RPELQHG
MicrocrediW¶VFKHPHZKLFKSURYLGHGVLPXOWDQHRXVDFFHVVWRERWKUHIXQGDEOHDQG
non-refundable support within the scheme. 
There was a breakthrough in 2010 and 2011, after which the credit schemes and venture 
capital schemes accelerated disbursements. One reason was the new Combined 
Microcredit scheme, which combined small loans and grants for micro and small 
businesses. This FI scheme has turned out to be the top JEREMIE-type product in 
Hungary. Secondly, from 2010 onwards several amendments were introduced, resulting 
in some stringent credit conditions being significantly relaxed, such as: 
x increasing the maximum credit thresholds and refinancing rates per type of 
financial intermediary;  
x fixing the interest rate threshold at 9%;  
x increasing the duration for both investment and working capital loans;  
x decreasing the required co-investment.  
Within the credit schemes, financial entreprises and local economic development 
agencies (LEDAs) were the most active intermediaries for the number of operations 
Ex-post evaluation Financial Instruments for enterprise support (WP 3) 
page 166  
(80%). Notably, from 2012, both financial enterprises and LEDAs concentrated on the 
Combined Microcredit scheme. 
Credit institutions could offer guarantees during the first EDOP implementation, but 
interest was very limited, particularly from banks. The average guarantee was close to 
EUR 10,000 (HUF 3 million) but there were only 1,140 operations by the end of 2014. 
While 15 banks and 28 savings cooperatives offered the portfolio guarantee scheme, 
from 2008 to 2013, when it was phased out, the counter-guarantee scheme was highly 
centralised, provided first by the HF, followed by the publicly-owned garantor 
organisation, Garantiqua Ltd from 2011.  
Although the conditions for the guarantee schemes were substantially relaxed during 
implementation by, for example, raising the trigger threshold for defaulting portfolios and 
easing rules on collateral, the slow progress of these schemes can be explained by: 
(a) restrictive regulatory rules, for example: 
(i) restrictions on coupling JEREMIE-type credit schemes with guarantee 
schemes at final recipient level; 
(ii) double financing rules; 
(iii) limiting guarantees to only investment loans;  
 
(b) low demand for guarantee schemes by final recipients, for example:  
(i) lack of information on the benefits of the schemes; 
(ii) ORZWUXVWLQWKHFRQGLWLRQV¶SUHGLFWDELOLW\ 
The 23 VC funds financed 198 projects, with an average of EUR 1.17 million for New 
Hungary, EUR 1.27 million for New Széchényi VC funds and EUR 147,000 for New 
Széchényi Seed Capital. After slow take up in the first years (2009-2010), the number of 
fund managers and volume of disbursements steadily increased after 2010. Improved 
macroeconomic conditions in the second half of the progamme period contributed 
significantly to this upward trend.  
The context in which FIs were introduced 
Slow economic growth in the Hungarian regions meant there was little if any 
convergence in the 2007-2013 period. Structural challenges to growth and signs of 
recession were already evident before the economic crisis hit in 2009. 
Throughout the programme period, the main macroeconomic indicators were weaker 
than for other countries in the Central and Eastern European region, such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia. This underperformance was coupled with widening 
territorial inequalities. 
Goals and theory of change (ToC)  
The main strategic objectives of the EDOP FIs were to: 
(1) provide access to finance for SMEs with a viable business plan or feasible 
investment ideas; and  
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(2) promote start-ups with innovative potential.  
There was no specific geographical or sectoral targeting. In addition to the SME policy 
objectives, the interventions were also aimed at market-making and market facilitation 
where SME financing was underdeveloped, such as microcredit, or in effect non-existent, 
such as seed and venture capital.  
The long-term FI targets are vaguely defined in the OP documents, i.e. promoting growth 
and job creation. The programme documents also lack any explanation of how to achieve 
these goals.  
Although the strategic goals are consistent with the ex-ante gap analysis and justified by 
other analyses, absorption pressures dominated the second half of the programming 
period. These resulted in slight changes to targets, including amendments to the credit 
schemes, relaxing screening by allowing companies with a credit history access to the 
funds and easing the conditions of the schemes.  
For the second strategic objective, the programme encouraged a large number of 
financial intermediaries, to generate competition and to ensure efficiency with several 
types of private and public fund managers. These intentions have been justified, 
especially with seed capital.  
7KH0$¶VPRWLYDWLRQVKLIWHGGXULQJ WKHSURJUDPPLQJSHULRG7KHSODQQLQJSURFHVVZDV
driven by the efficiency of support instruments to simplify market entry, promote new 
intermediaries and foster competition. In the second half of the programming period, 
absorption became more important.  
The combined microcredit scheme was very successful. Combinations with non-financial 
support were not developed at programme level but this practice is common with some 
fund managers, such as LEDAs. 
Management and implementation of FIs 
The governance structure does not obviously match the structure in EU regulations. This 
was one of the biggest challenges to clarify according to the government representatives 
interviewed. Adaptation of EU regulations to the national context required a lot of effort 
due to the unique approach of the national authorities.  
The bottom line of the ongoing controversy was that the high number of implementing 
bodies did not mean a corresponding high number of FIs. In total, the country ran 11 
different FI schemes managed by one MA, one central Holding Fund and 137 financial 
intermediaries. The schemes used standardised calls and funding agreements.  
There were five types of intermediaries: a guarantee institute, Garantiqa Ltd, (exclusively 
offering the counter-guarantee scheme), credit institutions (banks and saving 
cooperatives), financial enterprises, LEDAs, and VC funds. Funding agreements differed 
for each of these groups, including the interest rate and the maximum disbursement. The 
approaches were quite different, with credit institutions showing little interest in 
promoting the support products, whereas many of the financial enterprises were founded 
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with the purpose of acting as fund manager. These financial enterprises and LEDAs 
offered FIs across the whole country. 
Banks were highly underrepresented, mainly due to:  
(a) a low maximum for loans of around EUR 166,000 (up to 2013);  
(b) perceptions of high administrative and reporting costs; and  
(c) complexity of procedural rules in the funding agreements. 
The MA and the Holding Fund relied on performance-based incentives to calculate next-
phase allocations to the financial intermediaries. So-FDOOHGµSDUWQHU-OLPLWV¶ZHUHEDVHd on 
past performance. Although these limits were raised during implementation, they proved 
to be good benchmarks for assessing beneficiary performance and helped to reduce 
implementation risk through the sequential allocation of the funds.  
The key performance incentive for venture capital funds was the asymmetric loss and 
revenue-sharing system, where the Holding Fund takes losses above a low limit, but does 
benefit less than proportional from the revenues.  
The Holding Fund was established in the summer of 2007. The various calls took from 
four weeks to four months to prepare for credit schemes and up to 1½ years for some VC 
schemes. Some loan and guarantee schemes were very quickly established, but were 
modified during implementation.  
HF management costs were on average EUR 1.47 million per year and totalled EUR 10.32 
million at the end of 2013. The annual management fee for the intermediaries is fixed at 
5% for all FIs in Hungary. How this compares to the actual (or planned) cost is still 
unknown, but it seems that these management fees are significantly above the market 
and are among the highest in all case studies. 
Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
The monitoring system focuses on operative indicators and uses a specific scoring model 
from the HF managers to assess the soundness and health of the portfolios. Performance 
data at the level of final recipients is based on self-reporting rather than on government 
databases.  
Programme- and priority-level indicators are poorly designed for almost all types of 
monitoring and strategic indicators. Values are missing in several AIRs for several 
LQGLFDWRUV IRU LQVWDQFH LQ WKH  $,5 IRU µ$ccess of financial mediation in the SME 
VHFWRU¶ )RU  DQG and there is no methodological guide on the meaning and 
interpretation of the values. During the interviews the MA and fund managers were 
obviously uncertain about indicators. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
7KH PDMRULW\ RI FUHGLW VFKHPHV ZHUH IRU LQYHVWPHQW ORDQV ZLWK WZR µRXWOLHU¶
intermediaries, banks and credit cooperatives, which concentrated their efforts mostly on 
working capital loans to businesses. The average amount of the loans varied substantially 
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across schemes and type of financial intermediary, also depending on the scheme. In 
general, the investment pattern was:  
x credit institutions, i.e. banks and credit cooperatives focused on SMEs with larger 
volumes. Both the average and median loan amounts are significantly higher for 
banks, e.g. EUR 83,000 for the average and EUR 42,000 as the median loan; 
x financial entreprises took the chance to invest primarily in micro- and small 
entreprises with substantially smaller needs; 
x LEDAs concentrated on micro- and small businesses with very low average loan 
size, e.g. under EUR 20,000 and occasionally with more personalised services, 
such as mentoring and coaching in business planning - at least, with the most 
successful local agencies.  
The top sectors benefiting from the credit and guarantee schemes were commerce, 
manufacturing and tourism, compared to firms with a strong Research and Development 
profile for venture capital funds. 
The EDOP and its PA 4 was designed specifically to support SMEs and enterprise 
development in the Convergence regions. Although FIs were already widely used in 
Hungary in the 2000s (financed by national funds), this was the first time that Cohesion 
Policy introduced JEREMIE instruments as an alternative to the non-refundable support 
used exclusively in the previous programme period. This new PA under the economic 
development programme was planned to be a large-scale pilot initiative to see how 
microcredit, small loans and guarantees could perform better than grants in terms of 
financing micro- and small firms and in terms of cost-efficiency. 
The EDOP was successful with a high commitment rate (over 90%). In 2014, over 90% 
of final recipients were micro and small firms, 64% of them with no credit history. These 
figures are very much in line with the initial intentions.  
By the end of 2014 there were 13,055 final recipients under PA 4, with close to 14,000 
transactions. Regional allocation of funds was relatively balanced, and monitoring data 
also suggest that almost 62,000 new jobs were created by 2013 for the whole EDOP, but 
there were no separate data available for FIs.  
According to our estimates, EUR 1 contributed by ERDF funds generated EUR 1.42 of 
total public and private capital investment.  
It is hard to assess the effectiveness of the interventions in terms of result and impact 
indicators since all the FI schemes are still in progress (only 25% of the 14,000 
transactions were closed by the end of 2014). Nevertheless, the official AIR 2014 reports 
on some of the result indicators ± such as:  
x the decrease in micro enterprises and SMEs without access to loans by 5.8% by 
2013 under PA 4 (target value: 12.8 % decrease by 2015). 
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x improved access to financial mediation for SMEs by 4.2%points change in the 
share of SMEs having access by the end of 2013 (target: +10% points change by 
2015).  
Unfortunately, the source of these data and the calculation methods are not clearly 
specified in the official reports. Nevertheless, the SMAF index for Hungary between 2007 
and 2014 shows that the overall score for Hungary has improved, rising from 81 to 95. 
The SMAF debt sub-index and the SMAF equity finance sub-index performed even better, 
hitting the EU baseline in 2013 with a score of 103. 
These figures suggest a slow convergence in SME financing and a slowly closing gap in 
the Hungarian financial markets. Further analysis is required with regard to: 
(a) sustainability of the improvement in both the credit and equity financing 
indicators; and  
(b) the effective contribution that EDOP FIs generate in terms of growth and 
productivity at the micro enterprise level.  
Counterfactual impact assessments should answer these questions after the programme 
is closed.  
In our interviews, both government and market stakeholders emphasised the significant 
market-making effect generated by the venture capital funds and a potential market-
clearing effect for SME microcredits. They also pointed to some indirect effects, such as 
the start-up network linked to the interventions, improved market know-how of FIs and 
positive perceptions of these instruments. 
The added value of FI implementation in Hungary is clearly reflected in the quick revival 
of the Hungarian VC market after the 2008 financial crisis. Without the EDOP measures, 
the market would be much more limited. 
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6.10.11 Italy 
Italy has a lengthy tradition of FIs within domestic enterprise support policy. In addition, 
FIs were used extensively by ERDF OPs to support enterprises in the 2007-2013 period.  
There are 19 OPs using FIs in Italy, out of 28 regional competitiveness and employment 
(RCE) and convergence programmes. FIs are less used by multiregional and national 
programmes (2 OPs out of 7), while they are used by all convergence OPs except OP 
µ6LFLO\¶The RCE programmes not using FIs are 'Valle d'Aosta', 'Autonomous Province of 
Trento' and 'Autonomous Province of Bolzano'. 
As in other EU countries, OP contributions are in some cases invested in the capital of 
existing legal entities dedicated to implementing FIs consistently with ERDF objectives.  
Confidi is one example of the mutual or co-operative consortia working at the local level 
on a quasi-commercial basis to provide loan guarantees to their members. 
The large majority of FIs for enterprise support are implemented without a Holding Fund 
(HF) and 61 of the FIs are specific funds (NHFs). HFs are used by seven OPs with a total 
of just 12 FEIs. This indicates the very limited number of FIs under each HF as only HFs 
in OP 'Campania' and 'Latium' have more than one. Interestingly, OP 'Calabria', OP 
'Latium' and OP 'Lombardia' set up both FEI and specific funds (NHFs), suggesting the 
need to adopt different implementation mechanisms to address local enterprise needs. 
FIs co-financed by Italian ERDF OPs offer loans, guarantees, and equity. Guarantee and 
loan schemes prevail, being offered by 11 and 10 OPs respectively. Equity is offered 
through seven instruments by six OPs (OPs 'Emilia-Romagna region', 'Latium', 'Liguria', 
'Tuscany', 'Veneto' and 'Sardinia'). A limited number of schemes provide non-financial 
support alongside the FI, usually as conventional advice and management support. 
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Table 34: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Italy in the 2007-2013 
period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency'   8 356.0 267.0 - 0.0 356.0 6.0 1.7 413
OP 'Research and Competitiveness'   9 1,115.5 836.6 30.8 - 1,115.5 411.3 36.9 21,046
OP 'Attrattori culturali, naturali e turismo' 3 110.0 81.6 - - 110.0 22.6 20.6 3,057
OP 'Calabria'   4 121.7 91.3 49.1 0.0 121.7 4.1 3.4 36
OP 'Campania'   6 430.0 326.3 66.1 - 400.0 66.4 16.6 469
OP 'Puglia'   17 298.2 186.6 30.2 0.0 298.2 60.7 20.4 -
OP 'Basilicata'   2 32.0 15.7 29.1 0.0 29.0 0.0 0.0 5
OP 'Abruzzo'   1 32.1 12.1 18.8 - 32.1 2.6 7.9 489
OP 'Emilia-Romagna region'   3 31.5 7.7 5.5 10.5 24.3 - - -
OP 'Friuli Venezia Giulia'   1 22.0 7.0 24.2 0.0 22.0 21.2 96.3 119
OP 'Latium'   9 145.5 72.8 47.7 - 145.5 56.3 38.7 3,695
OP 'Liguria'   3 73.8 20.2 25.4 10.0 73.8 15.7 21.2 77
OP 'Lombardia'   5 145.8 57.8 59.5 - 145.8 53.1 36.4 387
OP 'Marche'   2 17.0 6.6 12.4 - 17.0 - - -
OP 'Molise'   2 30.6 11.3 40.4 - 30.6 10.5 34.4 197
OP 'Piemonte'   4 100.0 39.6 18.6 0.0 100.0 65.2 65.2 3,934
OP 'Tuscany'   5 226.4 60.9 30.7 26.7 206.5 156.0 75.6 2,674
OP 'Umbria'   1 44.9 14.7 19.8 10.8 44.9 13.4 29.9 391
OP 'Veneto'   6 121.8 56.0 52.3 0.0 121.8 231.8 190.3 346
OP 'Sardinia'   3 300.2 212.0 69.3 0.0 296.9 64.4 21.7 2,846
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6.10.12 Lithuania 
Prior to 2007±2013 programming period, SMEs benefited from two FIs ± guarantees for 
loans and microcredits. These instruments were financed from national funds as well as 
the PHARE programme.  
ERDF±financed FIs were first introduced in the 2007±2013 programming period. All 
ERDF±ILQDQFHG ),V IRU HQWHUSULVHV DUH FRYHUHG E\ 23 µ(FRQRPLF *URZWK¶ 2QH ), IRU
HQWHUSULVHV LV ILQDQFHG IURP (6) µ3URPRWLQJ (QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶ XQGHU 23 µ+XPDQ
5HVRXUFHV 'HYHORSPHQW¶ 2QH 23 GRHV QRW FRQWDLQ ),V IRU HQWHUSULVHV 23 µ&RKHVLRQ
3URPRWLRQ¶ DV WKLV LV for infrastructure development. The Ministry of Economy is 
responsible for programming and implementation of ERDF±financed FIs for enterprises. 
Support is overwhelmingly in the form of loans, followed by guarantees and venture 
capital. No non-financial support is offered in pure loan or pure guarantee schemes. All 
venture capital schemes include business advice, management support and in one case, 
networking activities. The Promotion Entrepreneurship Fund (L + G + O) offers business 
advice and consulting, support for the preparation of business plans and training. 
Table 35: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Lithuania in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Economic Growth'  26 265.8 265.8 25.1 0.0 265.8 236.1 88.8 5,573
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6.10.13 Case Study OP Economic Growth  
Implementation of financial instruments (FIs) in Lithuania was largely determined by the 
economic crisis that struck the country in 2008. Another important stimulus was the 
arrival of a new government that opted to use FIs extensively as the principal means of 
stimulating economic recovery.  
Before the crisis, the market gaps and corresponding intervention through FIs could be 
considered marginal. The crisis increased the market gaps and FIs have been at the 
forefront in addressing the demands of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that 
were unable to access external financing. In contrast to the Theory of Change (ToC), 
innovation did not play a key role in FI implementation under the Operational Programme 
(OP) Economic Growth. Instead, FIs have been increasingly used by SMEs for dealing 
with the lack of working capital, rather than for investment. 
This case study highlights the relevance of the financial market assessment in the 
definition of the ToC and the evaluation of FI implementation. Specific characteristics of 
financial systems, such as system stability, or the variability of credit conditions and the 
cost of credit, should also be considered in market gap assessments. 
7KHVWDWHDJHQF\,19(*$,QYHVWLFLMžLUYHUVORJDUDQWLMRV+ROGLQJ)XQG+)PDQDJHU
played an increasingly important role in the implementation of FIs. JEREMIE (Joint 
European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises), the other HF, was managed by the 
European Investment Fund (EIF). 
The FI under scrutiny 
The OP Economic Growth is the largest Lithuanian OP from the 2007±2013 period, with 
an allocation of EUR 3.08 billion. This OP finances investments in research and 
technological development, development of the information society and economic and 
transport infrastructure. FIs for enterprises are supported under Priority Axis (PA) 2 
µ,QFUHDVLQJEXVLQHVVSURGXFWLYLW\DQG LPSURYLQJ WKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW¶ ,Q WRWDO
FIs (HF not included) have been implemented, grouped into nine schemes. Support 
through FIs is predominantly in the form of loans (15 products), with guarantees (4 
products) and venture capital (VC) (5 products). This variety of schemes has many banks 
broadly involved, which in turn makes the FIs accessible to more SMEs. FIs are not the 
only form of finance under Priority Axis 2. Non±repayable assistance (grants) for 
enterprises are provided, for example, for investment in equipment and technology, new 
IT management solutions and activities to boost exports. 
Goals and ToC of implemented FIs 
The FIs were designed to address the lack of external financing for SMEs. Having 
financial resources available for business investment was expected to also contribute to 
the broad policy objectives of long±term economic growth and an increase in labour 
productivity. In a 2007 EIF study, a market gap was identified: loans, guarantees and 
equity. However, the study could not anticipate the increased demand for working capital 
due to the economic crisis. Different reactions to this change were key factors in the 
implementation of FIs during the 2007±2013 period. 
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While all FIs in the OP Economic Growth are aimed at increasing SME access to finance, 
different FIs address different problems. The large variety of FI products has ensured 
widespread use of the schemes.  
Despite the variety and differentiation of FIs, the documented ToC is very simple and 
incomplete. All FIs are aimed at SMEs, which correspond to the expected short term 
result expressed in the ToC (improvement in SME access to financing sources). Start±
ups, innovation±oriented enterprises and SMEs in underdeveloped regions are mentioned 
in programme documents as the recipients in greatest need of support. However, neither 
the selection criteria for final recipients nor the monitoring indicators reported to the 
Managing Authority (MA) distinguish particular groups of SMEs. There is an overlap 
between loan and guarantee schemes since they provide very similar products to final 
recipients. Only a few products make unique offers. For example, Practica Seed Capital 
KUB is the only risk capital fund investing exclusively in seed and start-up capital. This 
indicates a weak ToC. Additionally, meaningful intermediate results for the FI target 
group are missing. FIs mainly target national macro-economic development goals, rather 
than regional or sectoral ones. 
The clearest inconsistency between the ToC and FI implementation was SME use of FI 
funds. The programme documentation identified the need for investment in modern 
technology and equipment. However, the crisis caused a shift in the purpose and form of 
FIs, which were often used to help SMEs survive difficult economic conditions. 
Management and implementation 
The overall governance structure is adequately developed and stable. FIs under the OP 
Economic Growth are implemented through two HFs (INVEGA and JEREMIE HF) and one 
fund without a HF (Guarantee Fund). INVEGA HF and the Guarantee Fund are managed 
by the INVEGA public agency, while the JEREMIE HF is managed by the EIF. HF 
managers are responsible for selecting financial intermediaries through tenders, as well 
as for implementing the investment strategy and financial engineering schemes. The 
Ministry of Finance is the MA and the Ministry of Economy is the Intermediate Body. The 
MA  
(a) Participates in the selection of HF and specific fund (Guarantee Fund) managers 
(together with the Intermediate Body); 
(b) supervises HF activities and 
(c) reimburses payment applications submitted by the Intermediate Body. 
The Intermediate Body: 
(a) oversees the implementation of financial engineering measures; 
(b) approves specific schemes and 
(c) participates in the selection and supervision of the HF and fund managers.  
Fund managers (financial intermediaries) are responsible for implementation of the 24 
FIs. There are 16 different fund managers in Lithuania; most of them are private 
companies (banks). Management costs and fees are very different depending on the 
nature of the FI and the operating body. 
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The overall financial performance of the FIs is good (with the exception of risk capital 
funds, which at the end of 2013 were in the middle of their investment period). Up to the 
end of 2013, EUR 278 million of ERDF funds had been paid to FIs, equalling the total 
ERDF allocation to FIs under OP Economic Growth. 
Co-investment plays an important part in the implementation of a range of FI schemes. 
Considerable private money was attracted to the Guarantee Funds (leverage 500%). In 
loan and VC funds there was only minimal private money (around 150%). In absolute 
numbers, by the end of 2013, EUR 274 million of private money had been co-invested 
(72% of OP target) and nearly equals the European Union (EU) funds. 
$Q LQGLFDWLRQ IRU UHYROYLQJ IXQGV LVJLYHQ LQ IRXU),V³6PDOO ORDQV WR60(V ± 6WDJH´
implemented by four different fund managers). In total EUR 23.7 million had revolved by 
the end of 2013. However, in most FIs the ratio between the funds invested in final 
recipients and the original fund size was below 100%. 
One of the main implementation issues that the HF manager and the Intermediate Body 
stress is the fact that there are still unclear regulations regarding the combination of FIs 
and grants. Some FI schemes were unattractive for financial intermediaries due to very 
detailed implementation rules. However, final recipients did not encounter difficult 
administrative procedures when applying for FI support.  
The cost-efficiency of FIs and grants was evaluated in 2014. However, there were no 
clear conclusions as the instruments are too different. FIs were more attractive to final 
recipients than grants. Enterprises that benefited from grants had to dedicate three to 
four times more time to project preparation and implementation than enterprises which 
used FIs. 
The large number of ERDF±financed FIs of different size on offer in Lithuania is 
considered best practice from the point of accessibility since SMEs can mix different FIs 
for maximum benefit. The scale of an FI is a poor predictor of its performance. The 
Lithuanian experience shows that small FIs can be very effective in filling a market gap. 
Monitoring and Evaluation of FIs 
Key indicators reported by HF managers are the number of SMEs supported and private 
investment attracted. These are OP±level indicators and their accuracy can be checked 
by the steering committee, especially if there are inconsistencies in the data. INVEGA 
also publishes profitability, liquidity and other indicators in its performance report. 
Although these are reported per institution, as opposed to the separate funds run by 
INVEGA, they are significant because almost all INVEGA activities are ERDF-financed FIs. 
Some important information on final recipients has not been reported. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
FIs clearly contributed to financing for around 7% of SMEs in Lithuania. Accordingly an 
important OP objective ´Increase SME access to finance´ was achieved. 
Up to the end of 2013, 4,720 SMEs benefited from FIs (83% of target and 7.2% of all 
SMEs in Lithuania). Loans and guarantees provided by FIs (both EU and private funds) 
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made up 7.2% of the business loans from Lithuanian banks at the end of 2013. Based on 
European Commission (EC) summary data, 38% of final recipients were micro±
enterprises. This is a high percentage, considering that micro±enterprises were not 
targeted in programme documentation. In addition, micro±enterprises also benefited 
from the Entrepreneurship Promotion Fund that was co-financed by the European 
Structural Fund (ESF). FIs financed under OP Economic Growth attracted EUR 274 million 
of private investment (72% of target). It is also worth noting that targets for both these 
indicators were increased during the programme period due to the good results. These 
new targets should be reached or almost reached by the end of 2015. 
Despite the delayed uptake of ERDF funds the boost to equity products in Lithuania is a 
major achievement. The main added value of ERDF VC funds as compared to private 
funds is their orientation to early stage investments (seed and start±up). There is some 
data on the performance of final recipients of equity funds. Total turnover increased by 
43% and the number of employees by 12%, while losses fell by 71%.  
In general, effects on turnover, job creation, innovation capacity and competitiveness of 
final recipients have not been systematically measured due to gaps in the intervention 
logic of the FIs. Although some enterprises were able to improve technology and upgrade 
their business processes, FIs were extensively used for financing working capital. 
During the crisis, targeted selection of final recipients for FI support was abandoned in 
favour of a broad approach to help enterprises survive. Overall, only a minor share of 
investments was made in innovative enterprises. FIs were extensively used to finance 
working capital. 
A 2014 evaluation of the impact of EU structural assistance on SMEs was the first to 
assess the impact of FIs in Lithuania. According to the counterfactual impact evaluation, 
RQO\RQHRIWKHWZRVFKHPHVDQDO\VHGµLQYHVWPHQWFUHGLWVSURYLGHGXQGHUVPDOOORDQVWR
60(V¶± Stage 2) significantly increased the number of employees and annual turnover of 
final recipients. However, working capital credits provided under the same scheme did 
not have the same effect. 
Broader policy goals also have not been as successful. In 2013, investment in fixed 
capital formation was 18% of GDP (61% of target) a decrease compared to 23% in 2005, 
three years before the crisis. 
As a percentage of the EU15 average, labour productivity improved in the 2007±2013 
programme period, from 53% of the EU15 average in 2007 to 65% in 2012 which was 
101% of the target.  However, there has been no impact evaluation assessing the effect 
of FIs on labour productivity. The effect of the economic and financial crisis on wages was 
probably more important than intervention through FIs.  
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6.10.14 Poland 
In Poland the first FIs supporting SMEs were loan and guarantee funds established in the 
¶V. These were mostly regional or local with active involvement from regional and 
local public authorities and socio-economic partners. Foreign financial aid and know-how 
transfer from Western European countries, the USA, Canada and the World Bank 
facilitated government programmes supporting FIs in different regions.  
EU support in the pre-accession period (i.e. PHARE 2000-2003) further increased the 
capacity of loan and guarantee funds and facilitated development of a country-wide 
QHWZRUN8QGHUWKH(5')ILQDQFHG³,QFUHDVHRI(QWHUSULVHV¶&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV´QDWLRQDO23
of 2004-2006 the loan and guarantee funds were additionally capitalised. During both of 
those periods, the FI managers could be accredited by the Polish Agency for Enterprise 
Development (PAED) to participate in the National System of Services for SMEs. 
In 2007-2013 ERDF support to SME-targeted FIs was shared between the national and 
regional OPs. All programmes offering support to SMEs use FIs. The Cohesion Policy 
2007-2013 management system in Poland is centrally coordinated by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Development (MID) (formerly the Ministry of Regional Development), 
which is responsible for programming and supervising implementation of the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and the national OPs. There are 2 ERDF financed 
national OPs supporting SME-targeted FIs, ³,QQRYDWLYH (FRQRP\´ ,( DQG ³(DVWHUQ
PolDQG 'HYHORSPHQW´ (3' 7KHLU managing authorities are based in the MID and 
intermediate bodies are in line Ministries and central government units. There are also 16 
Regional OPs (ROP) programmed and managed by regional governments, such as the 
Regional Management Boards led by Marshalls, and the managing authorities are based 
in the Marshall Offices. 
The number of FIs supported in 2007-2013 in Poland is very high (211) compared to 
Member States with similar size, economic growth, population, level of entrepreneurship 
development, and decentralised territorial structure (many regional and local funds). 
Interestingly, some of the ROP financed FIs have received additional allocations from the 
managing authorities for implementation of further editions of the same FIs within the 
current programming period.    
The most typical forms of support in Poland include loans and guarantees, with only a 
few equity schemes. 
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Table 36: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Poland in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Innovative economy' 12 93.8 79.8 1.3 0.0 93.8 28.7 30.6 144
OP 'Development of Eastern Poland'   20 49.1 42.7 7.8 0.0 49.1 40.7 83.0 2,346
OP 'Lower Silesia'   22 99.3 99.3 36.4 0.0 99.3 109.5 110.3 4,764
OP 'Kujawsko-Pomorskie'   18 41.0 41.0 23.8 0.0 40.9 37.8 92.4 1,127
OP 'Lubelskie'   6 38.3 35.9 14.9 0.0 38.1 33.2 87.1 1,841
OP 'Lubuskie'   7 9.3 9.3 9.3 0.0 9.3 8.3 89.2 427
23
àyG]NLH
 14 44.8 29.1 12.8 0.0 44.8 45.4 101.4 539
OP 'Lesser Poland'   14 42.8 36.3 13.3 0.0 38.6 28.7 74.3 1,671
OP 'Mazovia'   14 30.0 22.7 6.1 0.0 30.0 33.1 110.2 1,148
OP 'Opolskie'   3 25.0 25.0 16.2 0.0 25.0 23.1 92.4 617
OP 'Podkarpackie'   9 30.9 26.2 10.8 0.0 30.9 25.1 81.3 2,698
OP 'Podlaskie'   6 31.3 31.3 18.6 0.0 31.3 30.9 98.7 833
OP 'Pomerania'   21 78.4 58.8 26.5 2.0 78.4 98.6 125.7 4,175
OP 'Zachodniopomorskie'   16 67.3 50.4 21.5 - 67.3 86.3 128.4 -
OP 'Greater Poland'   17 121.8 91.3 31.4 0.0 121.8 193.8 159.1 6,791
23
ĝZLĊWRNU]\VNLH
 7 35.4 29.1 17.2 0.0 35.4 31.1 87.7 795
OP 'Silesia'   4 20.4 16.6 5.3 3.8 20.4 12.0 58.9 336
OP 'Warminsko-Mazurskie'   2 30.5 30.5 13.1 0.0 29.8 30.3 101.7 1,141
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6.10.15 Case 6WXG\0DáRSROVND5HJLRQDO23 
The FIs under scrutiny 
The OP 0DáRSROVND 0523-2013 has a total budget of EUR 1.87 billion of which 
EUR 1.36 billion is from the ERDF. It is the key operational instrument for 
implementation of the region's development policy. The strategic objective of the 
programme is to facilitate economic growth and employment. 
6XSSRUW IRU HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS LV FRYHUHG E\ 3ULRULW\ $[LV 3$  µ5HJLRQDO 2SSRUWXQLW\
(FRQRP\¶ZLWKDWRWDOEXGJHWRI(85PLOOLRQ(5')(85PLOOLRQ, which is 21% 
RI WKH WRWDO23DQGRI WKH(5')DOORFDWLRQ7KH3$¶VRSHUDWLRQDOREMHFWLYHZDV WR
increase enterprise competitiveness. 
The overall ERDF allocation to FIs of EUR 35 million (21% of the PA and 2.6% of the OP 
ERDF allocation) is implemented under measure 2.1.D. The specific objective for the FIs 
is to provide small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with external, alternative 
sources of finance. Additionally, selected financial instruments are targeted to SMEs who 
have suffered from natural disasters, i.e. floods. These FIs are intended to assist these 
SMEs to reduce their risk of losing market position.  
Since 2009, 14 FIs were established under the MROP for loans (7 funds), guarantees (3 
funds) and loans to SMEs affected by natural disasters (4 funds). There were no equity 
funds. Fund volumes ranged from EUR 1.4 to EUR 4.9 million, with one regional 
guarantee fund of EUR 13.6 million being the only exception.  
All of the allocated capital had been disbursed by the end of 2014 and loan funds¶
resources started to revolve (at different speeds). One exception is the MARR fund for 
those affected by natural disasters, which has only disbursed 25% of its resources.  
The guarantee funds generally show a much lower level of performance. Disbursement 
from the OP to the funds was slightly under 50% and investment in final recipients 
ranged between 37% and 71% (at end 2014). 
Goals and theory of change (ToC) of FIs 
The specific objectives of the FIs were to provide SMEs with external finance and to 
strengthen institutional capacity within the region. Furthermore, SMEs affected by floods 
were supported to restore their market position. Providing additional financing for SME 
development addresses elements of the OP diagnosis and SWOT analysis, especially 
weak SMEs, low level of SME investment and a financial market not adjusted to SME 
needs. Since the financial gap assessment was not compulsory, the Managing Authority 
(MA) relied on knowledge and experience from fund managers prior to the 2007-2013 
period, wKLFK LGHQWLILHG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ QHHGV IRU ILQDQFLDO VXSSRUW Some 1,100 
enterprises should be supported with loans and guarantees, with a strong focus on 
micro-enterprises (740 projects targeted). 
The division of labour between the FIs is based on the territorial deployment of resources 
to fund managers in all the sub-UHJLRQVRI0DáRSROVNDPDNLQJWKRVHUHVRXUFHVDYDLODEOH
to final recipients locally. All the FIs offer support at all stages of enterprise development, 
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targeting all sectors and enterprises from the entire region. All SMEs can be supported, 
but most funds target micro-enterprises and a few schemes concentrated on particular 
sectors or territories, e.g. tourism, rural areas and small towns. 
7KH0$¶VPRWLYDWLRQWRLQWURGXFH(5')FR-financed FIs was to support SME activities that 
would not be eligible for grants due to State aid non-compliance. Furthermore, the 
revolving character of the funds, remaining within the regional business support 
institutions was another strong incentive. 
Fund managers do not offer FI support alongside non-repayable support yet they 
combine it frequently with non-financial support like advice and in some cases with 
grants from other OPs, e.g. Human Capital. In general the fund managers increase or 
invest their own capital, which often originates from revolved money (legacy funds). 
Management and implementation of FIs 
The MA chose direct implementation for FI delivery, and delegated this to the 
Intermediate Body (IB), MCP. All fund managers were recruited from the region in a 
competitive, transparent procedure of calls for applications. All fund managers are public 
and have previous experience of managing EU-funded FIs. The FI set-up process was not 
regarded as costly or time-consuming. The resources were usually made available to final 
recipients within three months of fund manager selection. 
By the end of 2014, the entire FI-dedicated OP allocation had been committed to the FIs. 
The OP contributions were completely paid to all the funds. On average, the FIs invested 
84% of the initial OP contributions in final recipients. All of the loan funds were 100% 
invested and resources started revolving. At the end of April 2015, those funds had 
generated from 130% to 315% of their initial OP payments in investments.  
Loan funds for SMEs affected by disasters had disbursed around 80% by the end of 2014. 
Three out of four funds invested 100% of their initial OP payments in final recipients, but 
one fund only invested around 21%. Some fund managers started revolving resources 
and at the end of April 2015, from 107% to 120% of their initial OP payments had been 
invested. 
The guarantee funds did not generally perform as well with an average at the end of 
2014 of slightly below 50% of the investment rate. None of them reached 100%.  
The FI portfolios are generally healthy. None of the FIs have recorded losses. The most 
serious implementation challenges were related to the eligibility of expenditure and low 
market demand for guarantees. Management costs in all the cases remain within the 
limits.  
There are no performance incentives for the fund managers beyond the management 
fee. They are mainly motivated by the increased capitalisation of the fund itself. 
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Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
The monitoring and reporting system is mostly focused on performance and 
implementation ensuring compliance with the regulatory and control framework, so not 
all data on achievements of OP strategic goals are available.  
The MROP reporting system includes three result indicators relevant for FIs, the value of 
loans or guarantees granted, the number of enterprises supported and jobs created. The 
latter only has data since 2012 and thus very likely underestimates the real job creation. 
There are no indicators which relate to the sectors of the final recipients, to investments 
induced or to SME turnover, which may impede assessment of the competitiveness 
outcomes of FI support. 
An evaluation study conducted in 2012 analysed the system and the main features of the 
individual instruments. However, this did not look into the effects of the FIs in relation to 
the strategic goals of MROP.  
Outcomes of FI implementation 
The FI system displays a differentiated picture of financial sustainability. The loan funds 
are revolving to a high degree whereas this is not the case for guarantee funds. However 
the entire allocation for all the FIs should be disbursed at least once by the end of 2015.  
All the FIs demonstrated a leverage effect averaging 1.25 and attracted at least EUR 
2.29 million of private investment by the end of 2014. However, these figures do not 
FRQWDLQVLJQLILFDQWDGGLWLRQDODPRXQWVRISULYDWH IXQGVVXFKDV WKH ILQDO UHFLSLHQWV¶RZQ
contribution to their projects, which could be up to 20%. Only a few fund managers 
contributed their own resources and then in low volumes.  
The establishment of 14 FIs directly from the MROP, some of them new, some 
recapitalised, was the main output and far above the target of four. The specific goal of 
developing the institutional potential of Malopolska-based entities was therefore 
achieved.  
Most of the support (77%) was directed at micro-enterprises and was predominantly 
investment capital (91% of the loans and guarantees). The rest included working capital 
for enterprise development. Despite the lack of data, support was estimated as being for:  
x manufacturing, 50%; followed by  
x trade and basic services, 30%; and  
x other services, 20%.  
Knowledge about the type of enterprises and/or investment projects supported is very 
limited so there is no assessment of achievement of the goal ± increasing 
competitiveness and innovativeness. 
The FIs provided external finance for 287 SMEs up to the end of 2014, and 1,915 are 
expected by the end of 2015, which is 75% above the OP target. FI support led to loans 
and guarantees for SMEs of at least EUR 7.1 million. This is above the OP target of EUR 
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5.5 million. By the end of 2015, this value is expected to increase up to 8 times to EUR 
48.9 million.  
By the end of 2014, 162 jobs had been created, which is around 20% of the target for all 
PA2 and matches the ERDF allocation to FIs of 21%. However, monitoring of jobs created 
by FI final recipients started only in 2012; therefore the reported value may 
underestimate the actual achievement. Measuring cost-effectiveness of different FIs is 
greatly distorted by shortcomings in reporting (underestimating jobs created, no 
turnover or Gross Value Added figures). The cost of one additional job varies within the 
loan instruments between EUR 45,000 and 300,000, with an average of over EUR 
100,000, which is twice as much as the cost of an additional job in non-repayable 
support for SME investment (EUR 41,000). 
The size of each individual fund does not seem to determine its effectiveness or its cost-
efficiency. Although the 11 loan instruments (total fund size EUR 18.75 million) appear to 
be very small on average (below EUR 2 million each) they do not show a positive 
correlation between fund size and management cost or fund size and job creation. 
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6.10.16 Portugal 
FIs have been used in Portugal for delivering ERDF investments since the 1994-1999 
programming period. Responsibility for OP programming lies principally at the national 
level. In the 2007-2013 programming period, of the nine Portuguese ERDF OPs, five 
contain FIs. The Government decided not to offer FIs within OPs for the three 
Convergence Regions in Mainland Portugal (Norte, Centro and Alentejo). The 
beneficiaries from these Regions are covered by the Thematic Factors of 
Competitiveness OP. None of the ESF OPs contain FIs. Venture capital and equity is the 
most important form of support in the five OPs, followed by guarantees. Venture capital 
and equity funds offer non-repayable support in the form of advice, management support 
and networking. No support is offered for guarantee funds. 
Table 37: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Portugal in the 2007-
2013 period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Thematic Factors of Competitiveness'  28 599.0 367.1 10.3 176.3 271.4 280.4 103.3 6,988
OP 'Algarve'   4 45.8 14.0 15.1 10.1 33.1 12.8 38.6 146
OP 'Azores'   7 27.3 23.5 8.1 - 16.2 2.4 14.7 2
OP 'Lisbon'   9 40.4 16.8 11.4 12.6 20.0 25.7 128.5 1,012
OP 'Madeira'   3 8.6 7.3 8.8 0.0 3.6 5.0 140.6 1,420
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6.10.17 Case Study OP COMPETE  
In 2007, a favourable socioeconomic context prevailed in Portugal. However, this rapidly 
changed with the 2008 economic crisis that had a deep impact on the Portuguese 
economy. Companies found themselves facing liquidity issues at the same time as 
funding constraints were being imposed by the banking system. Credit was scarce and 
expensive. From 2009 to 2012, the amount of credit available to companies fell by nearly 
20% and interest rates more than doubled. 
It was under this changing background that the COMPETE - Competitiveness Factors 
Operational Programme ± of the National Strategic Reference Framework (QREN) was 
developed and implemented. There was an evident need for new financial schemes 
related to risk capital and Business Angels which would promote investment in 
technology and start-up companies as well as facilitate access to credit for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including those managed by women and young 
people.  
This motivated public intervention through COMPETE, which led a centralised financing 
process to improve efficiency in SME financing. 
COMPETE is an OP with an ERDF allocation of EUR 3.2 billion and a total volume of EUR 
5.6 billion. Its broad array of objectives aims to improve the overall competitiveness of 
WKH3RUWXJXHVHHFRQRP\LQDOORI3RUWXJDO¶VFRQYHUJHQFHUHJLRQV 
The FIs under scrutiny 
One of the five support schemes under this OP, SAFPRI, deals with FIs and has 
approximately EUR 367 million in ERDF allocation. In total, EUR 600 million has been 
committed to the FI. The main objective of PA 3 is to ensure that the financial 
environment provides conditions for companies to be established, to grow, to consolidate 
and internationalise. 
There are the six specific VC schemes, two finance lines for Business Angels (FLBA) and 
two funds offering loans and guarantees. The VC instruments were assigned to 23 
different funds. 
These 27 FIs within COMPETE include instruments for SME equity and SME debt 
reinforcement. For own-equity reinforcement, the VC funds were divided into six 
categories: 
x Innovation and Internationalisation (10 funds); 
x Corporate (2 funds); 
x Early Stage (4 funds); 
x Pre-Seed (3 funds); 
x Revive (3 funds); and 
x Audiovisual (1 fund). 
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Finance Lines for Business Angels (FLBA) was managed through 51 Business Angels 
vehicle entities. For debt, there were two credit lines: Finance Line for Investe QREN; 
and PME Investe I and II.  
With the exception of Investe QREN, all other 26 FIs implemented within COMPETE were 
under the HF FINOVA.  
Only half of the ERDF money allocated to FI was disbursed by the end of 2014. However, 
approximately two thirds of the specific fund money was invested in final recipients. The 
credit line funds and FLBA performed well, with nearly all the money allocated and 
around three quarters invested in final recipients. 
Goals and theory of change (ToC) 
The rationale for introducing FIs was the low level of entrepreneurship in Portugal and 
WKH µFUHGLW FUXQFK¶ WKDW KLW WKH FRXQWU\ DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU 60(V LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI WKH
financial crises of 2008. The FIs developed within COMPETE were designed to overcome 
the limitations of SME financing in Portugal. 
The implicit ToC assumes that  
(a) a centralised strategy with strong coordination of support efforts through one 
HF will deliver a quantitatively satisfactory output;  
(b) widening the spread of specific FIs will help cover the needs for sectoral and 
development stage support, including an increase in the start-up rate for 
technology based SMEs; and  
(c) the SMEs will show increasing interest in the new FIs, leading to a sustainably 
improved supply in the financial market.  
It was expected that 5,000 SMEs would be supported by 2015, 33% in an initial stage of 
maturity; and 30% in growth potential sectors.  
The FIs had clearly different profiles, minimising the risk of overlapping activities. 
Portugal was one of the Member States fostering synergies between FIs and other 
instruments such as grants. The loan and guarantee scheme INVESTE systematically 
combined credit lines with non-repayable grants. In addition, subsidised loans are 
frequently combined with guarantees. 
Management and implementation of FIs 
COMPETE is the Managing Authority (MA) under which SAFPRI and FINOVA HF are 
implemented. The FINOVA HF is managed by PME Investimentos that manages the six 
VC fund categories, FLBA and the PME Investe I and II credit lines.  
The 23 VCF are managed by thirteen different fund managers, selected by public 
procurement procedure. Most managers operate only one of the funds; some manage 
multiple FIs, such as Portugal Ventures S.A., a publicly owned VC company managing 
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seven funds. PME Investe I and II management was directly assigned to IAPMEI (Public 
Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation) and Turismo de Portugal.  
There is a strong mix of managers, reflecting private/public ownership and different 
professional backgrounds. 
The selection process involved 11 tender notices from 2008 to 2013. The first VCF was 
set-up at the end of 2010 and the latest in August 2013 (VCF Revive), three years after 
the launch of the respective tender. 
There does not seem to be a difference between the management of VCFs run by private 
or public managers. FI activities are governed in both cases by the same specifications of 
the scheme. This also applies to success factors and performance linked incentives. 
Incentives are linked to performance, using management fee reduction for low 
performance and later on (for Revive) index remuneration to the number of applications 
to the VCF. According to COMPETE, management fees were generally around 1.8%, 
below the target maximum of 2.5% (for 2015).  
Of the 123 projects in which the VCFs invested, approximately 10 have already been 
closed. No precise picture of closed deals, prognosis of future exits or future performance 
of individual VCFs can be provided at this time. The end date for all VCFs is set for 2020. 
One of the main implementation challenges, however, was the temporary discontinuation 
of funding from the EC due to a lack of guaranteed adequate management checks on 
expenditure. This also caused some delays. 
Monitoring and evaluation of FIs 
Performance of the FI is monitored with four indicators, measuring (a) the quality of VC, 
(b) the extent of financing oriented toward sectors with growth potential, (c) guarantees 
to SMEs and (d) management cost. Achievements have exceeded targets for all the 
LQGLFDWRUVH[FHSWIRUµJXDUDQWHHVWR60(V¶.  
Reporting to fund managers and COMPETE appears to be well designed. It varies 
according to the type of instrument and is monthly, quarterly or semi-annual. For 
example, most VCFs provided quarterly reports, while the VCFs under Revive, due to 
their complexity, provided monthly reports.  
One evaluation was carried out in 2013 for the COMPETE OP in which the FIs received a 
positive rating, although some had not fully started operating at the time. 
Outcomes of FI implementation 
Attracting private money to supplement ERDF funding was a key element for fund 
managers. The total private contribution in the various FIs was approximately EUR 232 
million, more than half of the committed resources from the OP. In comparison to other 
06¶23V Oeverage has been modest, in particular for VC. This may be due to a lack of 
information of co-investment at the level of the final recipient. The data only refers to 
money coming from the EU and national sources covered by the OP. 
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No revolving effect has been seen or reported up to now. Sustainability of the funds can 
only be assessed after all the VCFs and Business Angels have exited from their 
investments. 
ThUHHRIWKHIRXU3$SHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUVZHUHDFKLHYHG7KLVLQFOXGHVWKHµ4XDOLW\RI
9&¶LQGLFDWRUZKHUH(85PLOOLRQZDVLQYHVWHGLQQHDUO\60(VEHLQJLQDQ
initial stage.  
About half of the funding was for SMEs in growth potential sectors, achieving the 
indicator target. Furthermore, the guarantees to SMEs indicator shows over 3,300 SMEs 
supported through credit lines. 
SMEs that received support were in different phases of their development cycle, and 
operating across 13 different sectors such as business services, paper and publications or 
education, health and culture. 
The second policy objective related to facilitating access to credit for SMEs, particularly 
those managed by women and young people. A significant number of SMEs were 
supported. However, there was a lack of investment in these by some VC funds. There is 
also incomplete information on support to female and young entrepreneurs.  
Consistency of implementation was mainly ensured by conditions in the funding 
agreements for each FI and respective fund manager. These conditions included 
comprehensive, time-related reporting obligations. However, some of the operational 
objectives were not covered by the monitoring system, such as support for female or 
young entrepreneurs.  
The number of VCFs (as compared to other Member States) seems high, yet appears 
adequate considering that diversity of FIs was an explicit objective. The reason for 
splitting these instruments into 23 funds, with some VCFs being as small as EUR 1.5 
million, raises the question of optimal size. Since the smaller funds did not exhibit a 
higher proportional management cost, the scale may not be a cost issue, but rather a 
problem of reaching the right recipients. In addition, it should also be considered that 
some managers operated several different FIs. 
A total of 621 jobs were created during implementation within PA 3. 
The FIs provided funds to SMEs in different stages and with different projects, some with 
high risk, which private equity entities may have been unwilling support. 
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6.10.18 Spain 
Spain does not have a long tradition of using ERDF FIs, as grants have been the main 
way WRVXSSRUW60(¶VXQGHUWKH236LQFHDQGGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWKHILQDQFLDODQG
banking crisis, lack of access to finance for micro and SMEs, as well as operating 
advantages (frontloaded certification of investments and public deficit recording) 
encouraged some authorities to plan and develop a limited number of FIs. In spite of 
this, regional authorities and central government have used FIs in guarantee funds, 
venture capital and private equity funds, and loan funds. These are mostly managed by 
regional development agencies and funded from the regular government budget. 
Therefore the use of ERDF for FIs was very limited in the 2007-2013 period. Most 
schemes use loans and guarantees. Two OPs use loans, guarantees and venture capital. 
Both venture capital schemes support seed and expansion stages of company 
development. There is little combination with grants. Non-financial support is also not 
generally provided. Only JEREMIE Barcelona offers networking support for its targeted 
recipients. Despite this, some FI support is provided for firms which are taking part in 
other supporting schemes, like technological parks. In such cases, the FI is linked to a 
general strategy of SME development in the region. 
Table 38: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in Spain in the 2007-2013 
period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Extremadura'   2 18.9 15.1 12.3 0.0 24.6 13.8 56.1 0
OP 'Andalusia'   3 379.8 304.0 61.4 0.0 378.8 130.3 34.4 63
OP 'Catalonia'   1 50.0 25.0 11.6 0.0 50.0 21.2 42.3 3
OP 'Canary Islands'   2 40.0 34.0 59.7 0.0 40.0 1.2 3.0 2
OP 'Research, Development and Innovation 3 527.0 411.0 28.3 0.0 527.0 123.9 23.5 860
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6.10.19 Case Study OP Technological Fund  
The Technological Fund Operational Programme (OP) provides extra funding for research, 
technological development and innovation (RTD&I). The current budget has been 
decreased to less than EUR 3 billion. 
The Specific Objectives (SOs) of the Technological Fund OP were matched with the 
National 6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\6WUDWHJ\RIWKURXJK62µWRSURPRWHLQQRYDWLYH
EXVLQHVV EHKDYLRXU¶ DQG 62 µWR VXSSRUW 5	' LQ FRPSDQLHV¶ IRU WHFKQRORJLFDO
GHYHORSPHQW7KHVHREMHFWLYHVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGHVVHQWLDOIRUERWKµFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV¶DQG
µFRQYHUJHQFH¶Uegions, especially the latter, due to growing regional disparities.  
Although it was not compulsory, the Spanish government distributed 70% of funds to 
Convergence regions, which account for only 27% of enterprises.  
Financial Instruments (FIs) were not considered at the beginning in the OP but were 
added only subsequently. After reprogramming during the implementation phase, 18% of 
the OP allocation (EUR 411 million) should be delivered through the FIs managed by 
Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (Centro para el Desarrollo 
Tecnológico Industrial) (CDTI) and Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO): 
x the small volume ICO Guarantee Fund 
x the medium volume CDTI Loan Fund and 
x the large volume ICO Loan Fund. 
All of them are under Priority Theme 7 (PT-7 µ,QYHVWPHQW LQ ILUPV GLUHFWO\ OLQNHG WR
UHVHDUFK DQG LQQRYDWLRQ¶ 7KH WRWDO DOORFDWLRQXQGHU 37-7 (national funding + ERDF) is 
EUR 527 million of which 100% is under FI management. Both ICO88 and CDTI89 
previously addressed project investment needs and had experience with ERDF co-
financed operations. 
Neither the OP documents nor the Intermediate Body officials (Ministry of Finance, CDTI) 
indicated a clear need to implement FIs at the beginning. In addition, there was no 
intervention logic specifically for FIs.  
However, there was a market gap as a result of the financial crisis. The contraction of 
bank credit to Spanish companies was at its worst in 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, 
µSXEOLFSROLF\ZRUULHV¶LQFUHDVHGLQUHODWLRQWR5	'	,LQYHVWPHQWDQGVPDOODQGPedium-
sized enterprise (SME) development. Strengthening the policies of corporate R&D 
investment was considered essential during the crisis. From 2007 to 2013, the number of 
technologically innovative companies decreased by more than 50%. The OP logically 
changed and included FIs. 
                                          
88 Instituto de Crédito Oficial is a state-owned bank, attached to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Competitiveness. 
89 CDTI is a public business entity, answering to the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, which 
encourages technological development and innovation in Spanish companies. It is the entity that channels 
the funding and support applications for national and international R&D&I projects of Spanish companies. 
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There is a clear distinction between the FIs, with each having different target groups and 
projects. Product differentiation between fund managers helps, with each FI having 
different objectives, roles and responsibilities.  
x The ICO Guarantee Fund focuses on long-term R&TD activities, mainly through 
collaborative projects. 
x The CDTI Loan Fund focuses on short-term acquisition and implementation of new 
technologies and technological innovation by companies. 
x The ICO Loan Fund focuses on supporting innovative enterprises with difficulties 
accessing credit to develop projects. 
However, geographical segmentation of funding was identified as a problem from the 
start, since there was a high concentration of resources in Convergence regions where 
there are fewer innovative companies and many similar funds (mainly non-repayable aid) 
are funnelled through regional OPs. Another concern was uncertainty over European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) regulation. This was not adequately reviewed at the 
beginning, and led to uncertainty over the definition and over how the funding 
agreement was to be implemented.  
In addition, it is worth remembering that most traditional banks do not usually finance 
investment projects related to R&D. These projects can have greater risk, often with a 
very long payback period. It is important to understand that public intermediaries were 
selected as fund managers because no financial institution was interested in offering 
these kinds of guarantees. 
A strong motivation to include FIs was also related to absorption problems at the 
beginning of the OP implementation. Almost all Annual Implementation Reports (AIRs) 
UHSRUWHGFRQFHUQVDERXWDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHµ1GH-FRPPLWPHQWUXOH¶90 during 2012 and 
2013. Thanks to FIs, the de-commitment rule was not implemented in 2012. 
By the end of 2014, the small-volume ICO Guarantee Fund had a disbursement rate of 
more than 312%, almost reaching the multiplier ratio of 3.5 defined in the funding 
agreement. The medium-volume CDTI Loan Fund disbursed almost 35% of allocated 
funds. The large-volume ICO Loan Fund was established at the end of 2013 but only 1%, 
or EUR 4.29 million, had been disbursed by the end of 2014.  
The Technological Fund OP has always struggled with absorption rates due to: 
x a high concentration of funding in convergence regions; 
x difficulties in finding final recipients for R&D corporate investment in Convergence 
regions; 
x competition between national and regional OPs to find suitable beneficiaries for 
R&D projects; 
x economic slowdown; 
                                          
90 ³7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQVKDOODXWRPDWLFDOO\GHFRPPLWDQ\SDUWRIDFRPPLWPHQWZKLFKKDVQRWEHHQ
settled by the payment on account or for which it has not received an acceptable payment application by 
the end of the second year following the year of commitment 
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x budgetary problems in Spanish public administrations. 
FI implementation required many meetings between each fund managers and the 
Managing Authority (MA) to understand the requirements and procedures. In addition, it 
took around six months to adapt software to a monitoring and management system that 
would meet FI needs, which were very different from other ERDF or national 
requirements. Clear economies of scale applied to FI set-up and management since each 
fund manager managed individual FIs based on existing capabilities. Furthermore, this 
case study found that public bodies tend to reduce management costs when possible. 
The lack of a specific FI monitoring system within the OP is considered a big gap. There is 
no defined framework and no targets, so outcomes have been difficult to assess. The MA 
does not follow guidance from the Committee of the Coordination of Funds (COCOF), so 
information in AIRs is not as useful as it could be. However, all the FIs reported that 756 
projects were implemented and more than EUR 310 million of public investment (ERDF + 
public funds) has been committed with EUR 272 million already disbursed. Additionally, 
each FI developed with different degrees of success.  
x The ICO Guarantee Fund started supporting operations in 2010 and since then 
692 projects have benefited. Final recipients were mainly manufacturing 
companies, professional services (primarily engineering) and ICT companies. This 
is in line with R&D investment at European Union level. 
x The CDTI Loan Fund has approved 157 projects, of which 53 have already 
received support. In this case, the main recipients have been manufacturers. 
x The ICO Loan Fund has only supported 11 companies. Paper companies and other 
manufacturing industries, wholesale trade, ICT, professional organisations, 
scientific and technical sectors benefited the most. 
Most of the companies were SMEs, although 20% were big companies. During the crisis, 
only strong institutions were able to carry out R&D investment. CDTI focuses on industry, 
which explains its beneficiaries. 
7KH23¶VVWUDWHJLFREMHFWLYHVWKDWZHUHOLQNHGWRDOO),VVHHPLQOLQHZLWKUHDOLQWHUYHQWLRQ
logic. However action cannot be linked to changes. A context analysis of science and 
technology development shows that almost all the indicators have worsened since the 
beginning of the period. However, there are several fields that have had slower 
deterioration.  
There are indications (but no evidence) that the ICO Guarantee Fund and CDTI Loan 
Fund will be able to achieve some of their specific and strategic objectives. These two FIs 
seem to have worked consistently in relation to their intervention logic. 
It is unlikely that the ICO Loan Fund will meet its objectives. 
The MA has stated that since the 2007-2013 period has not yet finished, the current FIs 
cannot be considered successful until the winding-up is completed. Additionally, exits 
from existing investments are very uncertain. 
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An important motivation for setting up FIs is to attract private resources. However, 
estimates show that only minimal private money was attracted to FIs. There is a lack of 
reliable data in particular for the ICO Guarantee Fund. It seems the leverage effect is far 
below expectations. Internalisation of the CDTI Loan Fund based on an existing financial 
product has shown a clear decline in private participation. The ICO Loan Fund was only 
recently established and has not grown quickly. Data from the 11 projects that have 
already been financed shows that co-investment reached 135%. 
The only evidence for revolving public money comes from the ICO Guarantee Fund. Here 
the ratio between funds available for investment and original fund volume is 3.1 (below 
the target of 3.5). The other two FIs only started recently, so repayments are limited. 
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6.10.20 United Kingdom  
The UK has co-financed financial instruments in ERDF programmes since the 1994-99 
programme period and has a lengthy tradition of using FIs within domestic SME support 
SROLF\$OORIWKH8.¶V(5')2Ps, except Gibraltar, offer support through FIs.   
The programming and management of OPs is carried out by separate ERDF managing 
DXWKRULWLHV IRU HDFK RI WKH 8.¶V FRQVWLWXHQW FRXQWULHV VR WKHUH DUH GLIIHUHQW managing 
authorities for England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar. Different 
approaches are taken to funding priorities and implementation arrangements within 
each. There are 21 funds under seven co-financed Holding Funds for enterprise support 
in the UK, with varying numbers of funds underneath each. There are about 25 other 
specific funds offering support for enterprises that are not under Holding Funds. Most of 
WKH ),V LQ WKH 8.¶V 'HYROYHG $GPLQLVWUDWLRQV of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
cover the entire country. There are also funds restricted to the territory of a regional OP 
within the Devolved Administration (e.g. the Highland Business Growth Fund, Highlands 
and Islands ERDF OP). The FIs co-financed under the English ERDF OPs are all regional.   
FIs co-financed by UK ERDF OPs offer loans, including micro-finance, and equity. 
Guarantees are not used (but there is a longstanding domestic SME guarantee scheme). 
Equity schemes offer broad coverage with support for early/ seed/ start-up phases; and 
a number are flexible enough to cover all stages and offer different forms of support 
(loans, equity, quasi equity or mezzanine financing) based on requirements. State aid is 
generally covered under the General Block Exemption Regulation, particularly for equity 
instruments, with several instances of notified aid. 
The provision of non-financial support alongside the FI is more common for equity FIs. 
These offer conventional advice, management support and seminars, as well as a 
number of innovative measures, such as matching young entrepreneurs with more 
experienced mentors (Venture Capital Fund, North West England ERDF OP), or the 
provision of incubator premises (Mercia Venture Capital Fund, West Midlands ERDF OP). 
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Table 39: OP key figures on FIs for enterprise support in UK in the 2007-2013 
period (end 2014) ¼P 
 
Source: European Commission (2015) Summary Report on Financial Instruments, own calculation 
Legend: 
x Number of FIs in the OP 
x OP contributions committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [27] 
x ERDF amounts committed to the fund (HF or specific fund) [28b] 
x The importance OPs give to FI as a form of enterprise support presented as % of total ERDF 
committed for enterprise (28b/total ERDF allocation per OP)  
x The attraction of private resources (though limited to the OP level) presented through the national 
private co-financing committed to the fund [30] 
x The progress made from commitments in the OP to disbursements to FI presented as OP contributions 
paid to the fund (HF or specific fund) [7]   
x The progress to disburse funds to the end-user (= final recipient) presented as OP contributions 
invested in final recipients [17]  
x % of OP contributions paid to the fund invested in final recipients (17/7) 
x Number of transactions at end-user level presented as Total # of financial products offered to final 
recipients [12] 
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OP 'Highlands and Islands of Scotland'  3 12.7 5.1 7.5 0.0 10.7 9.5 89.0 35
OP 'West Wales and the Valleys' 2 104.9 52.5 13.9 52.5 104.9 95.4 90.9 332
OP 'Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly'  2 5.1 3.8 1.6 0.0 5.1 7.5 145.9 121
OP 'Lowlands and Uplands of Scotland'  5 299.7 89.5 35.8 82.5 218.6 116.9 53.5 1,035
OP 'South-East of England'  1 4.4 2.2 15.2 - 4.4 1.0 23.7 24
OP 'Northern-Ireland'  1 16.0 8.0 4.6 8.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 36
OP 'East of England'  2 24.8 24.8 28.6 0.0 24.8 16.2 65.3 30
OP 'North East of England'  9 167.9 64.6 30.7 71.3 167.9 144.7 86.2 771
OP 'London'  2 22.9 11.4 12.4 7.9 21.4 16.1 75.5 30
OP 'West Midlands'  6 79.8 28.7 12.6 41.5 67.6 56.8 84.0 241
OP 'North West England' 13 206.9 103.4 21.5 99.2 206.9 148.0 71.5 591
OP 'Yorkshire and The Humber'  7 203.4 84.4 26.7 95.0 156.6 151.4 96.7 1,750
OP 'East Midlands'  1 5.5 2.2 0.9 0.0 4.8 2.4 49.8 24
OP 'South West England'  3 8.5 4.3 4.5 0.0 8.5 10.1 118.4 336
OP 'East Wales'  2 65.5 20.8 48.4 28.3 65.5 61.9 94.5 242
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6.10.21 Case Study OP North East England 
The North-East region has long been one of the weakest regions of the UK in economic 
terms. In large measure this is the legacy of past dominance then decline of heavy 
industry ± especially shipbuilding, coal and steel. In addition, the physical make-up of the 
region means that it is relatively isolated from other major population centres (such as 
the agglomerations surrounding Leeds in Yorkshire & Humberside and Manchester in the 
North-West, both of which are much larger in population and economic terms and which 
have significantly more developed local financial markets). The population of the North-
East is just 2.5 million, most of which live in urban areas although the geography of the 
region is such that much of it is rural and some of it remote. At the start of the 2007-
2013 programme period regional GVA was around 80% of the UK average and the North-
East had the highest proportion of workless households in the UK ± 23%, compared to 
the UK average of 17%. The North-East has a longstanding enterprise deficit ± the OP 
noted that the region had 266 businesses per 10,000 population, compared with the 
English average of 394; this means that some 29,500 extra businesses would be needed 
to bring the North-East to this level.  
Against this background, the North-East OP was driven by two priorities: enhancing and 
exploiting innovation (with a provisional allocation of EUR 402 million ± including both 
ERDF and national resources); and business growth and enterprise (provisional allocation 
EUR 327 million). Importantly, the volume of ERDF funding was small compared to those 
under the domestic Regional Economic Strategy (RES) and this was an important 
consideration in the use of financial instruments to help deliver the programme ± there 
was a desire to make the most of limited funds and to create a legacy for re-investment 
in the region.  
The OP SWOT identified the business financial services market as a weakness in the 
region and improving access to finance was seen as making an important contribution to 
the headline targets in the Regional Economic Strategy, which included creating 18,500-
22,000 new businesses. The OP was aligned with domestic strategy but sought ways to 
DGGYDOXHDQGSURYLGHDµWUDQVIRUPDWLYHHIIHFW¶ 
Financial instruments were an important part of this strategy in the 2007-2013 
programme ± they account for over 20% of ERDF allocations in the OP. The overall 
purpose was to stimulate the establishment and expansion of businesses with growth 
potential, to stimulate the demand for business finance and to provide related business 
support to improve the survival of supported businesses. 
,QSUDFWLFDOWHUPVWKLVZDVLPSOHPHQWHGWKURXJKD(85PLOOLRQPLOOLRQµIXQG
RIIXQGV¶)LQDQFHIRU%XVLQHVV1RUWK(DVW)%1(FRPSULVLQJDVXite of seven individual 
µSURGXFW IXQGV¶ )%1( ZDV VWUXFWXUHG WR VXSSRUW DOO GHYHORSPHQW SKDVHV RI 60(V LH
proof of concept (PoC), start-up and spin-out activity; early stage growth; and expansion 
and growth. Although relevant to SMEs in most sectors, there was specific targeting of 
UHVRXUFHV WR PHHW WKH 23¶V VWURQJ IRFXV RQ LQQRYDWLYH DQG WHFKQRORJ\-oriented SMEs; 
and to a lesser extent, start ups and existing SMEs in disadvantaged areas. A one-year 
extension to the end of 2015 brought additional resources, bringing the total FBNE 
volume to EUR 154.47 million (£142.5 million). In addition to this suite of funds under 
FBNE, the Creative Content Fund (CCF) was established as a pilot fund of EUR 5.22 
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million (£4.8 million), to test a model for private investment in the commercial creative 
sector on a pari-passu basis. 
By the end of 2014, 92% of the OP allocation had been committed to FBNE and invested 
in firms. The CCF had invested all its available funds by end of 2012. 
In looking at recent experience with FIs in the North-East, it is important to note that 
North East England had prior experience, through both EU and domestic funding sources, 
in implementing a series of individual funds from proof of ion counts each concept (the 
first non-grant based PoC fund in the UK) to co-investment and microloans. This 
experience was actively used in the design of instruments for 2007-2013. With the 
introduction of a holding fund model, FBNE was intended to achieve better integration 
and a more strategic approach, as well as ensure the EIB financial contribution to the 
fund (the EIB loan was for EUR 68 million (£62.5 million)). North East Finance (NEF) was 
created as the Holding Fund Manager, drawing experienced individuals from previous FIs 
LQWKHUHJLRQ7KHVHYHQµSURGXFWIXQGV¶ZHUHGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHDFRQWLQXXPRIILQDQFH
for SMEs and to attract more private investors to the region, with some overlap in fund 
objectives to generate competition among the Fund Managers (FMs) and to provide SMEs 
with an element of choice.  
The MA of the OP directly appointed NEF as the HF manager of FBNE, and Northern Film 
and Media (NFM HoldCo) as the HF manager for the Creative Content Fund.  
Five fund managers were selected to manage the seven FBNE product funds and the CCF 
by public procurement procedures. All fund managers are private companies experienced 
in financial management. Two of the selected fund managers were new to the region. 
Management fees for running the funds range from 1.85% to 4.95% per annum, 
resulting in a rather high proportion of OP contributions for management costs of the 
total OP contribution. Fund managers and the HF Manager claimed that the 
administrative burden associated with FBNE is far in excess of traditional grant schemes 
and also more than not co-financed instruments. 
A number of areas of good practice in management and implementation can be 
identified. In particular, FMs are given clear parameters for the operation of the funds; 
guidelines within Fund Management Agreements provide a set of mandatory (input and 
output) targets as well as a set of target economic development indicators. The Fund 
Managers are given flexibility within the product funds to select the appropriate mix of 
loan, quasi-equity and equity on a case-by-case basis. The Holding Fund Manager 
produces comprehensive quarterly and annual reports, providing a transparent overview 
of performance to the Board and stakeholders (including the MA). 
During the programme period, external events changed the economic and operational 
context for the Funds. First, the financial crisis and economic recession had implications 
both for the supply of finance (e.g. banks reduced lending considerably, private investors 
were more cautious about co-investing) and the demand for finance from firms (attention 
focused on survival rather than growth).  
Second, the change of UK Government in 2010 led to the abolition of the Regional 
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Development Agencies in England (the RDAs had delegated MA powers for management 
and implementation of the regional ERDF programmes in England for the first part of the 
2007-2013 period) and the closure of key business support agencies such as Business 
Link. During the latter part of the programme period, a new economic development 
architecture was gradually put in place, with the introduction of two Local Enterprise 
Partnerships in North East England, bringing new strategic drivers to the implementation 
of ERDF (notably a focus on the geographical distribution of funds), as well as the 
introduction of new domestic instruments at the national and regional levels. 
A series of market reviews, as well as a comprehensive JEREMIE review in 2013, re-
assessed the positioning and fit of FBNE within the context of the market and other 
interventions. The 2013 review found that the Fund was performing well and had been 
able to adapt to the changes that had taken place; thus no major revisions to the 
operation of FIs were recommended.  
The achievements of the FBNE model are reflected in: 
x a governance and management system that is perceived to function well, and 
high levels of expertise; 
x continued high levels of applications to the FBNE funds (with an overall conversion 
rate of applications to investments of 6:1); 
x the number of SMEs assisted and average investment volume, which are both on 
target; 
x the financial health of the portfolio (defaults, returns etc), which is broadly in line 
with the planned profile; 
x and economic indicators (c.3,800 jobs created/safeguarded, £138 million 
leverage) which are also broadly on target.  
In addition, once the EIB loan has been fully repaid (scheduled for 31 December 2016), 
all further returns will form the basis of a Legacy Fund - after all loans, fees and costs are 
paid, the net legacy pot is expected to be in the region of EUR 110 million (£100 million), 
70% of the overall OP investment and close to 100% of ERDF plus public match. 
The main challenges for FBNE have been: 
x how to maintain EIB loan repayment targets for those funds which have mainly 
invested in the form of equity ± targets have been maintained, but there is 
evidence that the timing of some exits has been sub-optimal and driven by the 
requirement to supply funds to meet EIB repayments, rather than investment 
considerations; 
x how to overcome the challenge of a new spatial focus as the region was 
effectively split into two LEP areas, highlighting geographical disparities in the 
distribution of funds; 
x how to adjust to the reduction in private investment availability; 
x how to reposition funds in the light of new national initiatives that affected the 
competitiveness of FIs under the regional OP. 
In practice, the assessment of FIs in this case study suggests that there has been 
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sufficient flexibility and experience to respond to these challenges. The holding fund 
VWUXFWXUH IDFLOLWDWHG WKH DELOLW\ WR µULJKW VL]H¶ IXQGV based on performance and market 
conditions and adjustments to targets or the involvement of private investors enabled 
the FIs to respond to changing market conditions. At the same time, however, the 
relatively large number of funds within the holding fund has incurred additional 
management costs; this seems likely to lead to a rationalisation of FIs in 2014-20.  
Additional data, beyond the main performance indicators required by the OP, has been 
collected to monitor the performance of the funds. The performance is good in relation to 
creation of new start-ups, survival rates, outcomes in disadvantaged areas and for 
women. However, a wider set of indicators could better demonstrate the economic 
impacts of the funds.  
:KLOHQRIRUPDOµ7KHRU\RI&KDQJH¶ZDVHOaborated for FIs when the OP was written, the 
enhanced intervention logic which can be developed retrospectively appears sound. It is 
also important to recognise that FIs under the North East England OP were not developed 
in a vacuum, but drew on considerable experience and lessons learned in the previous 
period and from domestic policy. Overall, FBNE has contributed well to the objectives of 
the OP. It has fulfilled a key objective of the OP (as well as the domestic Regional 
Economic Strategy and associated Access to Finance Strategy) in building a 
comprehensive regional revolving fund, and developing the private investment 
community and capacity of the North East. Its focus on supporting technology and 
innovation tied in with Priority 1 objectives, while other funds covered the broad business 
stock, enabling start-ups and growth in non-priority sectors. 
The Creative Content Fund has been less successful, with poor returns and a high failure 
rate. However, the CCF was launched as a two-year pilot fund precisely to trial an 
innovative approach ± offering a co-investment model in the creative sector. Indeed, 
Fund Managers argue that, given more time, the CCF would have improved performance. 
Nevertheless, the pilot was not renewed and there are no plans for further co-funded FIs 
for this sector in 2014-2020. Indeed, some commercial creative projects have been 
funded under the FBNE.  
Roughly EUR 150 million have been secured at deal level from public and private sources, 
leading to an overall leverage ratio of 4.95 which is relatively evenly distributed across 
the different funds. Even the Microloan Fund had a leverage factor of 3.1 (according to 
EC definition). The major part of these financial means levered in is private. 
Output performance is measured in terms of SMEs receiving financial assistance and 
average investment volume per SME. The first indicator is broadly met by most product 
funds except for the microloan fund (55% of the target achieved to end 2014). The 
average investment volume amounts to EUR 136,000 and is somewhat below the set 
profile, in particular concerning the Technology Fund and the Accelerator Fund. 
With 1,953 new jobs created and 2,803 jobs safeguarded, the employment effect of the 
FIs is significant in the region ± and to three quarters located in disadvantages areas. 
Based on the volume of applications, the conversion of applications to approvals, the 
pace of approvals and the anticipated timely exhaustion of funds at the end of 2015, it 
can be concluded that the scale of the FBNE was appropriate. Arguments can be made 
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for a rationalisation of product funds, e.g. simplification of offer, avoiding driving down 
the value generated by investments (by limiting overlap between funds), generating 
more competition between fund managers with respect to fee rates at the procurement 
stage. 
Without ERDF, access to finance instruments could have been developed only at a greatly 
reduced level. There would have been a loss of the ability to provide a continuum of 
finance across the funding lifecycle. Leverage of private money into the region could not 
have been achieved at the targeted level without ERDF. 
Plans are underway for an ERDF co-funded Fund of Funds in the 2014-2020 period in the 
North East, although it will not be launched directly after FBNE 1 completes its 
implementation period at the end of 2015. It is hoped to continue the HF model, which 
has worked well in this period. To save administration costs, a smaller number of funds 
are foreseen, and it is likely that there will be no specific sectoral funds. 
6.11 Management costs and fees by FI in the case study OPs  
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Operational 
Programme(s) 
Management costs 
and fees (annual %) 
Type of financial 
product 
CZ Credit Fund E 2007, Praha 2007CZ161PO004 0.00 loans 
CZ Guarantee Fund E 2007, Praha 2007CZ161PO004 0.00 mixed 
DE BayBG Bayerische Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, München 2007DE162PO001 1.22 vc 
DE Clusterfonds EFRE Bayern GmbH & Co. KG, Landshut 2007DE162PO001 0.73 vc 
DE LfA Förderbank Bayern, München 2007DE162PO001 0.11 loans 
DE S-Refit EFRE Fonds Bayern GmbH, Regensburg 2007DE162PO001 1.75 vc 
ES CDTI-INNOVA 2007ES16UPO001 0.00 Mixed 
ES ICO-CDTI-GARANTÍAS 2007ES16UPO001 0.13 guarantees 
ES ICO INNOVACIÓN-FONDO TECNOLÓGICO 2007ES16UPO001 0.00 loans 
FR  FONDS DE PARTICIPATION JEREMIE LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON 
/ FRANCE 2007FR162PO013 1.16 HF 
FR  Prêt d'honneur - Capital-risque - Garantie en Languedoc-
Roussillon 2007FR162PO013 2.14 Mixed 
LT Guarantee fund, Lithuania, Vilnius 2007LT161PO002 0.99 guarantees 
LT INVEGA FUND, VILNIUS 2007LT161PO002 0.12 HF 
LT First Loss Portfolio Guarantee (AB Siauliu bankas, Lithuania) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 guarantees 
LT First Loss Portfolio Guarantee for Leasing (SIA Unicredit Leasing 
Lithuanian Branch Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 guarantees 
LT First Loss Portfolio Guarantee (Nordea Bank Finland Plc, 
Lithuania) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 guarantees 
LT Funded Risk Sharing Product (AB SEB bankas) 2007LT161PO002 0.57 loans 
LT Funded Risk Sharing Product (AB Siauliu bankas) 2007LT161PO002 0.89 loans 
LT Funded Risk Sharing Product (AB Swedbank) 2007LT161PO002 0.71 loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (AB bank Citadele, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (AB bank FINASTA, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (AB DnB Bank, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT 2SHQ&UHGLW)XQG$%âLDXOLžEDQNâLDXOLDL 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (AS UniCredit Bank Lietuvos branch) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (BAB bank SNORAS, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT 2SHQ&UHGLW)XQG%$%ŹNLREDQN.DXQDV 2007LT161PO002 0.00 Loans 
LT Open Credit Fund (UAB Medicinos bank, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT Small loans to SMEs (AB bank Citadele, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
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Operational 
Programme(s) 
Management costs 
and fees (annual %) 
Type of financial 
product 
LT 6PDOOORDQVWR60(V$%âLDXOLžEDQNâLDXOLDL 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT 6PDOOORDQVWR60(V%$%ŹNLREDQN.DXQDV 2007LT161PO002 0.00 Loans 
LT Small loans to SMEs (UAB Medicinos bank, Vilnius) 2007LT161PO002 0.00 loans 
LT JER 004 JEREMIE HOLDING FUND, LITHUANIA 2007LT161PO002 2.37 HF 
LT Business Angels Co-investment Fund I KUB Vilnius, Lithuania 2007LT161PO002 3.89 vc 
LT LitCapital I KUB Vilnius, Lithuania 2007LT161PO002 3.84 vc 
LT Lithuanian SME Fund KUB, Vilnius, Lithuania 2007LT161PO002 3.50 vc 
LT Practica Seed Capital KUB, Vilnius Lithuania 2007LT161PO002 3.55 vc 
LT Practica Venture Capital KUB, Vilnius Lithuania 2007LT161PO002 2.85 vc 
HU VENTURE FINANCE HUNGARY PLC (MV ZRT.), BUDAPEST 2007HU161PO001 0.23 HF 
HU Abaúj Takarék Takarékszövetkezet, Forró 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU AGRIA Bélapátfalva Takarékszövetkezet, Bélapátfalva 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Aktív Hitel, Nyírmeggyes 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Alapítvány a Vidék Kis- és Középvállalkozásainak Fejlesztésére 
Baranya Megyei Vállalkozói Központ, Pécs 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Alföld-)DNWRULQJ3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Szeged 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Alliance Jura-+RQJULH.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODSNH]HOĘ=UW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Alsónémedi és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Alsónémedi 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Arteus Credit Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU $;213pQ]J\LpV/t]LQJ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Szolnok 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 
Bács-Kiskun Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Kecskemét 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Bak és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Bak 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Balmazújváros és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Balmazújváros 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Békés Megyéért Vállalkozásfejlesztési Közhasznú Közalapítvány, 
Békéscsaba 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU %*)LQDQFH=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU %RKHPLDQ)LQDQFLQJ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Bóly és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Bóly 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
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Operational 
Programme(s) 
Management costs 
and fees (annual %) 
Type of financial 
product 
HU %RQLWiV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Budapest Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU %XGD5HJLRQiOLV%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ 0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%L 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
HU &DSLWDO+LWHOKi]=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
HU Carion Ingatlanfinanszírozási Centrum Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Central-)XQG.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU CIB Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU City-)DNWRU3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Commerzbank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Core Venture Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU CORRIGIA Pénzügyi Szolgáltató Zrt., Pécs 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU &5(',7,0(3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU DBH Investment Kocki]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU DEBT-INVEST Pénzügyi Szolgáltató és Befektetési  =iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Dél-Dunántúli Takarék Szövetkezeti Hitelintézet, Kaposvár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 'LQDPR9HQWXUHV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU DRB Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Bank Zrt., Siklós 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Dunapataj és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Dunapataj 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU 'XQD7DNDUpN%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ*\ĘU 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Eger és Környéke Takarékszövetkezet, Eger 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU (OVĘ(JHUV]HJL+LWHO3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Zalaegerszeg 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU (OVĘ+LWHONDSX3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0~N|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU (OVĘ0DJ\DU.7.=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU (QGUĘGpV9LGpNH7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW*\RPDHQGUĘG 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
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HU ÉRB Észak-magyarországi Regionális Bank Zrt., Tokaj 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Mixed 
HU Erste Bank Hungary Nyrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Észak Tolna Megyei Takarékszövetkezet, Iregszemcse 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU (XURWUDGH&DSLWDO3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Kisigmánd 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU )HOVĘ]VROFDpV9LGpNH7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW)HOVĘ]VROFD 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU )+%.HUHVNHGHOPL%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]Ypnytársaság, 
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU ),1$7(&+&DSLWDO.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 VC 
HU ),1(;767$583.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU )L[+LWHO3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Fókusz Takarékszövetkezet, Jászszentlászló 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU )ĘQL[7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW'HEUHFHQ 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Fontana Credit Takarékszövetkezet, Szeged 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Forrás Takarékszövetkezet, Veszprém 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Gádoros és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Gádoros 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Garangold Investment BefektHWĘ=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Garantiqa Hitelgarancia Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU *%	3DUWQHUV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 VC 
HU *5È1,7%DQN=iUWN|UHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Gran Private Equity Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Green Credit Finance Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Gyöngyös-Mátra Takarékszövetkezet, Gyöngyös 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Debrecen 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Hajdú Takarék Takarékszövetkezet, Debrecen 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Hatvan és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Hatvan 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU HemLVSKHUH.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
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HU 
Heves Megyei Vállakozás -és Területfejlesztési Alapítvány, Eger 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Hévíz és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Hévíz 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Hitelpont Pénzügyi SzolgálWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Hungária Takarék, Bonyhád 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU ,Q+ROG3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, 
Szolnok 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Jász Takarékszövetkezet, Jászberény 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU .DHURXV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=UW0DJYHWĘ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU .DHURXV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-kezelĘ=UW1|YHNHGpVL%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU KA-VOSZ Vállalkozásfejlesztési Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU KDB Bank (Magyarország) Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU .HUHVNHGHOPLpV+LWHOEDQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Kéthely és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet/Bank, Marcali 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU .LQL]VL%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ9HV]SUpP 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Kisalföldi Vállalkozásfejlesztési AlapítYiQ\*\ĘU 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Kiskun Takarék (Kiskunfélegyházi Takarékszövetkezet), 
Kiskunfélegyháza 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Kis-Rába menti Takarékszövetkezet, Beled 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU .RPSOH[)DNWRU.|YHWHOpVNH]HOĘ=UW%XGDSHst 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Körmend és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Körmend 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Környe-Bokod Takarékszövetkezet, Környe 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Kunszentmárton és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Kunszentmárton 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU LMGL-,19(67)$&725,1*3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU /|YĘpV9LGpNH7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW/|YĘ 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 0DJQHWLVVLPR3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
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HU 0DJ1HW0DJ\DU.|]|VVpJL%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU 0DJ\DU+LWHO.|]SRQW3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Magyar-0LNURKLWHOH]Ę.|]SRQW3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Magyar Vidék Hitelszövetkezet, Pécs 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Magyar Záloghitel Faktoráló és Pénzügyi Szolgáltató Zrt., 
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Mecsek Takarék, Mecseknádasd 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Merkantil Váltó- és VagyonEHIHNWHWĘ%DQN=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU 0LNURILQDQV]tUR]y3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 0,.52+,7(/*D]GDViJIHMOHV]WĘ3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU MKB Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Mohácsi Takarék Bank Zrt., Mohács 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU 0RUDQGR.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU MVG Magyar Gazdaság- pV9iOODONR]iVIHMOHV]WĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Nagykáta és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Nagykáta 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 1+%1|YHNHGpVL+LWHO%DQN=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
HU Nógrád Megyei Regionális Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, 
Salgótarján 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 273%DQN1\LOYiQRVDQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Pannon 2005 FaktoUpV+LWHO=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 3DQQRQ)LQDQFH3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
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HU Pannonhalma és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Pannonhalma 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU 3DQQRQ+LWHO3pQ]J\L=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Pannon Takarék Bank Zrt., Komárom 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU PARTISCUM XI Takarékszövetkezet, Szeged 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 3È75,$7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW*\|PUĘ 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 3%*)0&7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU 3(5,21.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Pest Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, *|G|OOĘ 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 3/$7,1,803pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Polgári Bank Zrt., Polgár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 3RUWIR/LRQ.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Primom Szabolcs-6]DWPiU%HUHJ0HJ\HL9iOODONR]iVpOpQNtWĘ
Alapítvány, Nyíregyháza 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 3ULPXV.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Rábaközi Takarékszövetkezet, Csorna 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 5DLIIHLVHQ%DQN=iUWN|UHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Rajka és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Rajka 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Rakamaz és Vidéke Körzeti Takarékszövetkezet, Rakamaz 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Régió Finansz Pénzügyi Zrt., Salgótarján 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 5HJLRQiOLV)HMOHV]WpVL)LQDQV]tUR]y=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Rétköz Takarékszövetkezet, Kisvárda 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 5LYHU)DFWRULQJ3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|G|
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Rónasági Takarékszövetkezet, Fülöpszállás 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Sajóvölgye Takarékszövetkezet, Kazincbarcika 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Sárbogárd és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Sárbogárd 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Savaria Takarékszövetkezet, Szombathely 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
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HU 6EHUEDQN0DJ\DURUV]iJ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Somogy Megyei Vállakozói Központ Közalapítvány, Kaposvár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Somogy Takarék Szövetkezet, Nagyatád 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 6RSURQ%DQN%XUJHQODQG=iUWN|UHQ0ĦN|GĘ5pV]YpQ\WiUVDViJ
Sopron 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU SZABOLCS Takarékszövetkezet, Nyíregyháza 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Szatmár-Beregi Takarékszövetkezet, Fehérgyarmat 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Széchenyi István Hitelszövetkezet, Zalaegerszeg 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
HU Széchenyi Kereskedelmi Bank Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Székesfehérvári Regionális Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, 
Székesfehérvár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Szentesi Hitelszövetkezet, Szentes 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Szentgál és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Szentgál 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 6]HQWOĘULQF-2UPiQViJ7DNDUpNV]|YHWNH]HW6]HQWOĘULQF 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Szigetvári Takarékszövetkezet, Pécs 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Terra &UHGLW3pQ]J\L6]ROJiOWDWy=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Tiszafüred és Vidéke Takarékszövetkezet, Tiszafüred 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 7LV]iQW~OL(OVĘ+LWHOV]|YHWNH]HW'HEUHFHQ 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU Tisza Takarékszövetkezet, Tiszaföldvár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 7ĘNHSDUWQHU.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-.HOH]Ę=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Tolna Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Szekszárd 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt., Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 mixed 
HU 9DORU&DSLWDO.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU 
Vas Megye és Szombathely Város Regionális 
Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Vállalkozói Központ, 
Szombathely 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 9HQWXULR.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘ
Részvénytársaság, Budapest 2007HU161PO001 0.00 vc 
HU Veszprém Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Veszprém 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU 9LU3D\)LQDQFLDO*URXS=iUWN|UĦHQ0ĦN|GĘRészvénytársaság, 
Mosonmagyaróvár 2007HU161PO001 0.00 Loans 
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HU X-9HQWXUHV$OSKD.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ=UW%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 VC 
HU X-9HQWXUHV%pWD.RFNi]DWL7ĘNHDODS-NH]HOĘ%XGDSHVW 2007HU161PO001 0.00 VC 
HU Zala Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány, Zalaegerszeg 2007HU161PO001 0.00 loans 
HU Zirci Takarékszövetkezet, Zirc 2007HU161PO001 0.00 guarantees 
PL )XQGXV]SRUĊF]HQLRZ\*DOLFMDGODSU]HGVLĊELRUFyZ]VHNWRUD0ĝ31RZ\6ąF] 2007PL161PO010 0.77 guarantees 
PL )XQGXV]3RUĊF]HĔ.UHG\WRZ\FK0DáRSROVNLH,QZHVW\FMH7DUQyZ 2007PL161PO010 0.71 guarantees 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\$JHQFML5R]ZRMX0DáRSROVNL=DFKRGQLHM6$
prowadzony przez ARMZ S.A. w Chrzanowie 2007PL161PO010 0.79 loans 
PL 
)XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\GODSU]HGVLĊELRUFyZSRV]NRdowanych w 
Z\QLNXNOĊVNĪ\ZLRáRZ\FKG]LDáDMąF\ZUDPDFK7DUQRZVNLHM
Agencji Rozwoju Regionalnego S.A. w Tarnowie 2007PL161PO010 1.37 loans 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\)XQGDFML5R]ZRMX5HJLRQX5DEND1RZHLQZHVW\FMHZ0DáRSROVFH5DEND=GUyM 2007PL161PO010 2.62 loans 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\)XQGDFML5R]ZRMX5HJLRQX5DEND5R]ZyM7XU\VW\NLZ0DáRSROVFH5DEND-Zdrój 2007PL161PO010 2.29 loans 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\-DQRVLN)XQGDFMLQDU]HF]5R]ZRMX
Polskiego Rolnictwa w Warszawie 2007PL161PO010 1.00 loans 
PL FunduV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\.OĊVNLĩ\ZLRáRZH5DEND=GUyM 2007PL161PO010 1.47 loans 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\2GEXGRZD6WRZDU]\V]HQLD6DPRU]ąGRZH&HQWUXP3U]HGVLĊELRUF]RĞFLL5R]ZRMXZ6XFKHM%HVNLG]NLHM 2007PL161PO010 1.31 loans 
PL )XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\6NDZD- StowDU]\V]HQLD6DPRU]ąGRZH&HQWUXP3U]HGVLĊELRUF]RĞFLL5R]ZRMXZ6XFKHM%HVNLG]NLHM 2007PL161PO010 1.28 loans 
PL 
0DáRSROVNL)XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\GODPLNURPDá\FKLĞUHGQLFK
SU]HGVLĊELRUFyZGRWNQLĊW\FKNOĊVNDPLĪ\ZLRáRZ\PLOXELQQ\PL
zdarzeniami nadzwyczajnyPL0DáRSROVNLHM$JHQFML5R]ZRMX
Regionalnego S.A. w Krakowie 2007PL161PO010 0.89 loans 
PL 
0DáRSROVNL)XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\GODSRĪ\F]HNXG]LHODQ\FKZ
UDPDFKIXQGXV]XGRILQDQVRZDQHJR]0DáRSROVNLHJR5HJLRQDOQHJR
Programu Operacyjnego, Kraków 2007PL161PO010 1.22 loans 
PL 0DáRSROVNL5HJLRQDOQ\)XQGXV]3RUĊF]HQLRZ\GODSRUĊF]HĔ
udzielanych w ramach MRPO, Kraków 2007PL161PO010 0.38 guarantees 
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PL 0LNUR)XQGXV]3RĪ\F]NRZ\&HQWUXP%L]QHVX0DáRSROVNL=DFKRGQLHM6S]RRZ2ĞZLĊFLPLX 2007PL161PO010 2.54 loans 
PT FINOVA - FUNDO DE APOIO AO FINANCIAMENTO À INOVAÇÃO - 
PORTO 2007PT161PO001 0.37 HF 
PT 16132 - FCR Portugal Ventures Internacionalização - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.23 vc 
PT 16133 - FCR Beta Ciências da Vida - Maia 2007PT161PO001 0.59 vc 
PT 16134 - FCR ASK Celta - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.41 vc 
PT 16135 - FCR Capital Criativo I - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.31 vc 
PT 16136 - FCR ES Ventures Inovação e Internacionalização - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.11 vc 
PT 16137 - FCR Portugal Ventures Indústrias Criativas - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.49 vc 
PT 16140 - FCR Portugal Ventures Early Stages - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.67 vc 
PT 16141 - FCR Minho e Internacionalização - Braga 2007PT161PO001 0.08 vc 
PT 16142 - FCR Novabase Capital Inovação & Internacionalização - 
Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.48 vc 
PT 16143 - FCR Patris Capital Partners - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.72 vc 
PT 16144 - FCR PME Turismo Inovação - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.15 VC 
PT 16145 - FCR PME/BES - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.34 vc 
PT 16146 - FCR Critical Ventures I - Coimbra 2007PT161PO001 0.62 vc 
PT 16147 - FCR Portugal Ventures Biocant - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.69 vc 
PT 16149 - FCR ASK Capital - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.46 vc 
PT 16152 - FCR Portugal Ventures Universitas - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.80 vc 
PT 16154 - FCR Portugal Ventures Acelerador de Comercialização de 
Tecnologia II - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 2.82 vc 
PT 16155 - FCR Istart I - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.24 vc 
PT 16156 - Linha de financiamento a investidores em capital de 
risco (Business Angels) 2007PT161PO001 0.00 vc 
PT 16159 - FCR Fast Change II - Porto 2007PT161PO001 0.56 vc 
PT 32822 - FCR REVITALIZAR NORTE - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 1.18 vc 
PT 32823 - FCR REVITALIZAR CENTRO - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.28 vc 
PT 32824 - FCR REVITALIZAR ALENTEJO - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.69 vc 
PT 40764 - LINHA DE FINANCIAMENTO A OPERAÇÕES 
DESENVOLVIDAS POR BUSINESS ANGELS 2007PT161PO001 0.00 vc 
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Operational 
Programme(s) 
Management costs 
and fees (annual %) 
Type of financial 
product 
PT 4574 - Linhas de Crédito PME Investe I e II 2007PT161PO001 0.00 mixed 
PT 5734 - Fundo Especial de Investimento - FICA - Lisboa 2007PT161PO001 0.00 vc 
PT Linha de Crédito Investe QREN, Porto 2007PT161PO001 0.00 Mixed 
UK 
FINANCE FOR BUSINESS NORTH EAST (UK), NORTH EAST 
FINANCE (HOLDCO) LTD, 1 ST JAMES GATE, NEWCASTLE UPON 
TYNE, NE1 4AD, UK 2007UK162PO005 3.05 HF 
UK 
NE Accelerator Fund, Northstar Equity Investors Limited (t/a 
Northstar Ventures), 5th Floor, Maybrook House, 27-35 Grainger 
Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 5JE 2007UK162PO005 3.12 vc 
UK NE Angel Fund, Rivers Capital Partners Limited, 34 Moor 
Crescent, Gosforth, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE3 4AP 2007UK162PO005 3.99 vc 
UK NE Growth Fund, NEL Fund Managers Limited, Akenside Studios, 
3 Akenside Hill, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 3UF 2007UK162PO005 2.34 vc 
UK NE Growth Plus Fund, FW Capital Limited, Oakleigh House, 14-16 
Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3DQ 2007UK162PO005 1.99 vc 
UK 
NE Micro Loan Fund, Tyne & Wear Enterprise Trust Ltd (t/a 
Entrust), Portman House, Portland Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, 
NE2 1AQ 2007UK162PO005 5.93 loans 
UK 
North East Proof of Concept Fund, Northstar Equity Investors 
Limited (t/a Northstar Ventures), 5th Floor, Maybrook House, 27-
35 Grainger Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 5JE 2007UK162PO005 3.95 vc 
UK North East Technology Fund, IP Group Plc, 24 Cornhill London 
EC3V 3ND 2007UK162PO005 3.27 vc 
UK North East Creative Content Fund, Level 10, Baltic Place West, 
South Shore Road, Gateshead, NE8 3AE 2007UK162PO005 0.00 mixed 
Source: 2015 Summary report data ; own calculation 
Note: In order to calculate the annual average management costs and fees on basis of the 2015 Summary Report the total management costs and 
fees paid to the fund are divided by OP contributions to the relevant FIs, then divided by the lifetime of the relevant FIs. 
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